

Information Circular

INFCIRC/254/Rev.10/Part 1^a

Date: 26 July 2011

General Distribution

Original: English

Communication Received from the Permanent Mission of the Netherlands regarding Certain Member States' Guidelines for the Export of Nuclear Material, Equipment and Technology

1. The Agency has received a Note Verbale from the Permanent Mission of the Kingdom of the Netherlands, dated 12 July 2011, in which it requests that the Agency circulate to all Member States a letter of 12 July 2011 from the Chairman of the Nuclear Suppliers Group, Ambassador Piet de Klerk, to the Director General, on behalf of the Governments of Argentina, Australia, Austria, Belarus, Belgium, Brazil, Bulgaria, Canada, China, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Kazakhstan, Republic of Korea, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Russian Federation, Slovakia, Slovenia, South Africa, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, Ukraine, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the United States of America,^b providing further information on those Governments' Guidelines for Nuclear Transfers.

2. In the light of the wish expressed in the above-mentioned Note Verbale, the text of the Note Verbale, as well as the letter and attachments thereto, are hereby reproduced for the information of all Member States.

^a INFCIRC/254/Part 2, as amended, contains Guidelines for Transfers of Nuclear-Related Dual-Use Equipment, Materials, Software and Related Technology.

^b The European Commission and the Chair of the Zangger Committee participate as observers.



The Permanent Mission of the Kingdom of the Netherlands to the International Atomic Energy Agency presents its compliments to the Director General of the IAEA and has the honour to forward a letter to the Director General by Ambassador Piet de Klerk, current Chairman of the Nuclear Suppliers Group, dated July 12th, regarding agreed amendments to the NSG Part 1 Guidelines.

The Permanent Mission has the honour to request that the abovementioned amendments to the Guidelines, as published in INFCIRC 254/Part 1, be circulated among the Member States of the IAEA.

The Permanent Mission of the Kingdom of the Netherlands to the IAEA avails itself of this opportunity to renew to the Director General of the IAEA the assurances of its highest consideration.

Vienna, July 12th 2011



H.E. Yukiya Amano
Director General
International Atomic Energy Agency
Vienna

Chairman of the Nuclear Suppliers Group

Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Kingdom of the Netherlands

Bezuidenhoutseweg 67

2594 AC Den Haag

The Netherlands

Den Haag, 12 July 2011

On behalf of the Governments of Argentina, Australia, Austria, Belarus, Belgium, Brazil, Bulgaria, Canada, China, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Kazakhstan, Republic of Korea, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxemburg, Malta, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Russian Federation, Slovakia, Slovenia, South Africa, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, Ukraine, United Kingdom, and United States¹, I have the honour to refer to all previous relevant communications from these Governments concerning their decisions to act in accordance with the Guidelines for Nuclear Transfers currently published as document INFCIRC/254Rev.9/Part 1, including its Annexes.

These Governments have decided to amend paragraph 6 and paragraph 7 of the Part 1 Guidelines. The new text reads as follows:

START OF TEXT

Special Controls on Sensitive Exports

6. Suppliers should exercise a policy of restraint in the transfer of sensitive facilities, equipment, technology and material usable for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, especially in cases when a State has on its territory entities that are the object of active NSG Guidelines Part 2 denial notifications from more than one NSG Participating Government.

(a) In the context of this policy, suppliers should not authorise the transfer of enrichment and reprocessing facilities, and equipment and technology therefor, if the recipient does not meet, at least, all of the following criteria:

(i) is a Party to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and is in full compliance with its obligations under the Treaty;

(ii) has not been identified in a report by the IAEA Secretariat which is under consideration by the IAEA Board of Governors, as being in breach of its obligations to comply with its safeguards agreement, nor continues to be the subject of Board of Governors decisions calling upon it to take additional steps to comply with its safeguards obligations or to build confidence in the peaceful nature of its nuclear programme, nor has been reported by the IAEA Secretariat as a State where the IAEA is currently unable to implement its safeguards agreement. This criterion would not apply in cases where the IAEA Board of Governors or the United Nations Security Council subsequently decides that adequate assurances exist as to the peaceful purposes of the recipient's nuclear programme and its compliance with its safeguards obligations. For the purposes of this paragraph, "breach" refers only to serious breaches of proliferation concern;

¹ The European Commission and the Chair of the Zangger Committee participate as observers.

(iii) is adhering to the NSG Guidelines and has reported to the Security Council of the United Nations that it is implementing effective export controls as identified by Security Council Resolution 1540;

(iv) has concluded an inter-governmental agreement with the supplier including assurances regarding non-explosive use, effective safeguards in perpetuity, and retransfer;

(v) has made a commitment to the supplier to apply mutually agreed standards of physical protection based on current international guidelines; and

(vi) has committed to IAEA safety standards and adheres to accepted international safety conventions.

(b) In considering whether to authorise such transfers, suppliers, while taking into account paragraphs 4(e), 6(a), and 10, should consult with potential recipients to ensure that enrichment and reprocessing facilities, equipment and technology are intended for peaceful purposes only, also taking into account at their national discretion, any relevant factors as may be applicable.

(c) Suppliers will make special efforts in support of effective implementation of IAEA safeguards for enrichment or reprocessing facilities, equipment or technology and should, consistent with paragraphs 4 and 13 of the Guidelines, ensure their peaceful nature. In this regard, suppliers should authorise transfers, pursuant to this paragraph, only when the recipient has brought into force a Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement, and an Additional Protocol based on the Model Additional Protocol or, pending this, is implementing appropriate safeguards agreements in cooperation with the IAEA, including a regional accounting and control arrangement for nuclear materials, as approved by the IAEA Board of Governors.

(d) In accordance with paragraph 16(b) of the Guidelines, prior to beginning transfers of enrichment or reprocessing facilities, equipment or technology, suppliers should consult with Participating Governments regarding the non-proliferation related terms and conditions applicable to the transfer.

(e) If enrichment or reprocessing facilities, equipment or technology are to be transferred, suppliers should encourage recipients to accept, as an alternative to national plants, supplier involvement and/or other appropriate multinational participation in resulting facilities. Suppliers should also promote international (including IAEA) activities concerned with multinational regional fuel cycle centres.

Special arrangements for export of enrichment facilities, equipment and technology

7. All States that meet the criteria in paragraph 6 above are eligible for transfers of enrichment facilities, equipment and technology. Suppliers recognise that the application of the Special Arrangements below must be consistent with NPT principles, in particular Article IV. Any application by the suppliers of the following Special Arrangements may not abrogate the rights of States meeting the criteria in paragraph 6.

(a) For a transfer of an enrichment facility, or equipment or technology therefor, suppliers should seek a legally-binding undertaking from the recipient State that neither the transferred facility, nor any facility incorporating such equipment or based on such technology, will be modified or operated for the production of greater than 20% enriched uranium. Suppliers should seek to design and construct such an enrichment facility or equipment therefor so as to preclude, to the greatest extent practicable, the possibility of production of greater than 20% enriched uranium.

(b) For a transfer of an enrichment facility or equipment based on a particular enrichment technology which has been demonstrated to produce enriched uranium on a significant scale as of 31 December 2008, suppliers should:

- avoid, as far as practicable, the transfer of enabling design and manufacturing technology associated with such items; and
- seek from recipients an appropriate agreement to accept sensitive enrichment equipment, and enabling technologies, or an operable enrichment facility under conditions that do not permit or enable replication of the facilities.

Information required for regulatory purposes or to ensure safe installation and operation of a facility should be shared to the extent necessary without divulging enabling technology.

(c) Cooperative enrichment enterprises based on a particular enrichment technology which has not been demonstrated to produce enriched uranium on a significant scale as of 31 December 2008, may be developed by participants individually or jointly; and any transfer of the resulting facilities and equipment will become subject to paragraph 7(b) no later than prior to the deployment of a prototype. For the purposes of paragraph 7(c) of the Guidelines, a prototype is a system or facility which is operated to generate technical information to confirm the technical potential or viability of the separation process for large-scale separation of uranium isotopes.

Suppliers may propose alternative arrangements relating to control of transfers of new enrichment technology to facilitate cooperation on enrichment technology. Such arrangements should be equivalent to those in paragraph 7(b), and the NSG should be consulted on these arrangements. Participating Governments will review the arrangements for export of enrichment facilities, equipment and technology every five years beginning in 2013 for the purpose of addressing changes in enrichment technology and commercial practices.

(d) Suppliers recognise that when implementing the arrangements envisaged by paragraph 7 in relation to existing and new cooperative enrichment enterprises, enabling technology may be held by, shared among, and transferred between partners of such enterprises, if partners agree to do so on the basis of their established decision making processes. Suppliers recognise that uranium enrichment may involve supply chains for the production and transfer of equipment for enrichment facilities and such transfers can be made, subject to the relevant provisions of these Guidelines.

(e) Suppliers should make special efforts to ensure effective implementation of IAEA safeguards at supplied enrichment facilities, consistent with paragraphs 13 and 14 of the Guidelines. For a transfer of an enrichment facility, the supplier and recipient State should work together to ensure that the design and construction of the transferred facility is implemented in such a way so as to facilitate IAEA safeguards. The supplier and recipient State should consult with the IAEA about such design and construction features at the earliest possible time during the facility design phase, and in any event before construction of the enrichment facility is started. The supplier and recipient State should also work together to assist the recipient State in developing effective nuclear material and facilities protection measures, consistent with paragraphs 12 and 14 of the Guidelines.

(f) Suppliers should satisfy themselves that recipients have security arrangements in place that are equivalent or superior to their own to protect the facilities and technology from use or transfer inconsistent with the national laws of the receiving State.

Definitions Section:

For the purpose of implementing paragraph 7 of the Guidelines, "Cooperative Enrichment Enterprise" means a multi-country or multi-company (where at least two of the companies are incorporated in different countries) joint development or production effort. It could be a consortium of States or companies or a multinational corporation.

END OF TEXT

In the interest of clarity, the complete text of the modified Guidelines and its Annexes is reproduced in the attachment.

The above Governments have decided to act in accordance with the Guidelines so revised and to implement them in accordance with their respective national legislation.

In reaching this decision, these Governments are fully aware of the need to contribute to economic development while avoiding contributing in any way to a proliferation of nuclear weapons or other


nuclear explosive devices or the diversion to acts of nuclear terrorism, and of the need to separate the issue of non-proliferation or non-diversion assurances from that of commercial competition.

Insofar as trade within the European Union is concerned, the Governments that are Member States of the European Union will implement this decision in the light of their commitments as Member States of the Union.

I would be grateful if you would bring this letter and its attachment to the attention of all Member States of the IAEA, as INFCIRC/254/Rev.10/Part 1.

On behalf of the above Governments, I wish to avail myself of this opportunity to renew to you the assurances of the Governments' highest consideration.

Yours sincerely,

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read 'Piet de Klerk', with a long horizontal flourish at the bottom.

Piet de Klerk

Chairman of the Nuclear Suppliers Group

H.E. Yukiya Amano

Director General

International Atomic Energy Agency

Vienna, Austria

GUIDELINES FOR NUCLEAR TRANSFERS

1. The following fundamental principles for safeguards and export controls should apply to nuclear transfers for peaceful purposes to any non-nuclear-weapon State and, in the case of controls on retransfer, to transfers to any State. In this connection, suppliers have defined an export trigger list.

Prohibition on nuclear explosives

2. Suppliers should authorize transfer of items or related technology identified in the trigger list only upon formal governmental assurances from recipients explicitly excluding uses which would result in any nuclear explosive device.

Physical protection

3. (a) All nuclear materials and facilities identified by the agreed trigger list should be placed under effective physical protection to prevent unauthorized use and handling. The levels of physical protection to be ensured in relation to the type of materials, equipment and facilities, have been agreed by the suppliers, taking account of international recommendations.

(b) The implementation of measures of physical protection in the recipient country is the responsibility of the Government of that country. However, in order to implement the terms agreed upon amongst suppliers, the levels of physical protection on which these measures have to be based should be the subject of an agreement between supplier and recipient.

(c) In each case special arrangements should be made for a clear definition of responsibilities for the transport of trigger list items.

Safeguards

4. (a) Suppliers should transfer trigger list items or related technology to a non-nuclear weapon State only when the receiving State has brought into force an agreement with the IAEA requiring the application of safeguards on all source and special fissionable material in its current and future peaceful activities. Suppliers should authorize such transfers only upon formal governmental assurances from the recipient that:
 - if the above-mentioned agreement should be terminated the recipient will bring into force an agreement with the IAEA based on existing IAEA model safeguards agreements requiring the application of safeguards on all trigger list items or related technology transferred by the supplier or processed, or produced or used in connection with such transfers; and
 - if the IAEA decides that the application of IAEA safeguards is no longer possible, the supplier and recipient should elaborate appropriate verification measures. If the recipient does not accept these measures, it should allow at the request of the supplier the restitution of transferred and derived trigger list items.

- (b) Transfers covered by paragraph 4 (a) to a non-nuclear-weapon State without such a safeguards agreement should be authorized only in exceptional cases when they are deemed essential for the safe operation of existing facilities and if safeguards are applied to those facilities. Suppliers should inform and, if appropriate, consult in the event that they intend to authorize or to deny such transfers.
 - (c) The policy referred to in paragraph 4 (a) and 4 (b) does not apply to agreements or contracts drawn up on or prior to April 3, 1992. In case of countries that have adhered or will adhere to INFCIRC/254/Rev. 1/Part 1 later than April 3, 1992, the policy only applies to agreements (to be) drawn up after their date of adherence.
 - (d) Under agreements to which the policy referred to in paragraph 4 (a) does not apply (see paragraphs 4 (b) and (c)) suppliers should transfer trigger list items or related technology only when covered by IAEA safeguards with duration and coverage provisions in conformity with IAEA doc. GOV/1621. However, suppliers undertake to strive for the earliest possible implementation of the policy referred to in paragraph 4 (a) under such agreements.
 - (e) Suppliers reserve the right to apply additional conditions of supply as a matter of national policy.
5. Suppliers will jointly reconsider their common safeguards requirements, whenever appropriate.

