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**The Role of Turkey in the
2015 NPT Review Conference**

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Introduction¹

The opening paragraph of the 2012 Wilton Park conference report “Global Constituencies in the NPT Regime: How to Build Consensus for 2015?” underlines that states from several groups and coalitions, based on their capabilities and interests, try to shape the nuclear nonproliferation regime mainly during NPT Review Conferences. A good understanding of their interactions can provide guidance to reach agreement in the future.

The NPT is the cornerstone of the nonproliferation regime, which rests on three mutually reinforcing pillars: nuclear nonproliferation, nuclear disarmament, and peaceful use of nuclear energy. Under “the non-proliferation-energy nexus” section, the report highlights that there is an intense debate on nuclear energy within the NPT forum. The core of the debate is the interpretation of Article IV, which often meets resistance from the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) states concerning hindrances to peaceful use based on concerns about proliferation.

NPT Review Conferences (RevCons) appear to be the only opportunity to re-interpret the Treaty’s provisions. This paper inquires whether Turkey can be an important actor in the 2015 RevCon and whether it can play a critical role in the efforts to build consensus on its major themes of nuclear disarmament, peaceful use of nuclear energy, the establishment of a weapons of mass destruction (WMD) free zone in the Middle East, and the closure of proliferation loopholes.

Turkey is an active member of the Non-proliferation and Disarmament Initiative (NPDI), which was established to advance the consensus outcomes of the 2010 NPT RevCon. The NPDI has presented several working papers and statements in NPT Preparatory Committees (PrepComs) regarding WMD free zone in the Middle East, nuclear security, transparency, disarmament, education, Additional Protocol, safeguards, etc.²

An international regime consists of many elements, such as international organizations, international law, multilateral agreements, groups, and initiatives. Initiatives like the NPDI fulfill an important role in the international nuclear nonproliferation regime, because it is a “middle power” initiative. Its members are: Australia, Canada, Chile, Germany, Japan, Mexico, Nigeria, the Netherlands, the Philippines, Poland, Turkey, and the UAE. Middle powers are significant actors in establishing and sustaining knowledge and understanding of norms on a certain issue owing to their status in the international community. As such, Turkey is a middle power that has bolstered its status in

¹ This research has been funded with support from the “The William and Flora Hewlett Foundation”. The views expressed in this report are entirely the authors’ own and not those of The William and Flora Hewlett Foundation.

² “Nonproliferation and Disarmament Initiative,” *NTI*, <<http://www.nti.org/treaties-and-regimes/non-proliferation-and-disarmament-initiative-npdi/>>.

international forums with its recent record of political and economic reforms and its active foreign policy. For this reason, this paper will also evaluate Ankara's willingness to play an active role leading to and during the 2015 NPT RevCon.

International Organizations and Regimes: What is an International Regime?

Traditional International Relations theories argue that the international system is anarchic, that is, there is no government over and above states to regulate their relations. Thus, their behavior is defined by the motivation to survive, as their primary interest. To ensure that, they seek power, which is military power to defend themselves and to deter potential or actual threats to their security. In this anarchical system, every state relies on its own power, that is, international relations is a self-help system. Eventually, states are in constant struggle for power. The assumptions of this strand of theories are that humans are by nature, selfish, hence there is no morality in international affairs.³ Therefore, even when states cooperate, such as in a military alliance, it will be short-lived: As soon as the threat disappears, the alliance will dissolve. Cooperative behavior is not likely due to the high possibility of cheating and the problem of "relative gains" (At least one party will gain more than the other as a result of cooperation, so one of them will be at a disadvantage although both parties gain from cooperation).⁴

As opposed to Realism and Neo-Realism, Liberal theories argue that international relations is a social realm, and states can form an international community, and can regulate their relations by international law, rules and organizations. They develop interdependencies which decrease the utility of war in inter-state relations. Liberal theories assume that humans are open for progress and change. According to Neo-liberal Institutionalism, cooperation between states is possible and long-lasting, because they will have something to gain from cooperation. Furthermore, there will be less of a possibility of cheating than Realists argue, because states will benefit from cooperation, law and organizations with respect to problem-solving. Hence, they will be less likely to cheat in order not to lose the trust of others and their seats in repetitive cooperative endeavors.⁵ This theory emphasizes the role of international organizations and institutions.

³See Classical Realist scholars: Thucydides, *Thucydides: History of the Peloponnesian War*, Rex Warner tr., Baltimore, MD: Penguin Classics, 1972; Niccolo Machiavelli, *The Prince*, trans. Peter Bondanella and Mark Musa, New York: Oxford University Press, 1984. Thomas Hobbes, *Leviathan*, Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1985.

⁴ See Joseph Grieco, "Anarchy and the Limits of Cooperation: A Realist Critique of the Newest Liberal Institutionalism," *International Organization* Vol.42, No. 3, 1988, pp. 485-507.

⁵ For the "neo-neo debate". See Robert O. Keohane, "Institutionalist Theory and the Realist Challenge After the Cold War," Center for International Affairs, Harvard University, Working Paper no. 92-7; and Joseph M. Grieco,

Another strand of liberalism is regime theory. Stephen Krasner defines an international regime “as sets of implicit or explicit principles, norms, rules, and decision-making procedures around which actors’ expectations converge in a given area of international relations.”⁶ It suggests that states not only cooperate with and form international institutions, but they also focus on issues of common concern and consistently strive to adopt new rules, norms, and form new institutions. Therefore, their behavior becomes predictable, like a river regime, in which the flow of the river has a certain pattern and volume.

States adopt norms and they adapt national legislation to these norms. In fact, Krasner underlines that “[p]rinciples and norms provide the basic defining characteristics of a regime.”⁷ Gradually, compliance with these norms and rules becomes part of a state’s identity. Generally, this identity is the guarantee or indicator of being a member of a group and provides ideational power through status and prestige.

The most notable example of an international regime is the nuclear nonproliferation regime. It rests on the norm of nuclear non-proliferation, that is, that the proliferation of nuclear weapons is a threat to international peace and security. The main elements of the regime are: the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT), the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG), Zangger Committee, Conference on Disarmament (CD), the Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty (still being negotiated), and nuclear-weapon-free zones. The NPT embodies the main principles of the regime, and the CTBT bans all nuclear explosions as an arms control and nonproliferation measure. To address the proliferation threat from the supply side, The Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty is negotiated to limit the available fissile material. The NSG controls the exports of material and technology that are related to the development of nuclear weapons. Nuclear-weapon-free zones are regional initiatives to prevent proliferation. As the threat of terrorists using weapons of mass destruction (WMD) became a top security issue in the wake of the 9/11 attacks, the first decade of the 21st century produced new treaties and regulations that were appended to the regime, such as the International Convention on the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism (ICSANT), the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material (CPPNM) and its

“Understanding the Problem of International Cooperation: The Limits of Neoliberal Institutionalism and the Future of Realist Theory,” Paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, Chicago, 3-6 September 1992.

⁶ Stephen D. Krasner, “Structural Causes and Regime Consequences: Regimes as Intervening Variables,” *International Organization*, Vol. 36, No. 2, International Regimes, Spring 1982, p. 186.

⁷ *Ibid*, p. 187.

2005 Amendment, the SUA Convention and its 2005 Protocol, UNSCR 1540, Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI), NPDI and Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism (GICNT).

The NPT and Review Conferences

The NPT is the basis of the nuclear nonproliferation regime and it rests on the mutually reinforcing pillars of nuclear non-proliferation, nuclear disarmament, and peaceful use of nuclear energy. This structure in its entirety forms the nuclear nonproliferation bargain. The Treaty distinguishes between members as nuclear-weapon states (NWS) and non-nuclear-weapon states (NNWS). The first group includes countries that have detonated a nuclear device prior to January 1, 1967, namely China, France, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States. These states pledge not to transfer nuclear weapons to non-nuclear-weapon states (Article I), and the latter pledge not to receive them (Article II). Articles III and IV are complementary, regulating the peaceful use of nuclear energy. Article IV gives the right to NNWS "...to develop research, production and use nuclear energy for peaceful purposes..."⁸ Under Article III, these states accept the safeguards of the IAEA, which is tasked with verifying compliance with the Treaty to prevent the diversion of nuclear energy from peaceful to military use.⁹

Article III

1. Each non-nuclear-weapon State Party to the Treaty undertakes to accept safeguards, as set forth in an agreement to be negotiated and concluded with the International Atomic Energy Agency in accordance with the Statute of the International Atomic Energy Agency and the Agency's safeguards system, for the exclusive purpose of verification of the fulfilment of its obligations assumed under this Treaty with a view to preventing diversion of nuclear energy from peaceful uses to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. Procedures for the safeguards required by this Article shall be followed with respect to source or special fissionable material whether it is being produced, processed or used in any principal nuclear facility or is outside any such facility. The safeguards required by this Article shall be applied on all source or special fissionable material in all peaceful nuclear activities within the territory of such State, under its jurisdiction, or carried out under its control anywhere.

Article IV

⁸ Article IV of the Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), <<http://www.un.org/en/conf/npt/2005/npttreaty.html>>.

⁹ Article III of the NPT.

1. Nothing in this Treaty shall be interpreted as affecting the inalienable right of all the Parties to the Treaty to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes without discrimination and in conformity with Articles I and II of this Treaty.

The second pillar is nuclear disarmament, which is covered in Article VI.

Article VI

Each of the Parties to the Treaty undertakes to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament, and on a treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control.¹⁰

These three pillars complement each other and uphold the Treaty and its goals.

The NPT was originally conceived to be of limited duration when it entered into force in 1970,¹¹ In 1995, in the Review and Extension Conference, the NPT was extended indefinitely. This was a breakthrough for the regime, because it not only showed that states benefitted from the mechanisms of the NPT, but also affirmed their commitment to nonproliferation goals. One of the important issues of the conference was the nuclear capability of Israel, which is not party to the Treaty. The Resolution on the Middle East indicated that Arab states consented to the extension of the Treaty on the condition that the regional states and nuclear-weapon states would work to free the Middle East of nuclear weapons as well as other weapons of mass destruction.¹²

...The Resolution, which was co-sponsored by the depositary States (Russian Federation, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and United States of America), is an essential element of the outcome of the 1995 Conference and of the basis on which the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons was indefinitely extended without a vote in 1995...¹³

¹⁰ Article VI of the NPT.

¹¹ Article X/2 of the NPT.

¹² The Resolution on the Middle East, NPT/CONF.1995/32/RES/1, New York, 17 April-12 May 1995; 2000 Review Conference Final Document, NPT/CONF.2000/28 (Parts I and II), p. 17. Also See the Address of the League of Arab States to the 2010 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, New York, May 28, 2010, p. 4, <http://www.un.org/en/conf/npt/2010/statements/pdf/arabstates_en.pdf >.

¹³ 2000 NPT Review Conference Final Document, NPT/CONF.2000/28 (Parts I and II), p. 17.

However, the Middle East Resolution was set aside in the following RevCons until the 2010 Review Conference, where the three depository states-Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States-reiterated their commitment to pursuing the goals of the Resolution. Despite efforts to implement the goals of the Middle East Resolution, the conference has yet to take place.¹⁴

The Significance of NPT RevCons

Article VIII, paragraph 3 of the NPT states that:

Five years after the entry into force of this Treaty, a conference of Parties to the Treaty shall be held in Geneva, Switzerland, in order to review the operation of this Treaty with a view to assuring that the purposes of the Preamble and the provisions of the Treaty are being realized. At intervals of five years thereafter, a majority of the Parties to the Treaty may obtain, by submitting a proposal to this effect to the Depository Governments, the convening of further conferences with the same objective of reviewing the operation of the Treaty.¹⁵

Before Review Conferences, Preparatory Committee (PrepCom) sessions are held. Review Conferences are the main fora for the State Parties to come together and put forward proposals in working papers. This provides a platform to discuss and to engage in interactions, which take place not only between nations but between regional groups and issue-based coalitions, like the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) and New Agenda Coalition (NAC).

The 2000 and 2010 RevCons can be deemed a success. The 2000 NPT RevCon produced the “13 Practical Steps” to implementing Article VI of the Treaty, one of which was the “...unequivocal undertaking by the nuclear weapon states [for] the total elimination of their nuclear arsenals.”¹⁶ The NAC was instrumental in including this point as one of the thirteen practical steps.¹⁷ The 2010 NPT RevCon was also a success, but only towards the end: There was a deadlock in the conference particularly about nuclear disarmament and the implementation of the Middle East Resolution.¹⁸ The

¹⁴ Mark Fitzpatrick, “Agenda setting for a Helsinki Conference on a Middle East WMD-free zone,” *IJSS*, May 14, 2014, <<http://www.ijss.org/en/politics%20and%20strategy/blogsections/2014-d2de/may-b015/wmd-free-zone-bbea>>; Elaine M. Grossman, “In Twist, Talks on Banning Mideast WMDs Shift to Geneva,” *NTI*, May 9, 2014, <<http://www.nti.org/gsn/article/twist-talks-banning-mideast-wmds-shift-geneva>>

¹⁵ Article VIII/3 of the NPT.

¹⁶ 2000 NPT Review Conference Final Document, NPT/CONF.2000/28 (Parts I and II), p.14.

¹⁷ Rebecca Johnson, *The 2000 NPT Review Conference: A Delicate, Hard-Won Compromise*, *Acronym Institute*, <[The 2000 NPT Review Conference: A Delicate, Hard-Won Compromise](#)>.

¹⁸ William Potter, Patricia Lewis, Gaukhar Mukhatzhanova, and Miles Pomper, “The 2010 NPT Review Conference: Deconstructing Consensus,” *CNS Special Report*, June 17, 2010, pp. 1-2.

failure of the 2005 NPT RevCon and the developments that undermined nonproliferation goals resulted in the perception that the regime was falling apart right before the 2010 NPT RevCon. In this sense, President Obama's speeches and U.S. actions regarding nuclear disarmament, arms control, and nuclear security were critical in addressing this perception.

Still, there were major differences between NWS, NNWS, and members of NAM, particularly in terms of nuclear disarmament and adherence to the Additional Protocol.¹⁹ The final document of the RevCon included a 64-point action plan not just to meet the goals for nuclear disarmament but also to address the two pillars of the Treaty, namely nuclear nonproliferation and peaceful use of nuclear energy. These steps included those for the physical protection of nuclear materials and facilities and called for all State Parties to ratify the 2005 amendment to the CPPNM as part of the growing emphasis on nuclear security.²⁰ This action plan came under the title "Conclusions and Recommendations" and only this section of the document received consensus support.²¹

Middle Powers and NAM

The Realist Theory of International Relations categorizes states as great and small powers. The Realist world is marked by the power struggle between great powers while small powers form balances of power or bandwagon.²² Middle powers are not as powerful as great powers, particularly in terms of military power, but they are capable of affecting their decisions, most notably through the decision-making process in international organizations. Middle powers are defined as "...politically and economically significant, internationally respected countries that have renounced the nuclear arms race."²³ They play a critical role in international politics both as followers and leaders.²⁴ The Middle Powers Initiative, established by seven international non-governmental organizations, aim at working with middle power governments affect NWS positions for disarmament.