Special controls on sensitive exports

6. Suppliers should exercise a policy of restraint in the transfer of sensitive facilities, equipment, technology and material usable for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, especially in cases when a State has on its territory entities that are the object of active NSG Guidelines Part 2 denial notifications from more than one NSG Participating Government.
- (a) In the context of this policy, suppliers should not authorise the transfer of enrichment and reprocessing facilities, and equipment and technology therefor, if the recipient does not meet, at least, all of the following criteria:
 - (i) is a Party to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and is in full compliance with its obligations under the Treaty;
 - (ii) has not been identified in a report by the IAEA Secretariat which is under consideration by the IAEA Board of Governors, as being in breach of its obligations to comply with its safeguards agreement, nor continues to be the subject of Board of Governors decisions calling upon it to take additional steps to comply with its safeguards obligations or to build confidence in the peaceful nature of its nuclear programme, nor has been reported by the IAEA Secretariat as a State where the IAEA is currently unable to implement its safeguards agreement. This criterion would not apply in cases where the IAEA Board of Governors or the United Nations Security Council subsequently decides that adequate assurances exist as to the peaceful purposes of the recipient's nuclear programme and its compliance with its safeguards obligations. For the

purposes of this paragraph, “breach” refers only to serious breaches of proliferation concern;

- (iii) is adhering to the NSG Guidelines and has reported to the Security Council of the United Nations that it is implementing effective export controls as identified by Security Council Resolution 1540;
 - (iv) has concluded an inter-governmental agreement with the supplier including assurances regarding non-explosive use, effective safeguards in perpetuity, and retransfer;
 - (v) has made a commitment to the supplier to apply mutually agreed standards of physical protection based on current international guidelines; and
 - (vi) has committed to IAEA safety standards and adheres to accepted international safety conventions.
- (b) In considering whether to authorise such transfers, suppliers, while taking into account paragraphs 4(e), 6(a), and 10, should consult with potential recipients to ensure that enrichment and reprocessing facilities, equipment and technology are intended for peaceful purposes only; also taking into account at their national discretion, any relevant factors as may be applicable.
- (c) Suppliers will make special efforts in support of effective implementation of IAEA safeguards for enrichment or reprocessing facilities, equipment or technology and should, consistent with paragraphs 4 and 13 of the Guidelines, ensure their peaceful nature. In this regard, suppliers should authorise transfers, pursuant to this paragraph, only when the recipient has brought into force a Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement, and an Additional Protocol based on the Model Additional Protocol or, pending this, is implementing appropriate safeguards agreements in cooperation with the IAEA, including a regional accounting and control arrangement for nuclear materials, as approved by the IAEA Board of Governors.
- (d) In accordance with paragraph 16(b) of the Guidelines, prior to beginning transfers of enrichment or reprocessing facilities, equipment or technology, suppliers should consult with Participating Governments regarding the non-proliferation related terms and conditions applicable to the transfer.
- (e) If enrichment or reprocessing facilities, equipment or technology are to be transferred, suppliers should encourage recipients to accept, as an alternative to national plants, supplier involvement and/or other appropriate multinational participation in resulting facilities. Suppliers should also promote international (including IAEA) activities concerned with multinational regional fuel cycle centres.

Special arrangements for export of enrichment facilities, equipment and technology

7. All States that meet the criteria in paragraph 6 above are eligible for transfers of enrichment facilities, equipment and technology. Suppliers recognise that the application of the Special Arrangements below must be consistent with NPT principles, in particular

Article IV. Any application by the suppliers of the following Special Arrangements may not abrogate the rights of States meeting the criteria in paragraph 6.

- (a) For a transfer of an enrichment facility, or equipment or technology therefor, suppliers should seek a legally-binding undertaking from the recipient State that neither the transferred facility, nor any facility incorporating such equipment or based on such technology, will be modified or operated for the production of greater than 20% enriched uranium. Suppliers should seek to design and construct such an enrichment facility or equipment therefor so as to preclude, to the greatest extent practicable, the possibility of production of greater than 20% enriched uranium.
- (b) For a transfer of an enrichment facility or equipment based on a particular enrichment technology which has been demonstrated to produce enriched uranium on a significant scale as of 31 December 2008, suppliers should:
 - (1) avoid, as far as practicable, the transfer of enabling design and manufacturing technology associated with such items; and
 - (2) seek from recipients an appropriate agreement to accept sensitive enrichment equipment, and enabling technologies, or an operable enrichment facility under conditions that do not permit or enable replication of the facilities.

Information required for regulatory purposes or to ensure safe installation and operation of a facility should be shared to the extent necessary without divulging enabling technology.

- (c) Cooperative enrichment enterprises based on a particular enrichment technology which has not been demonstrated to produce enriched uranium on a significant scale as of 31 December 2008, may be developed by participants individually or jointly; and any transfer of the resulting facilities and equipment will become subject to paragraph 7(b) no later than prior to the deployment of a prototype. For the purposes of paragraph 7(c) of the Guidelines, a prototype is a system or facility which is operated to generate technical information to confirm the technical potential or viability of the separation process for large-scale separation of uranium isotopes.

Suppliers may propose alternative arrangements relating to control of transfers of new enrichment technology to facilitate cooperation on enrichment technology. Such arrangements should be equivalent to those in paragraph 7(b), and the NSG should be consulted on these arrangements. Participating Governments will review the arrangements for export of enrichment facilities, equipment and technology every five years beginning in 2013 for the purpose of addressing changes in enrichment technology and commercial practices.

- (d) Suppliers recognise that when implementing the arrangements envisaged by paragraph 7 in relation to existing and new cooperative enrichment enterprises, enabling technology may be held by, shared among, and transferred between partners of such enterprises, if partners agree to do so on the basis of their established decision making processes. Suppliers recognise that uranium enrichment may involve supply chains for the production and transfer of equipment for enrichment facilities and such transfers can be made, subject to the relevant provisions of these Guidelines.

- (e) Suppliers should make special efforts to ensure effective implementation of IAEA safeguards at supplied enrichment facilities, consistent with paragraphs 13 and 14 of the Guidelines. For a transfer of an enrichment facility, the supplier and recipient State should work together to ensure that the design and construction of the transferred facility is implemented in such a way so as to facilitate IAEA safeguards. The supplier and recipient State should consult with the IAEA about such design and construction features at the earliest possible time during the facility design phase, and in any event before construction of the enrichment facility is started. The supplier and recipient State should also work together to assist the recipient State in developing effective nuclear material and facilities protection measures, consistent with paragraphs 12 and 14 of the Guidelines.
- (f) Suppliers should satisfy themselves that recipients have security arrangements in place that are equivalent or superior to their own to protect the facilities and technology from use or transfer inconsistent with the national laws of the receiving State.

Definitions Section:

For the purpose of implementing paragraph 7 of the Guidelines, “Cooperative Enrichment Enterprise” means a multi-country or multi-company (where at least two of the companies are incorporated in different countries) joint development or production effort. It could be a consortium of States or companies or a multinational corporation.

Controls on supplied or derived material usable for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices

- 8. Suppliers should, in order to advance the objectives of these guidelines and to provide opportunities further to reduce the risks of proliferation, include, whenever appropriate and practicable, in agreements on supply of nuclear materials or of facilities which produce material usable for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, provisions calling for mutual agreement between the supplier and the recipient on arrangements for reprocessing, storage, alteration, use, transfer or retransfer of any material usable for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices involved.

Controls on retransfer

- 9. (a) Suppliers should transfer trigger list items or related technology only upon the recipient’s assurance that in the case of:
 - (1) retransfer of such items or related technology,
 - or
 - (2) transfer of trigger list items derived from facilities originally transferred by the supplier, or with the help of equipment or technology originally transferred by the supplier;

the recipient of the retransfer or transfer will have provided the same assurances as those required by the supplier for the original transfer.

(b) In addition the supplier's consent should be required for:

- (1) any retransfer of trigger list items or related technology and any transfer referred to under paragraph 9(a) (2) from any State which does not require full scope safeguards, in accordance with paragraph 4(a) of these Guidelines, as a condition of supply;
- (2) any retransfer of enrichment, reprocessing or heavy water production facilities, equipment or related technology, and for any transfer of facilities or equipment of the same type derived from items originally transferred by the supplier;
- (3) any retransfer of heavy water or material usable for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices.

(c) To ensure the consent right as defined under paragraph 9(b), government to government assurances will be required for any relevant original transfer.

(d) Suppliers should consider restraint in the transfer of items and related technology identified in the trigger list if there is a risk of retransfers contrary to the assurances given under paragraph 9(a) and (c) as a result of a failure by the recipient to develop and maintain appropriate, effective national export and transshipment controls, as identified by UNSC Resolution 1540.

Non-proliferation Principle

10. Notwithstanding other provisions of these Guidelines, suppliers should authorize transfer of items or related technology identified in the trigger list only when they are satisfied that the transfers would not contribute to the proliferation of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices or be diverted to acts of nuclear terrorism.

Implementation

11. Suppliers should have in place legal measures to ensure the effective implementation of the Guidelines, including export licensing regulations, enforcement measures, and penalties for violations.

SUPPORTING ACTIVITIES

Physical security

12. Suppliers should promote international co-operation in the areas of physical security through the exchange of physical security information, protection of nuclear materials in transit, and recovery of stolen nuclear materials and equipment. Suppliers should promote broadest adherence to the respective international instruments, inter alia, to the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material, as well as implementation of

INFCIRC/225, as amended from time to time. Suppliers recognize the importance of these activities and other relevant IAEA activities in preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons and countering the threat of nuclear terrorism.

Support for effective IAEA safeguards

13. Suppliers should make special efforts in support of effective implementation of IAEA safeguards. Suppliers should also support the Agency's efforts to assist Member States in the improvement of their national systems of accounting and control of nuclear material and to increase the technical effectiveness of safeguards.

Similarly, they should make every effort to support the IAEA in increasing further the adequacy of safeguards in the light of technical developments and the rapidly growing number of nuclear facilities, and to support appropriate initiatives aimed at improving the effectiveness of IAEA safeguards.

Trigger list plant design features

14. Suppliers should encourage the designers and makers of trigger list facilities to construct them in such a way as to facilitate the application of safeguards and to enhance physical protection, taking also into consideration the risk of terrorist attacks. Suppliers should promote protection of information on the design of trigger list installations, and stress to recipients the necessity of doing so. Suppliers also recognize the importance of including safety and non-proliferation features in designing and construction of trigger list facilities.

Export Controls

15. Suppliers should, where appropriate, stress to recipients the need to subject transferred trigger list items and related technology and trigger list items derived from facilities originally transferred by the supplier or with the help of equipment or technology originally transferred by the supplier to export controls as outlined in UNSC Resolution 1540. Suppliers are encouraged to offer assistance to recipients to fulfil their respective obligations under UNSC Resolution 1540 where appropriate and feasible.

Consultations

16. (a) Suppliers should maintain contact and consult through regular channels on matters connected with the implementation of these Guidelines.
 - (b) Suppliers should consult, as each deems appropriate, with other governments concerned on specific sensitive cases, to ensure that any transfer does not contribute to risks of conflict or instability.
 - (c) Without prejudice to sub-paragraphs (d) to (f) below:
 - In the event that one or more suppliers believe that there has been a violation of supplier/recipient understanding resulting from these Guidelines, particularly in the case of an explosion of a nuclear device, or illegal termination or violation of IAEA safeguards by a recipient, suppliers should consult promptly through diplomatic channels in order to determine and assess the reality and extent of the alleged

violation. Suppliers are also encouraged to consult where nuclear material or nuclear fuel cycles activity undeclared to the IAEA or a nuclear explosive activity is revealed.

- Pending the early outcome of such consultations, suppliers will not act in a manner that could prejudice any measure that may be adopted by other suppliers concerning their current contacts with that recipient. Each supplier should also consider suspending transfers of Trigger List items while consultations under 16(c) are ongoing, pending supplier agreement on an appropriate response.
 - Upon the findings of such consultations, the suppliers, bearing in mind Article XII of the IAEA Statute, should agree on an appropriate response and possible action, which could include the termination of nuclear transfers to that recipient.
- (d) If a recipient is reported by the IAEA to be in breach of its obligation to comply with its safeguards agreement, suppliers should consider the suspension of the transfer of Trigger List items to that State whilst it is under investigation by the IAEA. For the purposes of this paragraph, “breach” refers only to serious breaches of proliferation concern;
- (e) Suppliers support the suspension of transfers of Trigger List items to States that violate their nuclear non-proliferation and safeguards obligations, recognising that the responsibility and authority for such decisions rests with national governments or the United Nations Security Council. In particular, this is applicable in situations where the IAEA Board of Governors takes any of the following actions:
- finds, under Article XII.C of the Statute, that there has been non-compliance in the recipient, or requires a recipient to take specific actions to bring itself into compliance with its safeguards obligations;
 - Decides that the Agency is not able to verify that there has been no diversion of nuclear material required to be safeguarded, including situations where actions taken by a recipient have made the IAEA unable to carry out its safeguards mission in that State.
- An extraordinary Plenary meeting will take place within one month of the Board of Governors’ action, at which suppliers will review the situation, compare national policies and decide on an appropriate response.
- (f) The provisions of subparagraph (e) above do not apply to transfers under paragraph 4 (b) of the Guidelines.

17. Unanimous consent is required for any changes in these Guidelines, including any which might result from the reconsideration mentioned in paragraph 5.

ANNEX A TRIGGER LIST REFERRED TO IN GUIDELINES

GENERAL NOTES

1. The object of these controls should not be defeated by the transfer of component parts. Each government will take such actions as it can to achieve this aim and will continue to seek a workable definition for component parts, which could be used by all suppliers.
2. With reference to Paragraph 9(b)(2) of the Guidelines, *same type* should be understood as when the design, construction or operating processes are based on the same or similar physical or chemical processes as those identified in the Trigger List.
3. Suppliers recognize the close relationship for certain isotope separation processes between plants, equipment and technology for uranium enrichment and that for the separation of stable isotopes for research, medical and other non-nuclear industrial purposes. In that regard, suppliers should carefully review their legal measures, including export licensing regulations and information/technology classification and security practices, for stable isotope separation activities to ensure the implementation of appropriate protection measures as warranted. Suppliers recognize that, in particular cases, appropriate protection measures for stable isotope separation activities will be essentially the same as those for uranium enrichment. (See Introductory Note in Section 5 of the Trigger List.) In accordance with Paragraph 16(a) of the Guidelines, suppliers shall consult with other suppliers as appropriate, in order to promote uniform policies and procedures in the transfer and protection of stable isotope separation plants, equipment and technology.

TECHNOLOGY CONTROLS

The transfer of "technology" directly associated with any item in the List will be subject to as great a degree of scrutiny and control as will the item itself, to the extent permitted by national legislation.

Controls on "technology" transfer do not apply to information "in the public domain" or to "basic scientific research".

In addition to controls on "technology" transfer for nuclear non-proliferation reasons, suppliers should promote protection of this technology for the design, construction, and operation of trigger list facilities in consideration of the risk of terrorist attacks, and should stress to recipients the necessity of doing so.

DEFINITIONS

"Technology" means specific information required for the "development", production", or "use" of any item contained in the List. This information may take the form of "technical data", or "technical assistance".

"Basic scientific research" - Experimental or theoretical work undertaken principally to acquire new knowledge of the fundamental principles of phenomena and observable facts, not primarily directed towards a specific practical aim or objective.

"development" - is related to all phases before "production" such as:

- design
- design research
- design analysis
- design concepts
- assembly and testing of prototypes
- pilot production schemes
- design data
- process of transforming design data into a product
- configuration design
- integration design
- layouts

"in the public domain" - "In the public domain," as it applies herein, means technology that has been made available without restrictions upon its further dissemination. (Copyright restrictions do not remove technology from being in the public domain.)

"production" - means all production phases such as:

- construction
- production engineering
- manufacture
- integration
- assembly (mounting)
- inspection
- testing
- quality assurance

"technical assistance" - "Technical assistance" may take forms such as: instruction, skills, training, working knowledge, consulting services.

Note: "Technical assistance" may involve transfer of "technical data".

"technical data" - "Technical data" may take forms such as blueprints, plans, diagrams, models, formulae, engineering designs and specifications, manuals and instructions written or recorded on other media or devices such as disk, tape, read-only memories.

"use" - Operation, installation (including on-site installation), maintenance (checking), repair, overhaul and refurbishing.

MATERIAL AND EQUIPMENT

1. Source and special fissionable material

As defined in Article XX of the Statute of the International Atomic Energy Agency:

1.1. "Source material"

The term "source material" means uranium containing the mixture of isotopes occurring in nature; uranium depleted in the isotope 235; thorium; any of the foregoing in the form of metal, alloy, chemical compound, or concentrate; any other material containing one or more of the foregoing in such concentration as the Board of Governors shall from time to time determine; and such other material as the Board of Governors shall from time to time determine.

1.2. "Special fissionable material"

- i) The term "special fissionable material" means plutonium-239; uranium-233; uranium enriched in the isotopes 235 or 233; any material containing one or more of the foregoing; and such other fissionable material as the Board of Governors shall from time to time determine; but the term "special fissionable material" does not include source material.
- ii) The term "uranium enriched in the isotopes 235 or 233" means uranium containing the isotopes 235 or 233 or both in an amount such that the abundance ratio of the sum of these isotopes to the isotope 238 is greater than the ratio of the isotope 235 to the isotope 238 occurring in nature.

However, for the purposes of the Guidelines, items specified in subparagraph (a) below, and exports of source or special fissionable material to a given recipient country, within a period of 12 months, below the limits specified in subparagraph (b) below, shall not be included:

- (a) Plutonium with an isotopic concentration of plutonium-238 exceeding 80%.

Special fissionable material when used in gram quantities or less as a sensing component in instruments; and

Source material which the Government is satisfied is to be used only in non-nuclear activities, such as the production of alloys or ceramics;

- | | |
|----------------------------------|---------------------|
| (b) Special fissionable material | 50 effective grams; |
| Natural uranium | 500 kilograms; |
| Depleted uranium | 1000 kilograms; and |
| Thorium | 1000 kilograms. |

2. Equipment and Non-nuclear Materials

The designation of items of equipment and non-nuclear materials adopted by the Government is as follows (quantities below the levels indicated in the Annex B being regarded as insignificant for practical purposes):

- 2.1. Nuclear reactors and especially designed or prepared equipment and components therefor (see Annex B, section 1.);**
- 2.2. Non-nuclear materials for reactors (see Annex B, section 2.);**
- 2.3. Plants for the reprocessing of irradiated fuel elements, and equipment especially designed or prepared therefor (see Annex B, section 3.);**
- 2.4. Plants for the fabrication of nuclear reactor fuel elements, and equipment especially designed or prepared therefor (see Annex B, section 4.);**
- 2.5. Plants for the separation of isotopes of natural uranium, depleted uranium or special fissionable material and equipment, other than analytical instruments, especially designed or prepared therefor (see Annex B, section 5.);**
- 2.6. Plants for the production or concentration of heavy water, deuterium and deuterium compounds and equipment especially designed or prepared therefor (see Annex B, section 6.);**
- 2.7. Plants for the conversion of uranium and plutonium for use in the fabrication of fuel elements and the separation of uranium isotopes as defined in sections 4 and 5 respectively, and equipment especially designed or prepared therefor (See Annex B, section 7.).**

ANNEX B
CLARIFICATION OF ITEMS ON THE TRIGGER LIST
(as designated in Section 2 of MATERIAL AND EQUIPMENT of Annex A)

1. Nuclear reactors and especially designed or prepared equipment and components therefor

1.1. Complete nuclear reactors

Nuclear reactors capable of operation so as to maintain a controlled self-sustaining fission chain reaction, excluding zero energy reactors, the latter being defined as reactors with a designed maximum rate of production of plutonium not exceeding 100 grams per year.

EXPLANATORY NOTE

A "nuclear reactor" basically includes the items within or attached directly to the reactor vessel, the equipment which controls the level of power in the core, and the components which normally contain or come in direct contact with or control the primary coolant of the reactor core.

It is not intended to exclude reactors which could reasonably be capable of modification to produce significantly more than 100 grams of plutonium per year. Reactors designed for sustained operation at significant power levels, regardless of their capacity for plutonium production are not considered as "zero energy reactors".

EXPORTS

The export of the whole set of major items within this boundary will take place only in accordance with the procedures of the Guidelines. Those individual items within this functionally defined boundary which will be exported only in accordance with the procedures of the Guidelines are listed in paragraphs 1.2. to 1.10. The Government reserves to itself the right to apply the procedures of the Guidelines to other items within the functionally defined boundary.

1.2. Nuclear reactor vessels

Metal vessels, or major shop-fabricated parts therefor, especially designed or prepared to contain the core of a nuclear reactor as defined in paragraph 1.1. above, as well as relevant reactor internals as defined in paragraph 1.8. below.

EXPLANATORY NOTE

The reactor vessel head is covered by item 1.2. as a major shop-fabricated part of a reactor vessel.

1.3. Nuclear reactor fuel charging and discharging machines

Manipulative equipment especially designed or prepared for inserting or removing fuel in a nuclear reactor as defined in paragraph 1.1. above.

EXPLANATORY NOTE

The items noted above are capable of on-load operation or at employing technically sophisticated positioning or alignment features to allow complex off-load fueling operations such as those in which direct viewing of or access to the fuel is not normally available.

1.4. Nuclear reactor control rods and equipment

Especially designed or prepared rods, support or suspension structures therefor, rod drive mechanisms or rod guide tubes to control the fission process in a nuclear reactor as defined in paragraph 1.1. above.

1.5. Nuclear reactor pressure tubes

Tubes which are especially designed or prepared to contain fuel elements and the primary coolant in a reactor as defined in paragraph 1.1. above at an operating pressure in excess of 50 atmospheres.

1.6. Zirconium tubes

Zirconium metal and alloys in the form of tubes or assemblies of tubes, and in quantities exceeding 500 kg for any one recipient country in any period of 12 months, especially designed or prepared for use in a reactor as defined in paragraph 1.1. above, and in which the relation of hafnium to zirconium is less than 1:500 parts by weight.

1.7. Primary coolant pumps

Pumps especially designed or prepared for circulating the primary coolant for nuclear reactors as defined in paragraph 1.1. above.

EXPLANATORY NOTE

Especially designed or prepared pumps may include elaborate sealed or multi-sealed systems to prevent leakage of primary coolant, canned-driven pumps, and pumps with inertial mass systems. This definition encompasses pumps certified to Section III, Division I, Subsection NB (Class 1 components) of the American Society of Mechanical Engineers (ASME) Code, or equivalent standards.

1.8. Nuclear reactor internals

"Nuclear reactor internals" especially designed or prepared for use in a nuclear reactor as defined in paragraph 1.1 above, including support columns for the core, fuel channels, thermal shields, baffles, core grid plates, and diffuser plates.

EXPLANATORY NOTE

"Nuclear reactor internals" are major structures within a reactor vessel which have one or more functions such as supporting the core, maintaining fuel alignment, directing primary coolant flow, providing radiation shields for the reactor vessel, and guiding in-core instrumentation.

1.9. Heat exchangers

Heat exchangers (steam generators) especially designed or prepared for use in the primary coolant circuit of a nuclear reactor as defined in paragraph 1.1 above.

EXPLANATORY NOTE

Steam generators are especially designed or prepared to transfer the heat generated in the reactor (primary side) to the feed water (secondary side) for steam generation. In the case of a liquid metal fast breeder reactor for which an intermediate liquid metal coolant loop is also present, the heat exchangers for transferring heat from the primary side to the intermediate coolant circuit are understood to be within the scope of control in addition to the steam generator. The scope of control for this entry does not include heat exchangers for the emergency cooling system or the decay heat cooling system.

1.10. Neutron detection and measuring instruments

Especially designed or prepared neutron detection and measuring instruments for determining neutron flux levels within the core of a reactor as defined in paragraph 1.1. above.

EXPLANATORY NOTE

The scope of this entry encompasses in-core and ex-core instrumentation which measure flux levels in a large range, typically from 10^4 neutrons per cm^2 per second to 10^{10} neutrons per cm^2 per second or more. Ex-core refers to those instruments outside the core of a reactor as defined in paragraph 1.1. above, but located within the biological shielding.

2. Non-nuclear materials for reactors

2.1. Deuterium and heavy water

Deuterium, heavy water (deuterium oxide) and any other deuterium compound in which the ratio of deuterium to hydrogen atoms exceeds 1:5000 for use in a nuclear reactor as defined in paragraph 1.1. above in quantities exceeding 200 kg of deuterium atoms for any one recipient country in any period of 12 months.

2.2. Nuclear grade graphite

Graphite having a purity level better than 5 parts per million boron equivalent and with a density greater than 1.50 g/cm³ for use in a nuclear reactor as defined in paragraph 1.1 above, in quantities exceeding 30 metric tons for any one recipient country in any period of 12 months.

EXPLANATORY NOTE

For the purpose of export control, the Government will determine whether or not the exports of graphite meeting the above specifications are for nuclear reactor use.

Boron equivalent (BE) may be determined experimentally or is calculated as the sum of BE_Z for impurities (excluding BE_{carbon} since carbon is not considered an impurity) including boron, where:

BE_Z (ppm) = CF x concentration of element Z (in ppm);

CF is the conversion factor: ($\sigma_z \times A_B$) divided by ($\sigma_B \times A_z$);

σ_B and σ_z are the thermal neutron capture cross sections (in barns) for naturally occurring boron and

element Z respectively; and A_B and A_z are the atomic masses of naturally occurring boron and element Z respectively.

3. Plants for the reprocessing of irradiated fuel elements, and equipment especially designed or prepared therefor

INTRODUCTORY NOTE

Reprocessing irradiated nuclear fuel separates plutonium and uranium from intensely radioactive fission products and other transuranic elements. Different technical processes can accomplish this separation. However, over the years Purex has become the most commonly used and accepted process. Purex involves the dissolution of irradiated nuclear fuel in nitric acid, followed by separation of the uranium, plutonium, and fission products by solvent extraction using a mixture of tributyl phosphate in an organic diluent.

Purex facilities have process functions similar to each other, including: irradiated fuel element chopping, fuel dissolution, solvent extraction, and process liquor storage. There may also be equipment for thermal denitration of uranium nitrate, conversion of plutonium nitrate to oxide or metal, and treatment of fission product waste liquor to a form suitable for long term storage or disposal. However, the specific type and configuration of the equipment performing these functions may differ between Purex facilities for several reasons, including the type and quantity of irradiated nuclear fuel to be reprocessed and the intended disposition of the recovered materials, and the safety and maintenance philosophy incorporated into the design of the facility.

A "plant for the reprocessing of irradiated fuel elements", includes the equipment and components which normally come in direct contact with and directly control the irradiated fuel and the major nuclear material and fission product processing streams.

These processes, including the complete systems for plutonium conversion and plutonium metal production, may be identified by the measures taken to avoid criticality (e.g. by geometry), radiation exposure (e.g. by shielding), and toxicity hazards (e.g. by containment).

EXPORTS

The export of the whole set of major items within this boundary will take place only in accordance with the procedures of the Guidelines.

The Government reserves to itself the right to apply the procedures of the Guidelines to other items within the functionally defined boundary as listed below.

Items of equipment that are considered to fall within the meaning of the phrase "and equipment especially designed or prepared" for the reprocessing of irradiated fuel elements include:

3.1. Irradiated fuel element chopping machines

INTRODUCTORY NOTE

This equipment breaches the cladding of the fuel to expose the irradiated nuclear material to dissolution. Especially designed metal cutting shears are the most commonly employed, although advanced equipment, such as lasers, may be used.

Remotely operated equipment especially designed or prepared for use in a reprocessing plant as identified above and intended to cut, chop or shear irradiated nuclear fuel assemblies, bundles or rods.

3.2. Dissolvers

INTRODUCTORY NOTE

Dissolvers normally receive the chopped-up spent fuel. In these critically safe vessels, the irradiated nuclear material is dissolved in nitric acid and the remaining hulls removed from the process stream.

Critically safe tanks (e.g. small diameter, annular or slab tanks) especially designed or prepared for use in a reprocessing plant as identified above, intended for dissolution of irradiated nuclear fuel and which are capable of withstanding hot, highly corrosive liquid, and which can be remotely loaded and maintained.

3.3. Solvent extractors and solvent extraction equipment

INTRODUCTORY NOTE

Solvent extractors both receive the solution of irradiated fuel from the dissolvers and the organic solution which separates the uranium, plutonium, and fission products. Solvent extraction equipment is normally designed to meet strict operating parameters, such as long operating lifetimes with no maintenance requirements or adaptability to easy replacement, simplicity of operation and control, and flexibility for variations in process conditions.

Especially designed or prepared solvent extractors such as packed or pulse columns, mixer settlers or centrifugal contactors for use in a plant for the reprocessing of irradiated fuel. Solvent extractors must be resistant to the corrosive effect of nitric acid. Solvent extractors are normally fabricated to extremely high standards (including special welding and inspection and quality assurance and quality control techniques) out of low carbon stainless steels, titanium, zirconium, or other high quality materials.