¹⁹ibid., pp.2, 3.

²⁰"Conclusions and recommendations for follow-on actions," Final Document of the 2010 NPT Review Conference, NPT/CONF.2010/50 (Vol. I), June 18, 2010, New York, pp. 19-29, <[http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=NPT/CONF.2010/50%20\(VOL.I\)>](http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=NPT/CONF.2010/50%20(VOL.I)>); For further details on the remaining issues of 2010 RevCon, See William Potter et al., "The 2010 NPT Review Conference," 2010, at <[>](http://cns.miis.edu/stories/pdfs/100617_npt_2010_summary.pdf).

²¹ Potter et al., 2010, p. 1.

²²See Stephen M. Walt, *Origins of Alliances*, Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1987.

²³ Middle Powers Initiative, Official Website, <[>](http://www.middlepowers.org/about.html).

²⁴ Margaret P. Karns and Karen Mingst eds., *International Organizations: The Politics and Process of Global Governance*, 2nd. Edition, 2010, p. 16.

Middle powers influence the decisions and initiatives taken not only at the international but also the regional level. The soft power of these middle powers comes from their economic or regional influence stemming from their key resources, giving them the ability to affect bargaining and diplomatic processes. Their diplomatic power and economic influence as growing economies and major importers are strong enough to affect great powers and provide input into their decision-making processes. Some middle powers, such as South Africa, owe their influence to the prestige they gained through denouncing nuclear weapons, maintaining a peaceful nuclear program, and demonstrating commitment to the nuclear nonproliferation norm. As such, Brazil and Argentina chose to accede to the NPT as non-nuclear weapon states even though they had the capability to start weapons programs.²⁵

NAM

With 115 members, the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) represents the interests and priorities of developing countries. Its origins lie in the 1955 Bandung Conference, which convened the leaders of mainly former colonies in Africa and Asia. Its aim was to discuss common concerns and to develop joint policies in international relations.²⁶ India, Egypt, and Indonesia stressed common problems like “resisting the pressures of major powers, maintaining their independence, and opposing colonialism and neo-colonialism, especially Western domination.”²⁷

The first NAM conference in 1961 in Cairo elevated the membership of NAM from a regional commitment to a set of shared principles. Some of the middle powers of NAM are: Egypt, India, Iran, Malaysia, Pakistan, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, South Africa, Syria, Iraq, Tunisia, UAE, and Venezuela. The principal aims and objectives of non-alignment spelled out resistance to Western domination and colonialism and emphasized independence in national policies. NAM states were to support movements of national independence while not participating in multilateral or bilateral military alliances with great powers. Since it was the Cold War period, they were referring to the East-West conflict. Accordingly, NAM members were asked not to join in military alliances with or give military bases to either camp.²⁸

²⁵ Julio Carasales, “The Argentine–Brazilian Nuclear Rapprochement”, *The Nonproliferation Review*, Vol. 2, No. 3, 1995, pp. 39–48; Michael Barletta, “Democratic Security and Diversionary Peace: Nuclear Confidence-Building in Argentina and Brazil”, *National Security Studies Quarterly*, Vol. 5, No. 3, 1999, pp. 19–38.

²⁶ The Non-Aligned Movement: Description and History, <http://www.nam.gov.za/background/history.htm>

²⁷ Ibid.

²⁸ Ibid.

Since its establishment, NAM has prioritized having an independent path and avoided entanglement in the conflicts between major powers. There are three elements which influenced the approach of NAM members towards international issues:

- “-right of independent judgment,
- struggle against imperialism and neo-colonialism, and
- the use of moderation in relations with all big powers.”²⁹

The New Agenda Coalition (NAC) also deserves mention, as it is a coalition of middle power countries that came together mainly as a reaction to nuclear weapons tests by India and Pakistan in 1998, and which sought to put pressure on all countries with nuclear weapons to enforce nuclear disarmament. Its members include Brazil, Egypt, Ireland, Mexico, New Zealand, and South Africa. (Slovenia and Sweden were also members but then left.)³⁰ The NAC played a significant role in reaching the 13 practical steps of the 2000 RevCon, especially concerning the “unequivocal commitment of nuclear-weapon states for nuclear disarmament.”³¹

Towards the 2015 NPT Review Conference: The Peaceful Use Puzzle

The 2012 Wilton Park report foresaw that the 2015 RevCon would be difficult. Under the heading “The nonproliferation-energy nexus,” item 34 states that:

How the international community should think about peaceful uses of nuclear energy remains a heated debate within the NPT fora. Western states are driven by proliferation concerns and are challenged to be re-interpreting Article IV as restricting the export and even development of at least some forms of nuclear technology, especially enrichment and reprocessing. NAM states argue that peaceful applications should not be hindered by nonproliferation concerns. The only opportunities for re-interpreting the Treaty’s provisions remain the NPT Review Conferences. All past NPT Conferences underlined the indivisible and mutually reinforcing nature of the three pillars and the necessary absence of restrictions on nuclear technology acquisition.³²

²⁹ Ibid.

³⁰ Joint Declaration by the Ministers for Foreign Affairs of: Brazil, Egypt, Ireland, Mexico, New Zealand, Slovenia, South Africa and Sweden, (The "New Agenda" Coalition), June 9, 1998, http://www.ccnr.org/8_nation_declaration.html

³¹ Sharon Squassoni, “Grading Progress on 13 Steps Towards Disarmament,” CEIP Policy Outlook, 2009, p. 3.

³² Wilton Park Report, 2012, p. 6.

This section will look at the relationship between nonproliferation and the peaceful use of nuclear energy. Article IV is being differently interpreted by the developed Western nations and the developing nations. This receives reaction mainly from NAM, which takes resistance to Western domination as one of its main principles. It has also been argued that denial of critical technologies will introduce a new cluster of nations of “haves vs. have-nots.” Furthermore, such a situation may also be used as leverage in times of crisis.³³ This section will also present the position of NAM regarding assurance of supply (of nuclear technology and fuel). NAM’s approach to peaceful use is highly influenced by a critical view of the prevailing political and economic system. This paper argues that middle powers and their initiatives can play a crucial role in influencing great powers and other developed nations, even making decisions that would benefit developing nations that feel disadvantaged within the nonproliferation regime.

This study will tackle the Nonproliferation and Disarmament Initiative and Turkey’s potential role in it. Ankara, with strong ties to the West through its membership in European and transatlantic organizations, has also been developing strong bonds with developing nations in the Middle East, Africa, and Asia by taking advantage of common historical and religious ties. It also has nuclear power plant projects and is a country that advocates assurance of supply.³⁴ Therefore, Turkey can use its influence to contribute to mutual understanding, which could facilitate talks leading up to the 2015 RevCon.

The NAM position towards nuclear energy:

After 9/11 and particularly as a reaction to the activities of the A. Q. Khan network³⁵, there were proposals on limiting the transfers of uranium enrichment and reprocessing technologies to countries that were launching nuclear power programs for the first time. However, several countries opposed the proposal on not only commercial but also discriminatory grounds. This was a re-interpretation of Article IV and some parties to the Treaty interpreted this article to mean that as long as they were in good standing with the Treaty, they had the right to acquire full fuel cycle. The

³³ Interview with a Turkish Foreign Ministry Official, July 14, 2014.