3.4. Chemical holding or storage vessels

INTRODUCTORY NOTE

Three main process liquor streams result from the solvent extraction step. Holding or storage vessels are used in the further processing of all three streams, as follows:

- (a) The pure uranium nitrate solution is concentrated by evaporation and passed to a denitration process where it is converted to uranium oxide. This oxide is re-used in the nuclear fuel cycle.
- (b) The intensely radioactive fission products solution is normally concentrated by evaporation and stored as a liquor concentrate. This concentrate may be subsequently evaporated and converted to a form suitable for storage or disposal.
- (c) The pure plutonium nitrate solution is concentrated and stored pending its transfer to further process steps. In particular, holding or storage vessels for plutonium solutions are designed to avoid criticality problems resulting from changes in concentration and form of this stream.

Especially designed or prepared holding or storage vessels for use in a plant for the reprocessing of irradiated fuel. The holding or storage vessels must be resistant to the corrosive effect of nitric acid. The holding or storage vessels are normally fabricated of materials such as low carbon stainless steels, titanium or zirconium, or other high quality materials. Holding or storage vessels may be designed for remote operation and maintenance and may have the following features for control of nuclear criticality:

- (1) walls or internal structures with a boron equivalent of at least two per cent, or
- (2) a maximum diameter of 175 mm (7 in) for cylindrical vessels, or
- (3) a maximum width of 75 mm (3 in) for either a slab or annular vessel.

4. Plants for the fabrication of nuclear reactor fuel elements, and equipment especially designed or prepared therefor

INTRODUCTORY NOTE

Nuclear fuel elements are manufactured from one or more of the source or special fissionable materials mentioned in MATERIAL AND EQUIPMENT of this annex. For oxide fuels, the most common type of fuel, equipment for pressing pellets, sintering, grinding and grading will be present. Mixed oxide fuels are handled in glove boxes (or equivalent containment) until they are sealed in the cladding. In all cases, the fuel is hermetically sealed inside a suitable cladding which is designed to be the primary envelope encasing the fuel so as to provide suitable performance and safety during reactor operation. Also, in all cases, precise control of processes, procedures and equipment to extremely high standards is necessary in order to ensure predictable and safe fuel performance.

EXPLANATORY NOTE

Items of equipment that are considered to fall within the meaning of the phrase "and equipment especially designed or prepared" for the fabrication of fuel elements include equipment which:

- (a) normally comes in direct contact with, or directly processes, or controls, the production flow of nuclear material;
- (b) seals the nuclear material within the cladding;
- (c) checks the integrity of the cladding or the seal; or
- (d) checks the finish treatment of the sealed fuel.

Such equipment or systems of equipment may include, for example:

- 1) fully automatic pellet inspection stations especially designed or prepared for checking final dimensions and surface defects of the fuel pellets;
- 2) automatic welding machines especially designed or prepared for welding end caps onto the fuel pins (or rods);
- 3) automatic test and inspection stations especially designed or prepared for checking the integrity of completed fuel pins (or rods).

Item 3 typically includes equipment for: a) x-ray examination of pin (or rod) end cap welds, b) helium leak detection from pressurized pins (or rods), and c) gamma-ray scanning of the pins (or rods) to check for correct loading of the fuel pellets inside.

5. Plants for the separation of isotopes of natural uranium, depleted uranium or special fissionable material and equipment, other than analytical instruments, especially designed or prepared therefor

INTRODUCTORY NOTE

Plants, equipment and technology for the separation of uranium isotopes have, in many instances, a close relationship to plants, equipment and technology for the separation of stable isotopes. In particular cases, the controls under Section 5 also apply to plants and equipment that are intended for the separation of stable isotopes. These controls of plants and equipment for the separation of stable isotopes are complimentary to controls on plants and equipment especially designed or prepared for the processing, use or production of special fissionable material covered by the Trigger List. These complementary Section 5 controls for stable isotope uses do not apply to the electromagnetic isotope separation process, which is addressed under Part 2 of the Guidelines.

Processes for which the controls in Section 5 equally apply whether the intended use is uranium isotope separation or stable isotope separation are: gas centrifuge, gaseous diffusion, the plasma separation process, and aerodynamic processes.

For some processes, the relationship to uranium isotope separation depends on the element (stable isotope) being separated. These processes are: laser-based processes (e.g. molecular laser isotope separation and atomic vapor laser isotope separation), chemical exchange, and ion exchange. Suppliers must therefore evaluate these processes on a case-by-case basis to apply Section 5 controls for stable isotope uses accordingly.

Items of equipment that are considered to fall within the meaning of the phrase "equipment, other than analytical instruments, especially designed or prepared" for the separation of isotopes of uranium include:

5.1. Gas centrifuges and assemblies and components especially designed or prepared for use in gas centrifuges

INTRODUCTORY NOTE

The gas centrifuge normally consists of a thin-walled cylinder(s) of between 75 mm (3 in) and 400 mm (16 in) diameter contained in a vacuum environment and spun at high peripheral speed of the order of 300 m/s or more with its central axis vertical. In order to achieve high speed the materials of construction for the rotating components have to be of a high strength to density ratio and the rotor assembly, and hence its individual components, have to be manufactured to very close tolerances in order to minimize the unbalance. In contrast to other centrifuges, the gas centrifuge for uranium enrichment is characterized by having within the rotor chamber a rotating disc-shaped baffle(s) and a stationary tube arrangement for feeding and extracting the UF₆ gas and featuring at least 3 separate channels, of which 2 are connected to scoops extending from the rotor axis towards the periphery of the rotor chamber. Also contained within the vacuum environment are a number of critical items which do not rotate and which although they are especially designed are not difficult to fabricate

nor are they fabricated out of unique materials. A centrifuge facility however requires a large number of these components, so that quantities can provide an important indication of end use.

5.1.1. Rotating components

(a) Complete rotor assemblies:

Thin-walled cylinders, or a number of interconnected thin-walled cylinders, manufactured from one or more of the high strength to density ratio materials described in the EXPLANATORY NOTE to this Section. If interconnected, the cylinders are joined together by flexible bellows or rings as described in section 5.1.1.(c) following. The rotor is fitted with an internal baffle(s) and end caps, as described in section 5.1.1.(d) and (e) following, if in final form. However the complete assembly may be delivered only partly assembled.

(b) Rotor tubes:

Especially designed or prepared thin-walled cylinders with thickness of 12 mm (0.5 in) or less, a diameter of between 75 mm (3 in) and 400 mm (16 in), and manufactured from one or more of the high strength to density ratio materials described in the EXPLANATORY NOTE to this Section.

(c) Rings or Bellows:

Components especially designed or prepared to give localized support to the rotor tube or to join together a number of rotor tubes. The bellows is a short cylinder of wall thickness 3 mm (0.12 in) or less, a diameter of between 75 mm (3 in) and 400 mm (16 in), having a convolute, and manufactured from one of the high strength to density ratio materials described in the EXPLANATORY NOTE to this Section.

(d) Baffles:

Disc-shaped components of between 75 mm (3 in) and 400 mm (16 in) diameter especially designed or prepared to be mounted inside the centrifuge rotor tube, in order to isolate the take-off chamber from the main separation chamber and, in some cases, to assist the UF₆ gas circulation within the main separation chamber of the rotor tube, and manufactured from one of the high strength to density ratio materials described in the EXPLANATORY NOTE to this Section.

(e) Top caps/Bottom caps:

Disc-shaped components of between 75 mm (3 in) and 400 mm (16 in) diameter especially designed or prepared to fit to the ends of the rotor tube, and so contain the UF₆ within the rotor tube, and in some cases to support, retain or contain as an integrated part an element of the upper bearing (top cap) or to carry the rotating

elements of the motor and lower bearing (bottom cap), and manufactured from one of the high strength to density ratio materials described in the EXPLANATORY NOTE to this Section.

EXPLANATORY NOTE

The materials used for centrifuge rotating components are:

- (a) Maraging steel capable of an ultimate tensile strength of $2.05 \times 10^9 \text{ N/m}^2$ (300,000 psi) or more;
- (b) Aluminium alloys capable of an ultimate tensile strength of $0.46 \times 10^9 \text{ N/m}^2$ (67,000 psi) or more;
- (c) Filamentary materials suitable for use in composite structures and having a specific modulus of $3.18 \times 10^6 \text{ m}$ or greater and a specific ultimate tensile strength of $7.62 \times 10^4 \text{ m}$ or greater ('Specific Modulus' is the Young's Modulus in N/m^2 divided by the specific weight in N/m^3 ; 'Specific Ultimate Tensile Strength' is the ultimate tensile strength in N/m^2 divided by the specific weight in N/m^3).

5.1.2. Static components

- (a) Magnetic suspension bearings:

Especially designed or prepared bearing assemblies consisting of an annular magnet suspended within a housing containing a damping medium. The housing will be manufactured from a UF_6 -resistant material (see EXPLANATORY NOTE to Section 5.2.). The magnet couples with a pole piece or a second magnet fitted to the top cap described in Section 5.1.1.(e). The magnet may be ring-shaped with a relation between outer and inner diameter smaller or equal to 1.6:1. The magnet may be in a form having an initial permeability of 0.15 H/m (120,000 in CGS units) or more, or a remanence of 98.5% or more, or an energy product of greater than 80 kJ/m^3 (10^7 gauss-oersteds). In addition to the usual material properties, it is a prerequisite that the deviation of the magnetic axes from the geometrical axes is limited to very small tolerances (lower than 0.1 mm or 0.004 in) or that homogeneity of the material of the magnet is specially called for.

- (b) Bearings/Dampers:

Especially designed or prepared bearings comprising a pivot/cup assembly mounted on a damper. The pivot is normally a hardened steel shaft with a hemisphere at one end with a means of attachment to the bottom cap described in section 5.1.1.(e) at the other. The shaft may however have a hydrodynamic bearing attached. The cup is pellet-shaped with a hemispherical indentation in one surface. These components are often supplied separately to the damper.

- (c) Molecular pumps:

Especially designed or prepared cylinders having internally machined or extruded helical grooves and internally machined bores. Typical dimensions are as follows: 75 mm (3 in) to 400 mm (16 in) internal diameter, 10 mm (0.4 in) or more wall thickness, with the length equal to or greater than the diameter. The grooves are typically rectangular in cross-section and 2 mm (0.08 in) or more in depth.

(d) Motor stators:

Especially designed or prepared ring-shaped stators for high speed multiphase AC hysteresis (or reluctance) motors for synchronous operation within a vacuum in the frequency range of 600 – 2000 Hz and a power range of 50 - 1000 VA. The stators consist of multi-phase windings on a laminated low loss iron core comprised of thin layers typically 2.0 mm (0.08 in) thick or less.

(e) Centrifuge housing/recipient:

Components especially designed or prepared to contain the rotor tube assembly of a gas centrifuge. The housing consists of a rigid cylinder of wall thickness up to 30 mm (1.2 in) with precision machined ends to locate the bearings and with one or more flanges for mounting. The machined ends are parallel to each other and perpendicular to the cylinder's longitudinal axis to within 0.05 degrees or less. The housing may also be a honeycomb type structure to accommodate several rotor tubes. The housings are made of or protected by materials resistant to corrosion by UF_6 .

(f) Scoops:

Especially designed or prepared tubes of up to 12 mm (0.5 in) internal diameter for the extraction of UF_6 gas from within the rotor tube by a Pitot tube action (that is, with an aperture facing into the circumferential gas flow within the rotor tube, for example by bending the end of a radially disposed tube) and capable of being fixed to the central gas extraction system. The tubes are made of or protected by materials resistant to corrosion by UF_6 .

5.2. Especially designed or prepared auxiliary systems, equipment and components for gas centrifuge enrichment plants

INTRODUCTORY NOTE

The auxiliary systems, equipment and components for a gas centrifuge enrichment plant are the systems of plant needed to feed UF₆ to the centrifuges, to link the individual centrifuges to each other to form cascades (or stages) to allow for progressively higher enrichments and to extract the 'product' and 'tails' UF₆ from the centrifuges, together with the equipment required to drive the centrifuges or to control the plant.

Normally UF₆ is evaporated from the solid using heated autoclaves and is distributed in gaseous form to the centrifuges by way of cascade header pipework. The 'product' and 'tails' UF₆ gaseous streams flowing from the centrifuges are also passed by way of cascade header pipework to cold traps (operating at about 203 K (-70°C)) where they are condensed prior to onward transfer into suitable containers for transportation or storage. Because an enrichment plant consists of many thousands of centrifuges arranged in cascades there are many kilometers of cascade header pipework, incorporating thousands of welds with a substantial amount of repetition of layout. The equipment, components and piping systems are fabricated to very high vacuum and cleanliness standards.

5.2.1. Feed systems/product and tails withdrawal systems

Especially designed or prepared process systems including:

Feed autoclaves (or stations), used for passing UF₆ to the centrifuge cascades at up to 100 kPa (15 psi) and at a rate of 1 kg/h or more;

Desublimers (or cold traps) used to remove UF₆ from the cascades at up to 3 kPa (0.5 psi) pressure. The desublimers are capable of being chilled to 203 K (-70°C) and heated to 343 K (70°C);

'Product' and 'Tails' stations used for trapping UF₆ into containers.

This plant, equipment and pipework is wholly made of or lined with UF₆-resistant materials (see EXPLANATORY NOTE to this section) and is fabricated to very high vacuum and cleanliness standards.

5.2.2. Machine header piping systems

Especially designed or prepared piping systems and header systems for handling UF₆ within the centrifuge cascades. The piping network is normally of the 'triple' header system with each centrifuge connected to each of the headers. There is thus a substantial amount of repetition in its form. It is wholly made of UF₆-resistant materials (see EXPLANATORY NOTE to this section) and is fabricated to very high vacuum and cleanliness standards.

5.2.3 Special shut-off and control valves

Especially designed or prepared bellows-sealed valves, manual or automated, shut-off or control, made of or protected by materials resistant to corrosion by UF₆, with a diameter of 10 to 160 mm, for use in main or auxiliary systems of gas centrifuge enrichment plants.

5.2.4. UF₆ mass spectrometers/ion sources

Especially designed or prepared magnetic or quadrupole mass spectrometers capable of taking 'on-line' samples of feed, product or tails, from UF₆ gas streams and having all of the following characteristics:

1. Unit resolution for atomic mass unit greater than 320;
2. Ion sources constructed of or lined with nichrome or monel or nickel plated;
3. Electron bombardment ionization sources;
4. Having a collector system suitable for isotopic analysis.

5.2.5. Frequency changers

Frequency changers (also known as converters or invertors) especially designed or prepared to supply motor stators as defined under 5.1.2.(d), or parts, components and sub-assemblies of such frequency changers having all of the following characteristics:

1. A multiphase output of 600 to 2000 Hz;
2. High stability (with frequency control better than 0.1%);
3. Low harmonic distortion (less than 2%); and
4. An efficiency of greater than 80%.

EXPLANATORY NOTE

The items listed above either come into direct contact with the UF₆ process gas or directly control the centrifuges and the passage of the gas from centrifuge to centrifuge and cascade to cascade.

Materials resistant to corrosion by UF₆ include stainless steel, aluminium, aluminium alloys, nickel or alloys containing 60% or more nickel.

5.3. Especially designed or prepared assemblies and components for use in gaseous diffusion enrichment

INTRODUCTORY NOTE

In the gaseous diffusion method of uranium isotope separation, the main technological assembly is a special porous gaseous diffusion barrier, heat exchanger for cooling the gas (which is heated by the process of compression), seal valves and control valves, and pipelines. Inasmuch as gaseous diffusion technology uses uranium hexafluoride (UF₆), all equipment, pipeline and instrumentation surfaces (that come in contact with the gas) must be made of materials that remain stable in contact with UF₆. A gaseous diffusion facility requires a number of these assemblies, so that quantities can provide an important indication of end use.

5.3.1. Gaseous diffusion barriers

- (a) Especially designed or prepared thin, porous filters, with a pore size of 100 - 1,000 Å (angstroms), a thickness of 5 mm (0.2 in) or less, and for tubular forms, a diameter of 25 mm (1 in) or less, made of metallic, polymer or ceramic materials resistant to corrosion by UF₆, and
- (b) especially prepared compounds or powders for the manufacture of such filters. Such compounds and powders include nickel or alloys containing 60% or more nickel, aluminium oxide, or UF₆-resistant fully fluorinated hydrocarbon polymers having a purity of 99.9% or more, a particle size less than 10 microns, and a high degree of particle size uniformity, which are especially prepared for the manufacture of gaseous diffusion barriers.

5.3.2. Diffuser housings

Especially designed or prepared hermetically sealed cylindrical vessels greater than 300 mm (12 in) in diameter and greater than 900 mm (35 in) in length, or rectangular vessels of comparable dimensions, which have an inlet connection and two outlet connections all of which are greater than 50 mm (2 in) in diameter, for containing the gaseous diffusion barrier, made of or lined with UF₆-resistant materials and designed for horizontal or vertical installation.

5.3.3. Compressors and gas blowers

Especially designed or prepared axial, centrifugal, or positive displacement compressors, or gas blowers with a suction volume capacity of 1 m³/min or more of UF₆, and with a discharge pressure of up to several hundred kPa (100 psi), designed for long-term operation in the UF₆ environment with or without an electrical motor of appropriate power, as well as separate assemblies of such compressors and gas blowers. These compressors and gas blowers have a pressure ratio between 2:1 and 6:1 and are made of, or lined with, materials resistant to UF₆.

5.3.4. Rotary shaft seals

Especially designed or prepared vacuum seals, with seal feed and seal exhaust connections, for sealing the shaft connecting the compressor or the gas blower rotor with the driver motor so as to ensure a reliable seal against in-leaking of air into the inner chamber of the compressor or gas blower which is filled with UF₆. Such seals are normally designed for a buffer gas in-leakage rate of less than 1000 cm³/min (60 in³/min).

5.3.5. Heat exchangers for cooling UF₆

Especially designed or prepared heat exchangers made of or lined with UF₆-resistant materials (except stainless steel) or with copper or any combination of those metals, and intended for a leakage pressure change rate of less than 10 Pa (0.0015 psi) per hour under a pressure difference of 100 kPa (15 psi).

5.4. Especially designed or prepared auxiliary systems, equipment and components for use in gaseous diffusion enrichment

INTRODUCTORY NOTE

The auxiliary systems, equipment and components for gaseous diffusion enrichment plants are the systems of plant needed to feed UF₆ to the gaseous diffusion assembly, to link the individual assemblies to each other to form cascades (or stages) to allow for progressively higher enrichments and to extract the "product" and "tails" UF₆ from the diffusion cascades. Because of the high inertial properties of diffusion cascades, any interruption in their operation, and especially their shut-down, leads to serious consequences. Therefore, a strict and constant maintenance of vacuum in all technological systems, automatic protection from accidents, and precise automated regulation of the gas flow is of importance in a gaseous diffusion plant. All this leads to a need to equip the plant with a large number of special measuring, regulating and controlling systems.

Normally UF₆ is evaporated from cylinders placed within autoclaves and is distributed in gaseous form to the entry point by way of cascade header pipework. The "product" and "tails" UF₆ gaseous streams flowing from exit points are passed by way of cascade header pipework to either cold traps or to compression stations where the UF₆ gas is liquefied prior to onward transfer into suitable containers for transportation or storage. Because a gaseous diffusion enrichment plant consists of a large number of gaseous diffusion assemblies arranged in cascades, there are many kilometers of cascade header pipework, incorporating thousands of welds with substantial amounts of repetition of layout. The equipment, components and piping systems are fabricated to very high vacuum and cleanliness standards.

5.4.1. Feed systems/product and tails withdrawal systems

Especially designed or prepared process systems, capable of operating at pressures of 300 kPa (45 psi) or less, including:

Feed autoclaves (or systems), used for passing UF₆ to the gaseous diffusion cascades;

Desublimers (or cold traps) used to remove UF₆ from diffusion cascades;

Liquefaction stations where UF₆ gas from the cascade is compressed and cooled to form liquid UF₆;

"Product" or "tails" stations used for transferring UF₆ into containers.

5.4.2. Header piping systems

Especially designed or prepared piping systems and header systems for handling UF₆ within the gaseous diffusion cascades. This piping network is normally of the "double" header system with each cell connected to each of the headers.

5.4.3. Vacuum systems

- (a) Especially designed or prepared large vacuum manifolds, vacuum headers and vacuum pumps having a suction capacity of 5 m³/min (175 ft³/min) or more.
- (b) Vacuum pumps especially designed for service in UF₆-bearing atmospheres made of, or lined with, aluminium, nickel, or alloys bearing more than 60% nickel. These pumps may be either rotary or positive, may have displacement and fluorocarbon seals, and may have special working fluids present.

5.4.4. Special shut-off and control valves

Especially designed or prepared manual or automated shut-off and control bellows valves made of UF₆-resistant materials with a diameter of 40 to 1500 mm (1.5 to 59 in) for installation in main and auxiliary systems of gaseous diffusion enrichment plants.

5.4.5. UF₆ mass spectrometers/ion sources

Especially designed or prepared magnetic or quadrupole mass spectrometers capable of taking "on-line" samples of feed, product or tails, from UF₆ gas streams and having all of the following characteristics:

1. Unit resolution for atomic mass unit greater than 320;
2. Ion sources constructed of or lined with nichrome or monel or nickel plated;
3. Electron bombardment ionization sources;
4. Collector system suitable for isotopic analysis.

EXPLANATORY NOTE

The items listed above either come into direct contact with the UF₆ process gas or directly control the flow within the cascade. All surfaces which come into contact with the process gas are wholly made of, or lined with, UF₆-resistant materials. For the purposes of the sections relating to gaseous diffusion items the materials resistant to corrosion by UF₆ include stainless steel, aluminium, aluminium alloys, aluminium oxide, nickel or alloys containing 60% or more nickel and UF₆-resistant fully fluorinated hydrocarbon polymers.

5.5. Especially designed or prepared systems, equipment and components for use in aerodynamic enrichment plants

INTRODUCTORY NOTE

In aerodynamic enrichment processes, a mixture of gaseous UF₆ and light gas (hydrogen or helium) is compressed and then passed through separating elements wherein isotopic separation is accomplished by the generation of high centrifugal forces over a curved-wall geometry. Two processes of this type have been successfully developed: the separation nozzle process and the vortex tube process. For both processes the main components of a separation stage include cylindrical vessels housing the special separation elements (nozzles or vortex tubes), gas compressors and heat exchangers to remove the heat of compression. An aerodynamic plant requires a number of these stages, so that quantities can provide an important indication of end use. Since aerodynamic processes use UF₆, all equipment, pipeline and instrumentation surfaces (that come in contact with the gas) must be made of materials that remain stable in contact with UF₆.

EXPLANATORY NOTE

The items listed in this section either come into direct contact with the UF₆ process gas or directly control the flow within the cascade. All surfaces which come into contact with the process gas are wholly made of or protected by UF₆-resistant materials. For the purposes of the section relating to aerodynamic enrichment items, the materials resistant to corrosion by UF₆ include copper, stainless steel, aluminium, aluminium alloys, nickel or alloys containing 60% or more nickel and UF₆-resistant fully fluorinated hydrocarbon polymers.

5.5.1. Separation nozzles

Especially designed or prepared separation nozzles and assemblies thereof. The separation nozzles consist of slit-shaped, curved channels having a radius of curvature less than 1 mm (typically 0.1 to 0.05 mm), resistant to corrosion by UF₆ and having a knife-edge within the nozzle that separates the gas flowing through the nozzle into two fractions.

5.5.2. Vortex tubes

Especially designed or prepared vortex tubes and assemblies thereof. The vortex tubes are cylindrical or tapered, made of or protected by materials resistant to corrosion by UF₆, having a diameter of between 0.5 cm and 4 cm, a length to diameter ratio of 20:1 or less and with one or more tangential inlets. The tubes may be equipped with nozzle-type appendages at either or both ends.

EXPLANATORY NOTE

The feed gas enters the vortex tube tangentially at one end or through swirl vanes or at numerous tangential positions along the periphery of the tube.

5.5.3. Compressors and gas blowers

Especially designed or prepared axial, centrifugal or positive displacement compressors or gas blowers made of or protected by materials resistant to corrosion by UF₆ and with a suction volume capacity of 2 m³/min or more of UF₆/carrier gas (hydrogen or helium) mixture.

EXPLANATORY NOTE

These compressors and gas blowers typically have a pressure ratio between 1.2:1 and 6:1.

5.5.4. Rotary shaft seals

Especially designed or prepared rotary shaft seals, with seal feed and seal exhaust connections, for sealing the shaft connecting the compressor rotor or the gas blower rotor with the driver motor so as to ensure a reliable seal against out-leakage of process gas or in-leakage of air or seal gas into the inner chamber of the compressor or gas blower which is filled with a UF₆/carrier gas mixture.

5.5.5. Heat exchangers for gas cooling

Especially designed or prepared heat exchangers made of or protected by materials resistant to corrosion by UF₆.

5.5.6. Separation element housings

Especially designed or prepared separation element housings, made of or protected by materials resistant to corrosion by UF₆, for containing vortex tubes or separation nozzles.

EXPLANATORY NOTE

These housings may be cylindrical vessels greater than 300 mm in diameter and greater than 900 mm in length, or may be rectangular vessels of comparable dimensions, and may be designed for horizontal or vertical installation.

5.5.7. Feed systems/product and tails withdrawal systems

Especially designed or prepared process systems or equipment for enrichment plants made of or protected by materials resistant to corrosion by UF₆, including:

- (a) Feed autoclaves, ovens, or systems used for passing UF₆ to the enrichment process;
- (b) Desublimers (or cold traps) used to remove UF₆ from the enrichment process for subsequent transfer upon heating;
- (c) Solidification or liquefaction stations used to remove UF₆ from the enrichment process by compressing and converting UF₆ to a liquid or solid form;

(d) 'Product' or 'tails' stations used for transferring UF₆ into containers.

5.5.8. Header piping systems

Especially designed or prepared header piping systems, made of or protected by materials resistant to corrosion by UF₆, for handling UF₆ within the aerodynamic cascades. This piping network is normally of the 'double' header design with each stage or group of stages connected to each of the headers.

5.5.9. Vacuum systems and pumps

- (a) Especially designed or prepared vacuum systems having a suction capacity of 5 m³/min or more, consisting of vacuum manifolds, vacuum headers and vacuum pumps, and designed for service in UF₆-bearing atmospheres,
- (b) Vacuum pumps especially designed or prepared for service in UF₆-bearing atmospheres and made of or protected by materials resistant to corrosion by UF₆. These pumps may use fluorocarbon seals and special working fluids.

5.5.10. Special shut-off and control valves

Especially designed or prepared manual or automated shut-off and control bellows valves made of or protected by materials resistant to corrosion by UF₆ with a diameter of 40 to 1500 mm for installation in main and auxiliary systems of aerodynamic enrichment plants.

5.5.11. UF₆ mass spectrometers/Ion sources

Especially designed or prepared magnetic or quadrupole mass spectrometers capable of taking 'on-line' samples of feed, 'product' or 'tails', from UF₆ gas streams and having all of the following characteristics:

1. Unit resolution for mass greater than 320;
2. Ion sources constructed of or lined with nichrome or monel or nickel plated;
3. Electron bombardment ionization sources;
4. Collector system suitable for isotopic analysis.

5.5.12. UF₆/carrier gas separation systems

Especially designed or prepared process systems for separating UF₆ from carrier gas (hydrogen or helium).

EXPLANATORY NOTE

These systems are designed to reduce the UF₆ content in the carrier gas to 1 ppm or less and may incorporate equipment such as:

- (a) Cryogenic heat exchangers and cryoseparators capable of temperatures of -120°C or less, or
- (b) Cryogenic refrigeration units capable of temperatures of -120°C or less, or
- (c) Separation nozzle or vortex tube units for the separation of UF₆ from carrier gas, or
- (d) UF₆ cold traps capable of temperatures of -20°C or less.

5.6. Especially designed or prepared systems, equipment and components for use in chemical exchange or ion exchange enrichment plants.

INTRODUCTORY NOTE

The slight difference in mass between the isotopes of uranium causes small changes in chemical reaction equilibria that can be used as a basis for separation of the isotopes. Two processes have been successfully developed: liquid-liquid chemical exchange and solid-liquid ion exchange.