³⁴ Turkish Representative’s statement, Record of the 1243rd Meeting of the IAEA Board of Governors, GOV/Or. 1243, June 18, 2009, Vienna.

³⁵ A.Q. Khan network is a non-state actor, which engaged in transferring nuclear material and technology from Pakistan to states of concern. For more information, See Christopher O. Clary, *The A.Q. Khan Network: Causes and Implications*, Master’s Thesis, Naval Post-Graduate School, Monterey, CA, December 2005.

United States argued otherwise, and this led to a debate in the Nuclear Suppliers Group of whether this would lead to subjective criteria.³⁶

The NAM strongly protested the denial of critical technologies at the IAEA Board of Governors and the NPT RevCon. They understood this position as one of discrimination and denial of the right to have peaceful use of nuclear energy, a right explicitly stated in the NPT. In the statement delivered by Argentina in June 2009 to the IAEA Board of Governors, NAM stated that:

The Group, in principle, reiterates its strong rejection of any attempts aimed to discourage the pursuit of any peaceful nuclear technology on the grounds of its alleged “sensitivity.”

The Group is of the view that any proposal for the assurance of supply should not be designed in a way that discourages States from developing or expanding their capabilities in the area of the nuclear fuel cycle, nor to hamper research and development and international cooperation in the field of peaceful nuclear activities. The Group reiterates that it is the *sovereign right*³⁷ of all States without discrimination to develop or expand their capabilities in the field of peaceful nuclear activities including the nuclear fuel cycle.

The Agency should not lose its main focus on promoting the peaceful uses of nuclear science and technology, including national fuel cycle capabilities, through national capacity building and transfer of technology. Any proposal which may contain any element that is not in full accordance with the IAEA Statute cannot be acceptable to the Group.³⁸

They also submitted a working paper during the 2010 NPT RevCon and recommended that “sensitivity” was not a criterion for denial of full fuel cycle.

Recommendation 42

To emphasize that the Treaty does not prohibit the transfer or use of nuclear equipment or material for peaceful purposes based on their “sensitivity”, and only stipulates that such equipment and material must be subject to full-scope IAEA safeguards.

³⁶ Fred McGoldrick, *Limiting Transfers of Enrichment and Reprocessing Technology: Issues, Constraints, Options*, Cambridge, Mass.: Project on Managing the Atom, Harvard University, May 2011, p. 21.

³⁷ Emphasis mine.

³⁸ Statement of the G-77 and China during the IAEA Board of Governors, 15-18 June 2009, delivered by Ms. Maria de los Milagros Donna Raballo, Charge d’Affaires, Permanent Mission of Argentina.

Recommendation 43

To reiterate that the issue of assurance of nuclear fuel supply is a very complex and multidimensional concept with technical, legal, commercial and economic implications. In order to reach a consensual conclusion, it is premature for this issue to be considered before extensive, comprehensive and transparent consultations are held. In this context, **to reject**, in principle, any attempts aimed at discouraging certain peaceful nuclear activities on the grounds of their alleged “sensitivity”; and **emphasize** that any ideas or proposals pertaining to the nonproliferation of any peaceful nuclear technology that are used as a pretext to prevent the transfer of such technology are inconsistent with the objectives of the Nonproliferation Treaty.³⁹

In the third session of the PrepCom for the 2015 NPT RevCon, Indonesia delivered a statement for NAM and underlined “the significance of full, effective, and non-discriminatory implementation of Article IV of the Treaty...”⁴⁰ NAM again used the phrase “sovereign right,” which referred to the NAM principle of non-discrimination and resistance to Western domination.

...each State party, has a sovereign right to define its national energy and fuel-cycle priorities, including the inalienable right to develop, for peaceful purposes, a full national nuclear fuel cycle...⁴¹

Thus, in their discourse, their definition of sovereignty referred to the independent decision-making capacity and opposition to the denial of full fuel-cycle by powerful states on the grounds that it is the “inalienable right” of non-nuclear-weapon states as stipulated in Article IV.

The Group firmly believes that hampering, fully or partly, the fullest exercise of the inalienable rights under Article IV of the Treaty, would seriously jeopardize the delicate balance between rights and obligations of States parties, in contravention with the Treaty’s object and purpose and would widen the gap between developed and developing countries in the field.⁴²

³⁹ Working Paper Submitted by the Members of the Groups of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, 2010 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons, April 28, 2010, NPT/CONF.2010/WP.46, p. 8.

⁴⁰ Statement by H.E. Dr. R. M. Marty M. Natalagawa, on behalf of the Non-aligned Movement States Parties to the Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons, at the General Debate of the Third Session of the Preparatory Committee for the 2015 Review Conference of the States Parties to the Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons, New York, 28 April, 2014, p. 3.

⁴¹ Statement of the Group of Non-Aligned Movement States Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, at the General Debate of the Third Session of the Preparatory Committee for the 2015 Review Conference of the States Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, New York, April 28, 2014, p. 3.

⁴² Ibid, p. 3.

According to NAM, the denial of this “inalienable right” fully or partly would endanger the nuclear nonproliferation bargain, because developed nations would gain more than others. Thus, cooperation only benefitted the powerful. The NAM strongly rejected restrictions and limitations on the peaceful use of nuclear energy:

The Group emphasizes that proliferation concerns are best addressed through multilaterally negotiated, universal, comprehensive and non-discriminatory agreements. (...) [S]uch arrangements must pursue and implement, without exception, the condition of adherence to the Treaty and to IAEA comprehensive safeguards as a condition for the supply to or cooperation with States not party to the Treaty.⁴³

The NAM underlined that the NPT was extended in 1995 in return for the promise that a zone free of weapons of mass destruction would be established in the Middle East and that they would continue to put pressure on this issue.

The Group strongly supports the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East, as a priority, and calls for the full implementation of the 1995 Resolution on the Middle East, **which is an integral and essential part of the package** of decision reached without a vote that **enabled the indefinite extension of the Treaty** in 1995. This Resolution remains valid until its objectives are achieved.⁴⁴

They expressed their deep concerns about the conference, which could not be convened even during the third PrepCom of the 2015 RevCon. They explicitly stated that failure to convene the conference would discredit not only the NPT but also the 2015 Review process, nuclear disarmament, and nonproliferation regime.⁴⁵

The NPDI and Turkey’s Potential Role in 2015 RevCon

One significant middle power initiative is the Nuclear Nonproliferation and Disarmament Initiative (NPDI). In 2008, Australia and Japan proposed the establishment of an international commission to reinvigorate international efforts to combat nuclear nonproliferation and disarmament in the context

⁴³ Ibid, p. 4. [Emphasis added]

⁴⁴ Ibid, p. 5.