In the liquid-liquid chemical exchange process, immiscible liquid phases (aqueous and organic) are countercurrently contacted to give the cascading effect of thousands of separation stages. The aqueous phase consists of uranium chloride in hydrochloric acid solution; the organic phase consists of an extractant containing uranium chloride in an organic solvent. The contactors employed in the separation cascade can be liquid-liquid exchange columns (such as pulsed columns with sieve plates) or liquid centrifugal contactors. Chemical conversions (oxidation and reduction) are required at both ends of the separation cascade in order to provide for the reflux requirements at each end. A major design concern is to avoid contamination of the process streams with certain metal ions. Plastic, plastic-lined (including use of fluorocarbon polymers) and/or glass-lined columns and piping are therefore used.

In the solid-liquid ion-exchange process, enrichment is accomplished by uranium adsorption/desorption on a special, very fast-acting, ion-exchange resin or adsorbent. A solution of uranium in hydrochloric acid and other chemical agents is passed through cylindrical enrichment columns containing packed beds of the adsorbent. For a continuous process, a reflux system is necessary to release the uranium from the adsorbent back into the liquid flow so that 'product' and 'tails' can be collected. This is accomplished with the use of suitable reduction/oxidation chemical agents that are fully regenerated in separate external circuits and that may be partially regenerated within the isotopic separation columns themselves. The presence of hot concentrated hydrochloric acid solutions in the process requires that the equipment be made of or protected by special corrosion-resistant materials.

5.6.1. Liquid-liquid exchange columns (Chemical exchange)

Countercurrent liquid-liquid exchange columns having mechanical power input (i.e., pulsed columns with sieve plates, reciprocating plate columns, and columns with internal turbine mixers), especially designed or prepared for uranium enrichment using the chemical exchange process. For corrosion resistance to concentrated hydrochloric acid solutions, these columns and their internals are made of or protected by suitable plastic materials (such as fluorocarbon polymers) or glass. The stage residence time of the columns is designed to be short (30 seconds or less).

5.6.2. Liquid-liquid centrifugal contactors (Chemical exchange)

Liquid-liquid centrifugal contactors especially designed or prepared for uranium enrichment using the chemical exchange process. Such contactors use rotation to achieve dispersion of the organic and aqueous streams and then centrifugal force to separate the phases. For corrosion resistance to concentrated hydrochloric acid

solutions, the contactors are made of or are lined with suitable plastic materials (such as fluorocarbon polymers) or are lined with glass. The stage residence time of the centrifugal contactors is designed to be short (30 seconds or less).

5.6.3. Uranium reduction systems and equipment (Chemical exchange)

- (a) Especially designed or prepared electrochemical reduction cells to reduce uranium from one valence state to another for uranium enrichment using the chemical exchange process. The cell materials in contact with process solutions must be corrosion resistant to concentrated hydrochloric acid solutions.

EXPLANATORY NOTE

The cell cathodic compartment must be designed to prevent re-oxidation of uranium to its higher valence state. To keep the uranium in the cathodic compartment, the cell may have an impervious diaphragm membrane constructed of special cation exchange material. The cathode consists of a suitable solid conductor such as graphite.

- (b) Especially designed or prepared systems at the product end of the cascade for taking the U^{+4} out of the organic stream, adjusting the acid concentration and feeding to the electrochemical reduction cells.

EXPLANATORY NOTE

These systems consist of solvent extraction equipment for stripping the U^{+4} from the organic stream into an aqueous solution, evaporation and/or other equipment to accomplish solution pH adjustment and control, and pumps or other transfer devices for feeding to the electrochemical reduction cells. A major design concern is to avoid contamination of the aqueous stream with certain metal ions. Consequently, for those parts in contact with the process stream, the system is constructed of equipment made of or protected by suitable materials (such as glass, fluorocarbon polymers, polyphenyl sulfate, polyether sulfone, and resin-impregnated graphite).

5.6.4. Feed preparation systems (Chemical exchange)

Especially designed or prepared systems for producing high-purity uranium chloride feed solutions for chemical exchange uranium isotope separation plants.

EXPLANATORY NOTE

These systems consist of dissolution, solvent extraction and/or ion exchange equipment for purification and electrolytic cells for reducing the uranium U^{+6} or U^{+4} to U^{+3} . These systems produce uranium chloride solutions having only a few parts per million of metallic impurities such as chromium, iron, vanadium, molybdenum and other bivalent or higher multi-valent cations. Materials of construction for portions of the system processing high-purity U^{+3} include glass, fluorocarbon polymers, polyphenyl sulfate or polyether sulfone plastic-lined and resin-impregnated graphite.

5.6.5. Uranium oxidation systems (Chemical exchange)

Especially designed or prepared systems for oxidation of U^{+3} to U^{+4} for return to the uranium isotope separation cascade in the chemical exchange enrichment process.

EXPLANATORY NOTE

These systems may incorporate equipment such as:

- (a) Equipment for contacting chlorine and oxygen with the aqueous effluent from the isotope separation equipment and extracting the resultant U^{+4} into the stripped organic stream returning from the product end of the cascade,
- (b) Equipment that separates water from hydrochloric acid so that the water and the concentrated hydrochloric acid may be reintroduced to the process at the proper locations.

5.6.6. Fast-reacting ion exchange resins/adsorbents (Ion exchange)

Fast-reacting ion-exchange resins or adsorbents especially designed or prepared for uranium enrichment using the ion exchange process, including porous macroreticular resins, and/or pellicular structures in which the active chemical exchange groups are limited to a coating on the surface of an inactive porous support structure, and other composite structures in any suitable form including particles or fibers. These ion exchange resins/adsorbents have diameters of 0.2 mm or less and must be chemically resistant to concentrated hydrochloric acid solutions as well as physically strong enough so as not to degrade in the exchange columns. The resins/adsorbents are especially designed to achieve very fast uranium isotope exchange kinetics (exchange rate half-time of less than 10 seconds) and are capable of operating at a temperature in the range of 100°C to 200°C.

5.6.7. Ion exchange columns (Ion exchange)

Cylindrical columns greater than 1000 mm in diameter for containing and supporting packed beds of ion exchange resin/adsorbent, especially designed or prepared for uranium enrichment using the ion exchange process. These columns are made of or protected by materials (such as titanium or fluorocarbon plastics) resistant to corrosion by concentrated hydrochloric acid solutions and are capable of operating at a temperature in the range of 100°C to 200°C and pressures above 0.7 MPa (102 psi).

5.6.8. Ion exchange reflux systems (Ion exchange)

- (a) Especially designed or prepared chemical or electrochemical reduction systems for regeneration of the chemical reducing agent(s) used in ion exchange uranium enrichment cascades.
- (b) Especially designed or prepared chemical or electrochemical oxidation systems for regeneration of the chemical oxidizing agent(s) used in ion exchange uranium enrichment cascades.

EXPLANATORY NOTE

The ion exchange enrichment process may use, for example, trivalent titanium (Ti^{+3}) as a reducing cation in which case the reduction system would regenerate Ti^{+3} by reducing Ti^{+4} .

The process may use, for example, trivalent iron (Fe^{+3}) as an oxidant in which case the oxidation system would regenerate Fe^{+3} by oxidizing Fe^{+2} .

5.7. Especially designed or prepared systems, equipment and components for use in laser-based enrichment plants.

INTRODUCTORY NOTE

Present systems for enrichment processes using lasers fall into two categories: those in which the process medium is atomic uranium vapor and those in which the process medium is the vapor of a uranium compound. Common nomenclature for such processes include: first category - atomic vapor laser isotope separation (AVLIS or SILVA); second category - molecular laser isotope separation (MLIS or MOLIS) and chemical reaction by isotope selective laser activation (CRISLA). The systems, equipment and components for laser enrichment plants embrace: (a) devices to feed uranium-metal vapor (for selective photo-ionization) or devices to feed the vapor of a uranium compound (for photo-dissociation or chemical activation); (b) devices to collect enriched and depleted uranium metal as 'product' and 'tails' in the first category, and devices to collect dissociated or reacted compounds as 'product' and unaffected material as 'tails' in the second category; (c) process laser systems to selectively excite the uranium-235 species; and (d) feed preparation and product conversion equipment. The complexity of the spectroscopy of uranium atoms and compounds may require incorporation of any of a number of available laser technologies.

EXPLANATORY NOTE

Many of the items listed in this section come into direct contact with uranium metal vapor or liquid or with process gas consisting of UF_6 or a mixture of UF_6 and other gases. All surfaces that come into contact with the uranium or UF_6 are wholly made of or protected by corrosion-resistant materials. For the purposes of the section relating to laser-based enrichment items, the materials resistant to corrosion by the vapor or liquid of uranium metal or uranium alloys include yttria-coated graphite and tantalum; and the materials resistant to corrosion by UF_6 include copper, stainless steel, aluminium, aluminium alloys, nickel or alloys containing 60% or more nickel and UF_6 -resistant fully fluorinated hydrocarbon polymers.

5.7.1. Uranium vaporization systems (AVLIS)

Especially designed or prepared uranium vaporization systems which contain high-power strip or scanning electron beam guns with a delivered power on the target of more than 2.5 kW/cm.

5.7.2. Liquid uranium metal handling systems (AVLIS)

Especially designed or prepared liquid metal handling systems for molten uranium or uranium alloys, consisting of crucibles and cooling equipment for the crucibles.

EXPLANATORY NOTE

The crucibles and other parts of this system that come into contact with molten uranium or uranium alloys are made of or protected by materials of suitable corrosion and heat resistance. Suitable materials include tantalum, yttria-coated graphite,

graphite coated with other rare earth oxides (see INFCIRC/254/Part 2 - (as amended)) or mixtures thereof.

5.7.3. Uranium metal 'product' and 'tails' collector assemblies (AVLIS)

Especially designed or prepared 'product' and 'tails' collector assemblies for uranium metal in liquid or solid form.

EXPLANATORY NOTE

Components for these assemblies are made of or protected by materials resistant to the heat and corrosion of uranium metal vapor or liquid (such as yttria-coated graphite or tantalum) and may include pipes, valves, fittings, 'gutters', feed-throughs, heat exchangers and collector plates for magnetic, electrostatic or other separation methods.

5.7.4. Separator module housings (AVLIS)

Especially designed or prepared cylindrical or rectangular vessels for containing the uranium metal vapor source, the electron beam gun, and the 'product' and 'tails' collectors.

EXPLANATORY NOTE

These housings have multiplicity of ports for electrical and water feed-throughs, laser beam windows, vacuum pump connections and instrumentation diagnostics and monitoring. They have provisions for opening and closure to allow refurbishment of internal components.

5.7.5. Supersonic expansion nozzles (MLIS)

Especially designed or prepared supersonic expansion nozzles for cooling mixtures of UF₆ and carrier gas to 150 K or less and which are corrosion resistant to UF₆.

5.7.6. Uranium pentafluoride product collectors (MLIS)

Especially designed or prepared uranium pentafluoride (UF₅) solid product collectors consisting of filter, impact, or cyclone-type collectors, or combinations thereof, and which are corrosion resistant to the UF₅/UF₆ environment.

5.7.7. UF₆/carrier gas compressors (MLIS)

Especially designed or prepared compressors for UF₆/carrier gas mixtures, designed for long term operation in a UF₆ environment. The components of these compressors that come into contact with process gas are made of or protected by materials resistant to corrosion by UF₆.

5.7.8. Rotary shaft seals (MLIS)

Especially designed or prepared rotary shaft seals, with seal feed and seal exhaust connections, for sealing the shaft connecting the compressor rotor with the driver motor so as to ensure a reliable seal against out-leakage of process gas or in-leakage of air or seal gas into the inner chamber of the compressor which is filled with a UF₆/carrier gas mixture.

5.7.9. Fluorination systems (MLIS)

Especially designed or prepared systems for fluorinating UF₅ (solid) to UF₆ (gas).

EXPLANATORY NOTE

These systems are designed to fluorinate the collected UF₅ powder to UF₆ for subsequent collection in product containers or for transfer as feed to MLIS units for additional enrichment. In one approach, the fluorination reaction may be accomplished within the isotope separation system to react and recover directly off the 'product' collectors. In another approach, the UF₅ powder may be removed/transferred from the 'product' collectors into a suitable reaction vessel (e.g., fluidized-bed reactor, screw reactor or flame tower) for fluorination. In both approaches, equipment for storage and transfer of fluorine (or other suitable fluorinating agents) and for collection and transfer of UF₆ are used.

5.7.10. UF₆ mass spectrometers/ion sources (MLIS)

Especially designed or prepared magnetic or quadrupole mass spectrometers capable of taking 'on-line' samples of feed, 'product' or 'tails', from UF₆ gas streams and having all of the following characteristics:

1. Unit resolution for mass greater than 320;
2. Ion sources constructed of or lined with nichrome or monel or nickel plated;
3. Electron bombardment ionization sources;
4. Collector system suitable for isotopic analysis.

5.7.11. Feed systems/product and tails withdrawal systems (MLIS)

Especially designed or prepared process systems or equipment for enrichment plants made of or protected by materials resistant to corrosion by UF₆, including:

- (a) Feed autoclaves, ovens, or systems used for passing UF₆ to the enrichment process;
- (b) Desublimers (or cold traps) used to remove UF₆ from the enrichment process for subsequent transfer upon heating;
- (c) Solidification or liquefaction stations used to remove UF₆ from the enrichment process by compressing and converting UF₆ to a liquid or solid form;

(d) 'Product' or 'tails' stations used for transferring UF₆ into containers.

5.7.12. UF₆/carrier gas separation systems (MLIS)

Especially designed or prepared process systems for separating UF₆ from carrier gas. The carrier gas may be nitrogen, argon, or other gas.

EXPLANATORY NOTE

These systems may incorporate equipment such as:

- (a) Cryogenic heat exchangers or cryoseparators capable of temperatures of -120°C or less, or
- (b) Cryogenic refrigeration units capable of temperatures of -120°C or less, or
- (c) UF₆ cold traps capable of temperatures of -20°C or less.

5.7.13. Laser systems (AVLIS, MLIS and CRISLA)

Lasers or laser systems especially designed or prepared for the separation of uranium isotopes.

EXPLANATORY NOTE

The lasers and laser components of importance in laser-based enrichment processes include those identified in INFICIRC/254/Part 2 - (as amended). The laser system for the AVLIS process usually consists of two lasers: a copper vapor laser and a dye laser. The laser system for MLIS usually consists of a CO₂ or excimer laser and a multi-pass optical cell with revolving mirrors at both ends. Lasers or laser systems for both processes require a spectrum frequency stabilizer for operation over extended periods of time.

5.8. Especially designed or prepared systems, equipment and components for use in plasma separation enrichment plants.

INTRODUCTORY NOTE

In the plasma separation process, a plasma of uranium ions passes through an electric field tuned to the ^{235}U ion resonance frequency so that they preferentially absorb energy and increase the diameter of their corkscrew-like orbits. Ions with a large-diameter path are trapped to produce a product enriched in ^{235}U . The plasma, which is made by ionizing uranium vapor, is contained in a vacuum chamber with a high-strength magnetic field produced by a superconducting magnet. The main technological systems of the process include the uranium plasma generation system, the separator module with superconducting magnet (see INFCIRC/254/Part 2 - (as amended)), and metal removal systems for the collection of 'product' and 'tails'.

5.8.1. Microwave power sources and antennae

Especially designed or prepared microwave power sources and antennae for producing or accelerating ions and having the following characteristics: greater than 30 GHz frequency and greater than 50 kW mean power output for ion production.

5.8.2. Ion excitation coils

Especially designed or prepared radio frequency ion excitation coils for frequencies of more than 100 kHz and capable of handling more than 40 kW mean power.

5.8.3. Uranium plasma generation systems

Especially designed or prepared systems for the generation of uranium plasma, which may contain high-power strip or scanning electron beam guns with a delivered power on the target of more than 2.5 kW/cm.

5.8.4. Liquid uranium metal handling systems

Especially designed or prepared liquid metal handling systems for molten uranium or uranium alloys, consisting of crucibles and cooling equipment for the crucibles.

EXPLANATORY NOTE

The crucibles and other parts of this system that come into contact with molten uranium or uranium alloys are made of or protected by materials of suitable corrosion and heat resistance. Suitable materials include tantalum, yttria-coated graphite, graphite coated with other rare earth oxides (see INFCIRC/254/Part 2 - (as amended)) or mixtures thereof.

5.8.5. Uranium metal 'product' and 'tails' collector assemblies

Especially designed or prepared 'product' and 'tails' collector assemblies for uranium metal in solid form. These collector assemblies are made of or protected by materials resistant to the heat and corrosion of uranium metal vapour, such as yttria-coated graphite or tantalum.

5.8.6. Separator module housings

Cylindrical vessels especially designed or prepared for use in plasma separation enrichment plants for containing the uranium plasma source, radio-frequency drive coil and the 'product' and 'tails' collectors.

EXPLANATORY NOTE

These housings have a multiplicity of ports for electrical feed-throughs, diffusion pump connections and instrumentation diagnostics and monitoring. They have provisions for opening and closure to allow for refurbishment of internal components and are constructed of a suitable non-magnetic material such as stainless steel.

5.9. Especially designed or prepared systems, equipment and components for use in electromagnetic enrichment plants.

INTRODUCTORY NOTE

In the electromagnetic process, uranium metal ions produced by ionization of a salt feed material (typically UCl_4) are accelerated and passed through a magnetic field that has the effect of causing the ions of different isotopes to follow different paths. The major components of an electromagnetic isotope separator include: a magnetic field for ion-beam diversion/separation of the isotopes, an ion source with its acceleration system, and a collection system for the separated ions. Auxiliary systems for the process include the magnet power supply system, the ion source high-voltage power supply system, the vacuum system, and extensive chemical handling systems for recovery of product and cleaning/recycling of components.

5.9.1. Electromagnetic isotope separators

Electromagnetic isotope separators especially designed or prepared for the separation of uranium isotopes, and equipment and components therefor, including:

(a) Ion sources

Especially designed or prepared single or multiple uranium ion sources consisting of a vapor source, ionizer, and beam accelerator, constructed of suitable materials such as graphite, stainless steel, or copper, and capable of providing a total ion beam current of 50 mA or greater.

(b) Ion collectors

Collector plates consisting of two or more slits and pockets especially designed or prepared for collection of enriched and depleted uranium ion beams and constructed of suitable materials such as graphite or stainless steel.

(c) Vacuum housings

Especially designed or prepared vacuum housings for uranium electromagnetic separators, constructed of suitable non-magnetic materials such as stainless steel and designed for operation at pressures of 0.1 Pa or lower.

EXPLANATORY NOTE

The housings are specially designed to contain the ion sources, collector plates and water-cooled liners and have provision for diffusion pump connections and opening and closure for removal and reinstallation of these components.

(d) Magnet pole pieces

Especially designed or prepared magnet pole pieces having a diameter greater than 2 m used to maintain a constant magnetic field within an electromagnetic isotope separator and to transfer the magnetic field between adjoining separators.

5.9.2. High voltage power supplies

Especially designed or prepared high-voltage power supplies for ion sources, having all of the following characteristics: capable of continuous operation, output voltage of 20,000 V or greater, output current of 1 A or greater, and voltage regulation of better than 0.01% over a time period of 8 hours.

5.9.3. Magnet power supplies

Especially designed or prepared high-power, direct current magnet power supplies having all of the following characteristics: capable of continuously producing a current output of 500 A or greater at a voltage of 100 V or greater and with a current or voltage regulation better than 0.01% over a period of 8 hours.

6. Plants for the production or concentration of heavy water, deuterium and deuterium compounds and equipment especially designed or prepared therefor

INTRODUCTORY NOTE

Heavy water can be produced by a variety of processes. However, the two processes that have proven to be commercially viable are the water-hydrogen sulphide exchange process (GS process) and the ammonia-hydrogen exchange process.

The GS process is based upon the exchange of hydrogen and deuterium between water and hydrogen sulphide within a series of towers which are operated with the top section cold and the bottom section hot. Water flows down the towers while the hydrogen sulphide gas circulates from the bottom to the top of the towers. A series of perforated trays are used to promote mixing between the gas and the water. Deuterium migrates to the water at low temperatures and to the hydrogen sulphide at high temperatures. Gas or water, enriched in deuterium, is removed from the first stage towers at the junction of the hot and cold sections and the process is repeated in subsequent stage towers. The product of the last stage, water enriched up to 30% in deuterium, is sent to a distillation unit to produce reactor grade heavy water; i.e., 99.75% deuterium oxide.

The ammonia-hydrogen exchange process can extract deuterium from synthesis gas through contact with liquid ammonia in the presence of a catalyst. The synthesis gas is fed into exchange towers and to an ammonia converter. Inside the towers the gas flows from the bottom to the top while the liquid ammonia flows from the top to the bottom. The deuterium is stripped from the hydrogen in the synthesis gas and concentrated in the ammonia. The ammonia then flows into an ammonia cracker at the bottom of the tower while the gas flows into an ammonia converter at the top. Further enrichment takes place in subsequent stages and reactor grade heavy water is produced through final distillation. The synthesis gas feed can be provided by an ammonia plant that, in turn, can be constructed in association with a heavy water ammonia-hydrogen exchange plant. The ammonia-hydrogen exchange process can also use ordinary water as a feed source of deuterium.

Many of the key equipment items for heavy water production plants using GS or the ammonia-hydrogen exchange processes are common to several segments of the chemical and petroleum industries. This is particularly so for small plants using the GS process. However, few of the items are available "off-the-shelf". The GS and ammonia-hydrogen processes require the handling of large quantities of flammable, corrosive and toxic fluids at elevated pressures. Accordingly, in establishing the design and operating standards for plants and equipment using these processes, careful attention to the materials selection and specifications is required to ensure long service life with high safety and reliability factors. The choice of scale is primarily a function of economics and need. Thus, most of the equipment items would be prepared according to the requirements of the customer.

Finally, it should be noted that, in both the GS and the ammonia-hydrogen exchange processes, items of equipment which individually are not especially designed or prepared for heavy water production can be assembled into systems which are especially designed or prepared for producing heavy water. The catalyst production

system used in the ammonia-hydrogen exchange process and water distillation systems used for the final concentration of heavy water to reactor-grade in either process are examples of such systems.

The items of equipment which are especially designed or prepared for the production of heavy water utilizing either the water-hydrogen sulphide exchange process or the ammonia-hydrogen exchange process include the following:

6.1. Water - Hydrogen Sulphide Exchange Towers

Exchange towers fabricated from fine carbon steel (such as ASTM A516) with diameters of 6 m (20 ft) to 9 m (30 ft), capable of operating at pressures greater than or equal to 2 MPa (300 psi) and with a corrosion allowance of 6 mm or greater, especially designed or prepared for heavy water production utilizing the water-hydrogen sulphide exchange process.

6.2. Blowers and Compressors

Single stage, low head (i.e., 0.2 MPa or 30 psi) centrifugal blowers or compressors for hydrogen-sulphide gas circulation (i.e., gas containing more than 70% H₂S) especially designed or prepared for heavy water production utilizing the water-hydrogen sulphide exchange process. These blowers or compressors have a throughput capacity greater than or equal to 56 m³/second (120,000 SCFM) while operating at pressures greater than or equal to 1.8 MPa (260 psi) suction and have seals designed for wet H₂S service.

6.3. Ammonia-Hydrogen Exchange Towers

Ammonia-hydrogen exchange towers greater than or equal to 35 m (114.3 ft) in height with diameters of 1.5 m (4.9 ft) to 2.5 m (8.2 ft) capable of operating at pressures greater than 15 MPa (2225 psi) especially designed or prepared for heavy water production utilizing the ammonia-hydrogen exchange process. These towers also have at least one flanged, axial opening of the same diameter as the cylindrical part through which the tower internals can be inserted or withdrawn.

6.4. Tower Internals and Stage Pumps

Tower internals and stage pumps especially designed or prepared for towers for heavy water production utilizing the ammonia-hydrogen exchange process. Tower internals include especially designed stage contactors which promote intimate gas/liquid contact. Stage pumps include especially designed submersible pumps for circulation of liquid ammonia within a contacting stage internal to the stage towers.

6.5. Ammonia Crackers

Ammonia crackers with operating pressures greater than or equal to 3 MPa (450 psi) especially designed or prepared for heavy water production utilizing the ammonia-hydrogen exchange process.

6.6. Infrared Absorption Analyzers

Infrared absorption analyzers capable of "on-line" hydrogen/deuterium ratio analysis where deuterium concentrations are equal to or greater than 90%.

6.7. Catalytic Burners

Catalytic burners for the conversion of enriched deuterium gas into heavy water especially designed or prepared for heavy water production utilizing the ammonia-hydrogen exchange process.

6.8. Complete heavy water upgrade systems or columns therefor

Complete heavy water upgrade systems, or columns therefor, especially designed or prepared for the upgrade of heavy water to reactor-grade deuterium concentration.

EXPLANATORY NOTE

These systems, which usually employ water distillation to separate heavy water from light water, are especially designed or prepared to produce reactor-grade heavy water (i.e., typically 99.75% deuterium oxide) from heavy water feedstock of lesser concentration.

7. Plants for the conversion of uranium and plutonium for use in the fabrication of fuel elements and the separation of uranium isotopes as defined in sections 4 and 5 respectively, and equipment especially designed or prepared therefor

EXPORTS

The export of the whole set of major items within this boundary will take place only in accordance with the procedures of the Guidelines. All of the plants, systems, and especially designed or prepared equipment within this boundary can be used for the processing, production, or use of special fissionable material.

7.1. Plants for the conversion of uranium and equipment especially designed or prepared therefor

INTRODUCTORY NOTE

Uranium conversion plants and systems may perform one or more transformations from one uranium chemical species to another, including: conversion of uranium ore concentrates to UO_3 , conversion of UO_3 to UO_2 , conversion of uranium oxides to UF_4 , UF_6 , or UCl_4 , conversion of UF_4 to UF_6 , conversion of UF_6 to UF_4 , conversion of UF_4 to uranium metal, and conversion of uranium fluorides to UO_2 . Many of the key equipment items for uranium conversion plants are common to several segments of the chemical process industry. For example, the types of equipment employed in these processes may include: furnaces, rotary kilns, fluidized bed reactors, flame tower reactors, liquid centrifuges, distillation columns and liquid-liquid extraction columns. However, few of the items are available "off-the-shelf"; most would be prepared according to the requirements and specifications of the customer. In some instances, special design and construction considerations are required to address the corrosive properties of some of the chemicals handled (HF , F_2 , ClF_3 , and uranium fluorides) as well as nuclear criticality concerns. Finally, it should be noted that, in all of the uranium conversion processes, items of equipment which individually are not especially designed or prepared for uranium conversion can be assembled into systems which are especially designed or prepared for use in uranium conversion.

7.1.1. Especially designed or prepared systems for the conversion of uranium ore concentrates to UO_3

EXPLANATORY NOTE

Conversion of uranium ore concentrates to UO_3 can be performed by first dissolving the ore in nitric acid and extracting purified uranyl nitrate using a solvent such as tributyl phosphate. Next, the uranyl nitrate is converted to UO_3 either by concentration and denitration or by neutralization with gaseous ammonia to produce ammonium diuranate with subsequent filtering, drying, and calcining.

7.1.2. Especially designed or prepared systems for the conversion of UO_3 to UF_6

EXPLANATORY NOTE

Conversion of UO_3 to UF_6 can be performed directly by fluorination. The process requires a source of fluorine gas or chlorine trifluoride.

7.1.3. Especially designed or prepared systems for the conversion of UO_3 to UO_2

EXPLANATORY NOTE

Conversion of UO_3 to UO_2 can be performed through reduction of UO_3 with cracked ammonia gas or hydrogen.

7.1.4. Especially designed or prepared systems for the conversion of UO_2 to UF_4

EXPLANATORY NOTE

Conversion of UO_2 to UF_4 can be performed by reacting UO_2 with hydrogen fluoride gas (HF) at 300-500°C.

7.1.5. Especially designed or prepared systems for the conversion of UF_4 to UF_6

EXPLANATORY NOTE

Conversion of UF_4 to UF_6 is performed by exothermic reaction with fluorine in a tower reactor. UF_6 is condensed from the hot effluent gases by passing the effluent stream through a cold trap cooled to -10°C. The process requires a source of fluorine gas.

7.1.6. Especially designed or prepared systems for the conversion of UF_4 to U metal

EXPLANATORY NOTE

Conversion of UF_4 to U metal is performed by reduction with magnesium (large batches) or calcium (small batches). The reaction is carried out at temperatures above the melting point of uranium (1130 °C).