⁴⁵ Ibid, p. 5.

of and following the 2010 NPT RevCon.⁴⁶ The NPDI followed the International Commission on Nuclear Nonproliferation and Disarmament (ICNND) to advance the consensus outcomes of the 2010 RevCon and the agendas of nuclear disarmament and nonproliferation.⁴⁷ The members of the initiative are Australia, Canada, Chile, Germany, Japan, Mexico, the Netherlands, Poland, Turkey and the UAE. Nigeria and the Philippines became members later. These countries underlined that nuclear disarmament strengthened the nuclear nonproliferation regime and listed steps on how to achieve it.⁴⁸ They also stated that the entry into force of the CTBT and the conclusion of the negotiations on a FMCT based on the Shannon Mandate were essential for disarmament. The practical steps endorsed by the 2010 NPT RevCon to convene a conference in 2012 on a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East were supported as was the conclusion and implementation of Comprehensive Safeguards Agreements and the Additional Protocol.⁴⁹ Although the NPDI is the newest of nuclear disarmament coalitions, it has been notably active during the period leading up to the 2015 RevCon.⁵⁰

The NPDI focuses on all three pillars of the NPT unlike other coalitions for nuclear policy, such as the Vienna Group or NAC. The founders of NPDI consciously sought to have regional diversity among the members of the group, but it could not prevent the fact that most of the group members were either NATO members or under U.S. extended nuclear deterrence. NPDI is not composed of like-minded members, particularly in terms of nuclear disarmament. Australia, Canada, Japan, and the Netherlands have led the drafting of NPDI statements and working papers. Thus, they can be said to form the core group.⁵¹

The members of the initiative support the peaceful use of nuclear energy to address climate change and energy security concerns. Last, but not least, the NPDI expresses commitment to cooperate to strengthen nuclear security against the threat of nuclear terrorism. Also, they are committed to the implementation of the conclusions and all 64 recommendations of the 2010 NPT RevCon under the four sub-headings of nuclear disarmament, nuclear non-proliferation, peaceful use of nuclear energy,

⁴⁶ International Commission on Nuclear Nonproliferation and Disarmament, <http://www.icnnd.org/Pages/default.aspx>

⁴⁷ Bill Potter and Gaukhar Mukhatzhanova, "Coalitions to Watch at the 2015 Review Conference," February 24, 2015, *NTI*, < <http://www.nti.org/analysis/articles/coalitions-watch-2015-npt-review-conference/> >.

⁴⁸ Joint Statement by Foreign Ministers on Nuclear Disarmament and Non-Proliferation, New York, 22 September 2010, < <http://www.dfat.gov.au/international-relations/security/non-proliferation-disarmament-arms-control/nuclear-weapons/Pages/joint-statement-by-foreign-ministers-on-nuclear-disarmament-and-non-proliferation.aspx> >

⁴⁹ *Ibid.*

⁵⁰ Potter and Mukhatzhanova, 2015.

⁵¹ *Ibid.*

and the Middle East.⁵² The NPDI submitted working papers in the 2012 PrepCom for the 2015 RevCon on issues including the Additional Protocol and transparency of nuclear weapons.⁵³ At the PrepCom, they issued a joint statement, delivered by Turkey, where the NPDI underlined the priority issues:

- universalization and effective implementation of the three pillars of the NPT
- full implementation of Article VI of the NPT in an irreversible and verifiable manner
- systematic reductions in all nuclear weapons categories, including non-strategic weapons, a diminishing role of nuclear weapons in security strategies, and
- a reduction in/of the operational status of nuclear weapon systems.⁵⁴

The NPT attracts criticism, especially on the slow pace or unwillingness of NWS to lead efforts in disarmament. In this sense, NPDI is confident in its ability to engage with them regarding disarmament, because the members usually take moderate positions and try to find the areas where the NWS will be more comfortable to discuss and on which there is more likelihood to get practical results. The importance of engaging the NWS is emphasized by the initiatives to explain their positions and proposals to NWS in at least five meetings.⁵⁵

Potter and Mukhatzhanova observe that transparency is the area in which the NPDI has had the greatest influence.⁵⁶ The NPDI members see that transparency and confidence-building measures in the disarmament process are essential for progress. To that end, they shared a standard reporting form to build international confidence.⁵⁷ The NPDI expressed its commitment to “promoting the application of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes under the highest standards of safety, security

⁵² Ibid.

⁵³ Additional Protocol, Working Paper Submitted by the members of the Non-Proliferation and Disarmament Initiative, Preparatory Committee for the 2015 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, First Session, NPT/CONF.2015/PC/I/WP/37, Vienna, April 27, 2012; Transparency of Nuclear Weapons, Working Paper Submitted by the members of the Non-Proliferation and Disarmament Initiative, Preparatory Committee for the 2015 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, First Session, NPT/CONF.2015/PC/I/WP/12, Vienna, April 20, 2012.

⁵⁴ The NPDI Joint Statement to the NPT PrepCom, Vienna, 30 April-11 May 2012.

⁵⁵ Potter and Mukhatzhanova, 2015.

⁵⁶ Ibid.

⁵⁷ Transparency of Nuclear Weapons, Working Paper Submitted by the members of the Non-Proliferation and Disarmament Initiative, Preparatory Committee for the 2015 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, First Session, NPT/CONF.2015/PC/I/WP/12, Vienna, April 20, 2012, pp. 1,2.

and nonproliferation.”⁵⁸ Potter and Mukhatzhanova expect the NPDI to make a valuable contribution at the 2015 RevCon with their insistence on transparency of nuclear arsenals. In other words, countries would be required to be transparent about the nuclear weapons stationed in their territories. They acknowledge that the NPDI is a new player and has not yet established itself as a bridge for non-nuclear-weapon states to communicate with NWS. Furthermore, the NPDI is tied by its members’ national positions and affiliations to other coalitions and alliances that would prevent the NPDI’s negotiating power as a group during the Review Conference.⁵⁹

In the 2013 PrepCom for the 2015 RevCon, the NPDI submitted working papers on the reduced role of nuclear weapons,⁶⁰ nuclear-weapon-free zones, negative security assurances⁶¹, and wider applications of safeguards in nuclear-weapon states.⁶² In the 2014 PrepCom, they submitted a working paper on the Middle East Nuclear Weapon Free Zone,⁶³ increased transparency in nuclear disarmament,⁶⁴ and nuclear security.⁶⁵

Regarding transparency, they cited three principles of nuclear disarmament: irreversibility, verifiability, and transparency. Transparency supports the two other principles, because, without it, disarmament cannot be verified and countries cannot be sure that nuclear disarmament has been accomplished irreversibly.⁶⁶

⁵⁸ The NPDI Joint Statement to the NPT PrepCom, Vienna, 30 April-11 May 2012, p.2.

⁵⁹ Potter and Mukhatzhanova, 2015.

⁶⁰ Reduced Role of Nuclear Weapons, Working Paper Submitted by the members of the Non-Proliferation and Disarmament Initiative, Preparatory Committee for the 2015 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, Second Session, NPT/CONF.2015/PC.II/WP4, Geneva, 6 March 2013.

⁶¹ Nuclear-weapon-free zones and negative security assurances, Working Paper Submitted by the members of the Non-Proliferation and Disarmament Initiative, Preparatory Committee for the 2015 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, Second Session, NPT/CONF.2015/PC.II/WP.24, Geneva, 11 April 2013.

⁶² Wider application of safeguards in the nuclear-weapon States, Working Paper Submitted by the members of the Non-Proliferation and Disarmament Initiative, Preparatory Committee for the 2015 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, Second Session, NPT/CONF.2015/PC.II/WP.23, Geneva, 5 April 2013.

⁶³ Establishing a weapons-of-mass-destruction-free-zone in the Middle East, Working Paper Submitted by the members of the Non-Proliferation and Disarmament Initiative, Preparatory Committee for the 2015 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, Third Session, NPT/CONF.2015/PC.III/WP.7, New York, 14 March 2014

⁶⁴ Increased Transparency in Nuclear Disarmament, Working Paper Submitted by the members of the Non-Proliferation and Disarmament Initiative, Preparatory Committee for the 2015 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, Third Session, NPT/CONF.2015/PC.III/WP.10, New York, 19 March 2014.

⁶⁵ Nuclear Security, Working Paper Submitted by the members of the Non-Proliferation and Disarmament Initiative, Preparatory Committee for the 2015 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, Third Session, NPT/CONF.2015/PC.III/WP. 26, New York, 21 April 2014.

⁶⁶ Increased Transparency in Nuclear Disarmament, Working Paper Submitted by the members of the Non-Proliferation and Disarmament Initiative, Preparatory Committee for the 2015 Review Conference of the

The New Outlook of Turkish Foreign Policy and Ankara's Position in the NPDI

Before becoming Foreign Minister in 2009, current Turkish Prime Minister Ahmet Davutoğlu was an academic who served as the chief advisor to the Prime Minister. He outlined a strategic vision, influenced Turkish foreign policy, and became the key figure to give Turkey new direction.⁶⁷ The “Synopsis of Turkish Foreign Policy” reveals the new outlook:

...As a result of this principled approach and its continued efforts, as well as thanks to its increasing means and capabilities Turkey has in fact become a leading country that works to expand the sphere of peace and prosperity in its region; generate stability and security; help establish an order that paves the way for prosperity, human development and lasting stability. Rise of Turkey to such a prominent position is also a consequence of Turkey's solid stance that vigorously seeks legitimacy and of the belief that its own security and stability can only be achieved through the security and stability of the region. Behind this stance lies intensive efforts and major initiatives intended for the creation of an environment of sustainable peace, security and tranquility in the region and beyond.⁶⁸

Similar to his predecessors, like the late Prime Minister (and then President) Turgut Özal and the late Foreign Minister İsmail Cem, Davutoğlu saw a rising regional and global role for Turkey and foresaw a multilateral and assertive foreign policy.⁶⁹ In his book *Strategic Depth*, Davutoğlu put forth the new strategic vision and foreign policy for Turkey.⁷⁰ He argued that Turkey was a “central power,” meaning that Turkey was not a state whose power extended not only to its immediate vicinity but also to the wider region, including the Middle East, Caucasus, Balkans, Central Asia, Caspian, Mediterranean, Persian Gulf, and Black Sea. Therefore, Davutoğlu attributed to Turkey a new role as a global strategic actor.⁷¹

Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, Third Session, NPT/CONF.2015/PC.III/WP.10, New York, March 19, 2014.

⁶⁷ Morton Abramowitz and H.J. Barkey, “Turkey's Transformers: The AKP Sees Big,” *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 88, No. 6, 2009, pp.118-28, and Bülent Aras, “The Davutoğlu Era in Turkish Foreign Policy,” *Insight Turkey*, Vol. 11, No. 3, 2009, pp.127-9, cited in Ioannis N. Grigoriadis, “Turkey's Foreign Policy Activism: Vision Continuity and Reality Checks,” *Southeast European and Black Sea Studies*, Vol.14, No: 2, 2014, p.160.

⁶⁸ Synopsis of Turkish Foreign Policy, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Turkey, <http://www.mfa.gov.tr/synopsis-of-the-turkish-foreign-policy.en.mfa>

⁶⁹ Grigoriadis, “Turkey's Foreign Policy Activism,” 2014, p.160.

⁷⁰ Ahmet Davutoğlu, *Stratejik Derinlik: Türkiye'nin Uluslararası Konumu (Strategic Depth: Turkey's International Position)*, İstanbul: Küre, 2001, cited in Grigoriadis, “Turkey's Foreign Policy Activism,” 2014, p. 161.

⁷¹ Bülent Aras and Aylin Görener. “National Role Conceptions and Foreign Policy Orientation: The Ideational Bases of the Justice and Development Party's Foreign Policy Activism in the Middle East,” *Journal of Balkan and Near Eastern Studies*, Vol. 12, No. 1, 2010, pp. 85-6.

Aras and Görener found that the former Foreign Minister and the current Prime Minister, Davutoğlu drifted away from the formerly emphasized “bridge role,” because he saw this role as a simple one. Rather, he favored the role of facilitator for intercultural dialogue, particularly after 9/11.⁷² Davutoğlu did not want to see Turkey as an instrument for other countries to use to meet their regional and global strategic targets. Instead, he argued for the development of a proactive policy parallel to Turkey’s historic and geographic significance.⁷³ Turkey’s growing involvement in the Middle East made it visible and popular, and stripped it of its image as a “Western agent” and replaced it with the image of a “moral power” with a foreign policy based on values, not interests.⁷⁴ However, Turkish foreign policy fell short of meeting the expectations of Arab public opinion and liberals after the uprisings in several Middle Eastern countries, particularly when they looked for support for democracy and liberal values. Instead, the region found a hesitant Turkey between verbal commitments and Realpolitik concerns.⁷⁵

In Aras and Görener’s study of national role conceptions to link elite perceptions with foreign policy, they use Chafetz et.al’s categorization of national roles.⁷⁶ In this sense, they identify six categories of national roles set forth by Ankara after 2002: regional leader, regional protector, regional sub-system collaborator, global sub-system collaborator, example, and bridge, albeit the last one was the least emphasized.⁷⁷ They find that most of government officials’ statements indicate the role of regional leader for Turkey. K.J. Holsti, one of the first theorists to apply role theory to international relations, defined the formation of this role when a government perceived certain duties and special responsibilities for itself in its relations within a particular region.⁷⁸ Aras and Görener found that Davutoğlu’s “Strategic Depth doctrine” was mainly shaped by the role of regional leader, because the main components of this strategic vision were geographical depth and historical depth:

The Strategic Depth doctrine calls for a new understanding of Turkey’s historical and cultural roots in its immediate neighbourhood, and an end to a forced alienation from its own past....What has emerged is a

⁷² Aras and Görener, “National Role Conceptions and Foreign Policy Orientation...”, 2010, pp. 85-6.

⁷³ Ioannis N. Grigoriadis, *The Davutoğlu Doctrine and Turkish Foreign Policy*, ELIAMEP

Working Paper, No. 8, Athens: ELIAMEP, 2010, cited in Grigoriadis, “Turkey’s Foreign Policy Activism,” 2014, p. 161.

⁷⁴ Grigoriadis, “Turkey’s Foreign Policy Activism,” 2014, p. 166.

⁷⁵ Ibid, p. 167.

⁷⁶ Glenn Chafetz, Hilel Abramson and Suzette Grillo, ‘Role Theory and Foreign Policy: Belarussian and Ukrainian Compliance with the Nuclear Nonproliferation Regime’, *Political Psychology*, Vol. 17, No. 4, December 1996, p. 734.

⁷⁷ Aras and Görener. “National Role Conceptions and Foreign Policy Orientation...”, 2010, pp. 78-86.

⁷⁸ K. J. Holsti, “National Role Conceptions in the Study of Foreign Policy’, *International Studies Quarterly*, Vol. 14, No. 3, September 1970, pp. 245–246.

process of discovery of the ‘closeness’ of these geographies and their ‘availability’ for Turkey’s involvement through the instruments of remembering past relations, unfolding cultural and civilizational affinities, and exploring opportunities for engagement.⁷⁹

Regarding the Middle East, national role conceptions suggest that Turkey foresees an important role for itself in the process of establishing a stable and cooperative regional security environment. In the international context, Ankara’s emphasis on active participation in global and regional arrangements and compliance with international rules and norms indicates that the “global sub-system collaborator role” conception drives Ankara to support the international order.⁸⁰ For this reason, one can argue that Ankara’s willingness to play a part in the resolution of the Iran nuclear issue in 2010 can be attributed to its self-perception as a “central power,” supporting its role as regional leader. With the help of Brazil, Turkey tried to establish this status by brokering a deal with Iran on its nuclear program.

Ankara tried to pursue an active foreign policy in the Middle East as an extension of its new line of foreign policy while Davutoğlu was foreign minister. Turkey’s participation in the NPDI was also an extension of its desire to play a more active role in regional and international affairs. Within the NPDI, Turkey is an active member.⁸¹ In 2011, Davutoğlu stated that he shared his assessments regarding the conference to be held in 2012 towards the establishment of a nuclear weapons-free zone in the Middle East, and that he made some proposals for the possible contributions of the NPDI for the process. Turkey even hosted the 2012 Ministerial conference of the NPDI in Istanbul.⁸² Following the sixth Ministerial meeting of the NPDI in 2013, Davutoğlu expressed that some nuclear issues should be tackled as a domestic problem or as a problem of the world, and not just an issue of foreign affairs. Nuclear disarmament is one of those issues, because what is under threat is the future of humanity as long as nuclear weapons exist.⁸³

⁷⁹Aras and Görener, “National Role Conceptions and Foreign Policy Orientation...”, 2010, p. 82.

⁸⁰ Ibid, pp. 83-4.

⁸¹ Turkey delivered the statement of NPDI on October 17, 2012 in the UN General Assembly First Committee, and also the Istanbul statement of the NPDI on June 16, 2012.

⁸² Press Release Regarding the Non-Proliferation and Disarmament Initiative (NPDI) Ministerial Statement, No: 218, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 22 September 2011, <http://www.mfa.gov.tr/no_-218_-22-september-2011_-press-release-regarding-the-non-proliferation-and-disarmament-initiative-_npdi_-ministerial-statement.en.mfa>

⁸³ Foreign Minister Davutoğlu: “In a World Where Nuclear Threat Exists, the Future of Humanity is Under Threat,” Ministry of Foreign Affairs, April 2013, <<http://www.mfa.gov.tr/foreign-minister-Davutoğlu-in-a-world-where-nuclear-threat-exists-the-future-of-humanity-is-under-threat.en.mfa>>

In fact, an official from the Turkish Foreign Ministry from the Department of Arms Control and Disarmament stated that Ahmet Davutoğlu greatly valued the NPDI as a middle power initiative during his time as Turkey's foreign minister. Although NPDI members have diverging and changing interests and expectations, they could meet around a common denominator, and after negotiations, they could reach a realistic, reasonable and more constructive language in the final statement (of the Ministerial meeting).⁸⁴ Turkey attaches special importance to the WMD Free Zone in the Middle East and great value to the principle of *pacta sunt servanda*.⁸⁵ Hence it reminds the members of the revived commitment to work towards the goals of the Middle East Resolution (that is, the creation of a WMD free zone in the Middle East). Ankara played a leading role in bringing the issue to the NPDI agenda. Nonproliferation and disarmament are complementary, but disarmament liabilities remain weak. So, a layered process, that is, a step-by-step approach, is necessary. So is transparency. Regarding peaceful use, Ankara does not want to see a new distinction between nuclear have's and have-not's in terms of nuclear technology, and argues that peaceful use of nuclear energy is a right as long as it is used in compliance with countries' respective international obligations. Thus, it supports the strengthening of nuclear safety, security and safeguards. Otherwise, if there is a new category of states, that could create dependence for have-nots, and might be used as leverage.⁸⁶

According to another Turkish Foreign Ministry official experienced in disarmament and nonproliferation issues, although the NPT is the cornerstone of the nonproliferation regime and the basis of nonproliferation, disarmament, and peaceful use of nuclear energy, it should be strengthened. The realization of the goals of Middle East Resolution is critical. The Arab states and Israel met for the conference on the WMD free zone, but they could not reach a decision. Setting a date for the next Middle East Conference before the 2015 Review Conference would be productive. Currently, countries need to address some of the shortcomings of the NPT to make it more effective. Ankara's position within the regime and particularly within the NPDI is taken seriously. Turkey acts on principles and is a state that other countries appeal to for its opinions.⁸⁷

According to a Turkish government official, the interests of major powers may sometimes impede international nuclear nonproliferation efforts. Therefore, coalitions like NAM may not be able to advance their proposals or positions all the time. Turkey upholds a national position based on

⁸⁴ Interview with a Foreign ministry official, July 14, 2014. Also See, NPDI 8th Ministerial Meeting Statement, April 12, 2014 <http://www.mofa.go.jp/files/000035199.pdf> and the NPDI Statement in the First Committee in the 69th UNGA,, October 20, 2014 <http://www.mofa.go.jp/files/000059964.pdf>

⁸⁵ "Treaties should be served" in Latin. One of the oldest norms of international relations, where the parties of a treaty are expected to honor their commitments.

⁸⁶ Interview with a Foreign ministry official, July 14, 2014.

⁸⁷ Interview with a Foreign ministry official, March 4, 2014.

principles and does not change its position according to the case at hand. Ankara is lukewarm to new rules and regulations that may contradict international law or the founding principles of export control agreements. After listening to President Obama's Prague speech in 2009 and seeing the determination of the U.S. administration on nonproliferation goals, Turkey was well-prepared for the 2010 NPT RevCon. Also, the related departments of Turkish government leaned on nonproliferation issues as bureaucrats with relevant international experience assumed positions in these departments prior to the 2010 RevCon. However, the Turkish official did not expect much change in the effectiveness of Turkey between the 2010 and 2015 RevCons.⁸⁸

Turkey's position on nuclear technology transfer in NSG

After the revelation of the A.Q. Khan network and their activities leading to proliferation, the United States under President George W. Bush's administration proposed that enrichment and reprocessing technologies should not be transferred to countries which did not have them before:

The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty was designed more than 30 years ago to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons beyond those states which already possessed them. Under this treaty, nuclear states agreed to help non-nuclear states develop peaceful atomic energy if they renounced the pursuit of nuclear weapons. But the treaty has a loophole which has been exploited by nations such as North Korea and Iran. These regimes are allowed to produce nuclear material that can be used to build bombs under the cover of civilian nuclear programs.

I propose a way to close the loophole. The world must create a safe, orderly system to field civilian nuclear plants without adding to the danger of weapons proliferation. The world's leading nuclear exporters should ensure that states have reliable access at reasonable cost to fuel for civilian reactors, so long as those states renounce enrichment and reprocessing. Enrichment and reprocessing are not necessary for nations seeking to harness nuclear energy for peaceful purposes.

The 40 nations of the Nuclear Suppliers Group should refuse to sell enrichment and reprocessing equipment and technologies to any state that does not already possess full-scale, functioning enrichment and reprocessing plants.⁸⁹

⁸⁸ Interview with an official from the Turkish government, who asked not to be named, March 9, 2015.

⁸⁹ President Announces New Set of Measures to Countering the Threat of WMD, National Defense University, Washington, D.C., February 11, 2004, <<http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2004/02/20040211-4.html>>.

The NSG members rejected that proposal and instead put forward a set of criteria to limit such trade. In November 2008, the members came up with “clean text” regarding the guidelines for the transfer of enrichment and reprocessing technologies.⁹⁰ Still, some of the members, mainly Turkey and South Africa, had reservations about the clean text during the Budapest meeting in 2009. Ankara disagreed with the language regarding the transfer of technology to countries close to unstable regions on the grounds that it would lead to other countries becoming interested in acquiring similar capabilities-because it was under subjective interpretation. Turkey argued that as long as a state was in full compliance with its international nonproliferation obligations, it should not be denied enrichment and reprocessing transfers. In the end, the members agreed to modify the NSG Guidelines.⁹¹ On the other hand, the NSG received proposals for including India and Israel as eligible states for nuclear technology transfers,⁹² and these were met with negative reaction.⁹³

Analysis

Turkey is a committed member of the international regimes on WMD nonproliferation. It is a country that neighbors regions with intensity of WMD the risk of proliferation, and those that lie in the transit route of materials and people, such as the Middle East, Caucasus and the Mediterranean. Ankara supports the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI), regularly reports to the UNSCR 1540 Committee, and is a member of the GICNT.⁹⁴ After the Cold War ended and more so after 9/11, Turkey assessed that it was close to the regions where there was a high concentration of weapons of mass

⁹⁰ McGoldrick, *Limiting Transfers of Enrichment and Reprocessing Technology*, 2011, p. 15. For revised Guidelines in Articles 6 and 7, See Communication Received from the Permanent Mission of the Netherlands regarding Certain Member States' Guidelines for the Export of Nuclear Material, Equipment and Technology, INFCIRC/254/Rev10/Part I, IAEA, July 26, 2011.

⁹¹ McGoldrick, 2011, pp. 16, 17.

⁹² Ibid, p. 17; See Fredrick Dahl, “Nuclear export group debates ties with Israel: document,” *Reuters*, April 14, 2014, <<http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/04/14/us-nuclear-trade-israel-idUSBREA3D0T320140414>>; “India and France Hold Key Nuclear Talks,” BBS News, December 6, 2010, <<http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-south-asia-11924016>>; Joint Statement by President Obama and Prime Minister Singh of India, White House, November 8, 2010, <<https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2010/11/08/joint-statement-president-obama-and-prime-minister-singh-india>>; “Obama in Mumbai Calls India Market of the Future,” *Voice of America*, November 5, 2010, <<http://www.voanews.com/content/obama-calls-for-more-trade-with-india-106817488/129960.html>>; Nuclear Suppliers Group Statement on Civil Nuclear Cooperation with India, September 6, 2008, <https://www.oecd-neo.org/law/nlbf/documents/083_085_NSg.pdf>.

⁹³ Salman Masoud, “Pakistan criticizes India’s Inclusion in NSG,” *New York Times*, January 27, 2015 <http://www.nytimes.com/2015/01/28/world/asia/pakistan-criticizes-indias-inclusion-in-nuclear-suppliers-group.html?_r=0#>; Saibal Dasgupta, “China redflags India’s entry to NSG, may push for Pakistan,” *The Times of India*, January 27, 2015, <<http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/China-red-flags-Indias-entry-into-NSG-may-push-for-Pakistan/articleshow/46024533.cms>>

⁹⁴ “Turkey’s Approach to Arms Control and Disarmament” *Republic of Turkey, Ministry of Foreign Affairs*, <<http://www.mfa.gov.tr/arms-control-and-disarmament.en.mfa>>.

destruction, potential for conflict, irregular migration, and illicit trade. Turkey aimed to implement nonproliferation and disarmament initiatives in these regions as well as prevent its territory from being used as a corridor. As a country with plans to use nuclear energy itself, Ankara promotes peaceful use of nuclear technology. It has also expressed support for arrangements that are non-discriminatory, provide uninterrupted supply of nuclear fuel, and do not undermine the right of the member states of the NPT to develop their own nuclear fuel cycle capabilities.⁹⁵

Turkey was also concerned about Iran's nuclear program and worried that if the issue were not addressed through diplomacy, Turkey would face the hardest consequences politically and economically.⁹⁶ Thus, in 2010, with Brazil, Turkey convinced Tehran to negotiate a nuclear swap deal, but it was not put into action because of the UN Security Council sanctions passed just a few weeks after the Tehran Declaration. The nuclear talks continued with the P5+1, which had been the format since 2006, and the main issue seemed to be distrust. Ankara does not favor the creation of new categorization of nuclear weapons possessors and non-possessors and the classification of nuclear programs as "dangerous vs. not dangerous."⁹⁷

Turkey is keen on the realization of the Middle East Weapons of Mass Destruction Free Zone (MEWMDFZ). The key parties to convene a conference and reach a deal on this are Iran, Syria, Egypt, and Israel. Internal turmoil in Syria and the activities of ISIS in the region prevent Damascus from channeling its energy to the discussions. The dismantlement of chemical weapons in Syria is a positive development but the outstanding issue is the Israel-Iran arguments on nuclear weapons. Both sides are likely to put the burden of nonproliferation and disarmament liabilities on the other. Of the four countries, it is Iran with whom Turkey has relatively stable relations although both sides still act with caution when dealing with each other. Ankara's active foreign policy in the Middle East took a downturn particularly after the political movements that have swept across Arab countries since 2011. Turkey's relations soured with Egypt, Syria, and Israel, three of the four key states for the WMD-free-zone conference. It can be expected to diminish Turkey's lobbying power during the 2015 RevCon regarding the disarmament goals in the region.

For Ankara, the NPT is the invaluable cornerstone of the nonproliferation regime. Thanks to the norms that have been built around the NPT regime, Turkey is working towards strengthening the

⁹⁵ Turkish representative's statement, 18 June 2009, IAEA Board meeting

⁹⁶ Mustafa Kibaroglu, "Turkish Perspectives on Iran's Nuclearization," *ORSAM*, <<http://www.orsam.org.tr/en/showArticle.aspx?ID=37>>.

⁹⁷ Interview with a Turkish Foreign Ministry official, July 14, 2014.

goals of the regime and endorses its status as a non-nuclear-weapon state as a security asset.⁹⁸ Turkey would loathe the undermining of the nonproliferation regime due to the lack of progress in key areas. Therefore, one should expect Ankara to be active in the NPT 2015 RevCon on at least two issues: MEWMDFZ and peaceful use of nuclear energy. Ankara has been enjoying its middle power status and is likely to take on a similar position with NAM members regarding assurance of nuclear fuel supply. One can expect Turkey to focus more on the solution rather than the problem of technology transfer.⁹⁹

The 2010 RevCon was a success in terms of building consensus among states to work towards common goals and reaching an agreement on the steps that need to be taken to accomplish those goals. However, the highlighted commitments of the RevCon were not met, such as the conference for the WMD-free-zone in the Middle East. In the meantime, relations between the United States and Russia suffer due to the Ukraine issue. The expectations for the 2015 RevCon are not high compared to the previous RevCon. The 2014 PrepCom hinted at the possible disagreements among the NPT Parties and lack of consensus between NWS and NNWS on disarmament.¹⁰⁰ It is an issue of whether middle powers and coalitions will be able to overcome these disagreements and come up with a common language, especially because the expectations for disarmament are so high.¹⁰¹

⁹⁸ Şebnem Udum, "Turkey's Non-Nuclear Weapon Status, A Theoretical Assessment," *ISYP Journal on Science and World Affairs*, Vol. 3, No. 2, 2007, pp.57-65.

⁹⁹ The problem is the nuclear energy-nuclear proliferation puzzle with a narrow focus on the intentions and status of states. The solution is about focusing on promoting the development of nuclear energy while strengthening measures of safety, security and safeguards.

¹⁰⁰ PrepCom 2014, *Nonproliferation for Global Security*, <<http://npsglobal.org/eng/prepcom-2014.html>>.

¹⁰¹ See the summary of the States Parties statements in the NPT Preparatory Committee of 2014, *Ibid*.