7.1.7. Especially designed or prepared systems for the conversion of UF_6 to UO_2

EXPLANATORY NOTE

Conversion of UF_6 to UO_2 can be performed by one of three processes. In the first, UF_6 is reduced and hydrolyzed to UO_2 using hydrogen and steam. In the second, UF_6 is hydrolyzed by solution in water, ammonia is added to precipitate ammonium diuranate, and the diuranate is reduced to UO_2 with hydrogen at 820°C. In the third process, gaseous UF_6 , CO_2 , and NH_3 are combined in water, precipitating ammonium uranyl carbonate. The ammonium uranyl carbonate is combined with steam and hydrogen at 500-600°C to yield UO_2 .

UF₆ to UO₂ conversion is often performed as the first stage of a fuel fabrication plant.

7.1.8. Especially designed or prepared systems for the conversion of UF₆ to UF₄

EXPLANATORY NOTE

Conversion of UF₆ to UF₄ is performed by reduction with hydrogen.

7.1.9. Especially designed or prepared systems for the conversion of UO₂ to UCl₄

EXPLANATORY NOTE

Conversion of UO₂ to UCl₄ can be performed by one of two processes. In the first, UO₂ is reacted with carbon tetrachloride (CCl₄) at approximately 400°C. In the second, UO₂ is reacted at approximately 700°C in the presence of carbon black (CAS 1333-86-4), carbon monoxide, and chlorine to yield UCl₄.

7.2. Plants for the conversion of plutonium and equipment especially designed or prepared therefor

INTRODUCTORY NOTE

Plutonium conversion plants and systems perform one or more transformations from one plutonium chemical species to another, including: conversion of plutonium nitrate to PuO₂, conversion of PuO₂ to PuF₄, and conversion of PuF₄ to plutonium metal. Plutonium conversion plants are usually associated with reprocessing facilities, but may also be associated with plutonium fuel fabrication facilities. Many of the key equipment items for plutonium conversion plants are common to several segments of the chemical process industry. For example, the types of equipment employed in these processes may include: furnaces, rotary kilns, fluidized bed reactors, flame tower reactors, liquid centrifuges, distillation columns and liquid-liquid extraction columns. Hot cells, glove boxes and remote manipulators may also be required. However, few of the items are available "off-the-shelf"; most would be prepared according to the requirements and specifications of the customer. Particular care in designing for the special radiological, toxicity and criticality hazards associated with plutonium is essential. In some instances, special design and construction considerations are required to address the corrosive properties of some of the chemicals handled (e.g. HF). Finally, it should be noted that, for all plutonium conversion processes, items of equipment which individually are not especially designed or prepared for plutonium conversion can be assembled into systems which are especially designed or prepared for use in plutonium conversion.

7.2.1. Especially designed or prepared systems for the conversion of plutonium nitrate to oxide

EXPLANATORY NOTE

The main functions involved in this process are: process feed storage and adjustment, precipitation and solid/liquor separation, calcination, product handling, ventilation, waste management, and process control. The process systems are particularly adapted

so as to avoid criticality and radiation effects and to minimize toxicity hazards. In most reprocessing facilities, this process involves the conversion of plutonium nitrate to plutonium dioxide. Other processes can involve the precipitation of plutonium oxalate or plutonium peroxide.

7.2.2. Especially designed or prepared systems for plutonium metal production

EXPLANATORY NOTE

This process usually involves the fluorination of plutonium dioxide, normally with highly corrosive hydrogen fluoride, to produce plutonium fluoride which is subsequently reduced using high purity calcium metal to produce metallic plutonium and a calcium fluoride slag. The main functions involved in this process are fluorination (e.g. involving equipment fabricated or lined with a precious metal), metal reduction (e.g. employing ceramic crucibles), slag recovery, product handling, ventilation, waste management and process control. The process systems are particularly adapted so as to avoid criticality and radiation effects and to minimize toxicity hazards. Other processes include the fluorination of plutonium oxalate or plutonium peroxide followed by a reduction to metal.

ANNEX C

CRITERIA FOR LEVELS OF PHYSICAL PROTECTION

1. The purpose of physical protection of nuclear materials is to prevent unauthorized use and handling of these materials. Paragraph 3(a) of the Guidelines document calls for agreement among suppliers on the levels of protection to be ensured in relation to the type of materials, and equipment and facilities containing these materials, taking account of international recommendations.
2. Paragraph 3(b) of the Guidelines document states that implementation of measures of physical protection in the recipient country is the responsibility of the Government of that country. However, the levels of physical protection on which these measures have to be based should be the subject of an agreement between supplier and recipient. In this context these requirements should apply to all States.
3. The document INFCIRC/225 of the International Atomic Energy Agency entitled "The Physical Protection of Nuclear Material" and similar documents which from time to time are prepared by international groups of experts and updated as appropriate to account for changes in the state of the art and state of knowledge with regard to physical protection of nuclear material are a useful basis for guiding recipient States in designing a system of physical protection measures and procedures.
4. The categorization of nuclear material presented in the attached table or as it may be updated from time to time by mutual agreement of suppliers shall serve as the agreed basis for designating specific levels of physical protection in relation to the type of materials, and equipment and facilities containing these materials, pursuant to paragraph 3(a) and 3(b) of the Guidelines document.
5. The agreed levels of physical protection to be ensured by the competent national authorities in the use, storage and transportation of the materials listed in the attached table shall as a minimum include protection characteristics as follows:

CATEGORY III

Use and Storage within an area to which access is controlled.

Transportation under special precautions including prior arrangements among sender, recipient and carrier, and prior agreement between entities subject to the jurisdiction and regulation of supplier and recipient States, respectively, in case of international transport, specifying time, place and procedures for transferring transport responsibility.

CATEGORY II

Use and Storage within a protected area to which access is controlled, i.e., an area under constant surveillance by guards or electronic devices, surrounded by a physical barrier with a limited number of points of entry under appropriate control, or any area with an equivalent level of physical protection.

Transportation under special precautions including prior arrangements among sender, recipient, and carrier, and prior agreement between entities subject to the jurisdiction and regulation of supplier and recipient States, respectively, in case of international transport, specifying time, place and procedures for transferring transport responsibility.

CATEGORY I

Materials in this category shall be protected with highly reliable systems against unauthorized use as follows:

Use and storage within a highly protected area, i.e., a protected area as defined for Category II above, to which, in addition, access is restricted to person whose trustworthiness has been determined, and which is under surveillance by guards who are in close communication with appropriate response forces. Specific measures taken in this context should have as their objective the detection and prevention of any assault, unauthorized access or unauthorized removal of material.

Transportation under special precautions as identified above for transportation of Category II and III materials and, in addition, under constant surveillance by escorts and under conditions which assure close communication with appropriate response forces.

6. Suppliers should request identification by recipients of those agencies or authorities having responsibility for ensuring that levels of protection are adequately met and having responsibility for internally co-ordinating response/recovery operations in the event of unauthorized use or handling of protected materials. Suppliers and recipients should also designate points of contact within their national authorities to co-operate on matters of out-of-country transportation and other matters of mutual concern.

TABLE: CATEGORIZATION OF NUCLEAR MATERIAL

Material	Form	Category		
		I	II	III
1. Plutonium*[a]	Unirradiated*[b]	2 kg or more	Less than 2 kg but more than 500 g	500 g or less*[c]
2. Uranium-235	Unirradiated*[b]	5 kg or more	Less than 5 kg but more than 1 kg	1 kg or less*[c]
	- uranium enriched to 20% ²³⁵ U or more	-	10 kg or more	Less than 10 kg*[c]
	- uranium enriched to 10% ²³⁵ U but less than 20%	-	-	10 kg or more
	- uranium enriched above natural, but less than 10% ²³⁵ U*[d]	-	-	-
3. Uranium-233	Unirradiated*[b]	2 kg or more	Less than 2 kg but more than 500 g	500 g or less*[c]
4. Irradiated fuel			Depleted or natural uranium, thorium or low-enriched fuel (less than 10% fissile content)*[e][f]	

[a] As identified in the Trigger List.

[b] Material not irradiated in a reactor or material irradiated in a reactor but with a radiation level equal to or less than 100 rads/hour at one metre unshielded.

[c] Less than a radiologically significant quantity should be exempted.

[d] Natural uranium, depleted uranium, and thorium and quantities of uranium enriched to less than 10% not falling in Category III should be protected in accordance with prudent management practice.

[e] Although this level of protection is recommended, it would be open to States, upon evaluation of the specific circumstances, to assign a different category of physical protection.

[f] Other fuel which by virtue of its original fissile material content is classified as Category I or II before irradiation may be reduced one category levels while the radiation level from the fuel exceed 100 rads/hour at one metre unshielded.

Information Circular

INFCIRC/254/Rev.8/Part 2^a

Date: 30 June 2010

General Distribution

Original: English

Communication Received from Certain Member States Regarding Guidelines for Transfers of Nuclear-related Dual-use Equipment, Material, Software and Related Technology

1. The Agency has received a Note Verbale from the Permanent Mission of Hungary, dated 14 June 2010, in which it requests that the Agency circulate to all Member States a letter of 7 May 2010 from the Chairman of the Nuclear Suppliers Group, Ambassador Ms. Györgyi Martin Zanathy, to the Director General, on behalf of the Governments of Argentina, Australia, Austria, Belarus, Belgium, Brazil, Bulgaria, Canada, China, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Kazakhstan, Republic of Korea, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxemburg, Malta, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Russian Federation, Slovakia, Slovenia, South Africa, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, Ukraine, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the United States of America,¹ providing further information on those Governments' Guidelines for Nuclear Transfers.
2. In the light of the wish expressed in the above-mentioned Note Verbale, the text of the Note Verbale, as well as the letter and attachments thereto, are hereby reproduced for the information of all Member States.

^a INFCIRC/254/Part 1, as amended, contains Guidelines for the export of nuclear material, equipment and technology.

¹ The European Commission participates as an observer.



PERMANENT MISSION OF THE REPUBLIC OF HUNGARY
TO THE UNITED NATIONS OFFICE AND OTHER
INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS IN VIENNA

INFCIRC/254/Rev.8/Part 2
Attachment

Ref. No.: 39/2010


The Permanent Mission of the Republic of Hungary to the United Nations Office and Other International Organizations in Vienna presents its compliments to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and has the honour to forward the attached letter, dated 07 May 2010 by Ambassador Györgyi Martin Zanathy, Chairperson of the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG), regarding the agreed amendments to document INFCIRC/254/Rev.7/Part 2, including its Annexes, to be conveyed to the Director General of the IAEA, Mr. Yukiya Amano.

The Permanent Mission of the Republic of Hungary to the United Nations Office and Other International Organizations in Vienna hereby requests that the abovementioned amendments to document INFCIRC/254/Rev.7/Part 2, including its Annexes be circulated among the Member States of the IAEA.

The Permanent Mission of the Republic of Hungary to the United Nations Office and Other International Organizations in Vienna avails itself of this opportunity to renew to the IAEA the assurances of its highest consideration.

Vienna, 14 June 2010

International Atomic Energy Agency
Vienna



CHAIRMAN OF THE NUCLEAR SUPPLIERS GROUP

Department for Security Policy and Non-Proliferation
Ministry of Foreign Affairs Hungary
H-1027 Budapest, Bem rkp. 47.
H-1394 Budapest 62, Pf. 423
Hungary

Tel: +36 1 458 1135 Fax: +36 1 457 5039
E-mail: bpnf@kum.hu

Budapest, 07 May 2010

On behalf of the Governments of Argentina, Australia, Austria, Belarus, Belgium, Brazil, Bulgaria, Canada, China, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Kazakhstan, Republic of Korea, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxemburg, Malta, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Russian Federation, Slovakia, Slovenia, South Africa, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, Ukraine, United Kingdom, and United States¹, I have the honour to refer to all previous relevant communications from these Governments concerning their decisions to act in accordance with the Guidelines for Nuclear Transfers currently published as document INFCIRC/254/Rev.7/Part 2, including its Annexes.

These Governments have decided to amend the Part 2 Guidelines, in order to more clearly define the standard of implementation that all Participating Governments of the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) regard as essential for the fulfillment of the Guidelines, as follows:

- NSG Part 2 entry 1.B.3.a has been modified to implement the most up-to-date international standard, International Organization for Standardization (ISO) 10360-2(2009). The new text retains a one-dimensional length measurement error parameter and the same value for that error parameter for establishing export control thresholds. This control is based on the tested actual performance of the machine rather than the manufacturer's specification. Furthermore, controls on two-dimensional machines are retained. Thus, the scope of nuclear proliferation controls on dimensional inspection machines of 1.B.3.a is unchanged by the new text.
- The existing technical note 1 for NSG Part 2 entry 1.B.3.d. has been deleted since it refers to the deleted VDI/VDE standard. Existing technical note 2 is now the new technical note 1.

¹ The European Commission participates as an observer.

In the interest of clarity, the complete text of the modified Guidelines and its Annexes is reproduced in the attachment, as well as a “Comparison Table of Changes to the Guidelines for Nuclear Transfers (INFCIRC/254/Rev.7/Part 2).”

These Governments have decided to act in accordance with the Guidelines so revised and to implement them in accordance with their respective national legislation.


In reaching this decision, these Governments are fully aware of the need to contribute to economic development while avoiding contributing in any way to a proliferation of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices or the diversion to acts of nuclear terrorism, and of the need to separate the issue of non-proliferation or non-diversion assurances from that of commercial competition.

Insofar as trade within the European Union is concerned, the Governments that are Member States of the European Union will implement this decision in the light of their commitments as Member States of the Union.

I would be grateful if you would bring this Note and its attachment, INFCIRC/254/Rev.8/Part 2 and the Comparison Table, to the attention of all Member States of the IAEA.

On behalf of the above Governments I wish to avail myself of this opportunity to renew to you the assurances of the Governments’ highest consideration.

Yours sincerely,



H.E. Ms. Györgyi Martin Zanathy
Chairman of the Nuclear Suppliers Group

H.E. Mr. Yukiya AMANO
Director General
International Atomic Energy Agency
Vienna

**GUIDELINES FOR TRANSFERS OF NUCLEAR-RELATED
DUAL-USE EQUIPMENT, MATERIALS, SOFTWARE, AND
RELATED TECHNOLOGY**

OBJECTIVE

1. With the objective of averting the proliferation of nuclear weapons and preventing acts of nuclear terrorism, suppliers have had under consideration procedures in relation to the transfer of certain equipment, materials, software, and related technology that could make a major contribution to a “nuclear explosive activity,” an “unsafeguarded nuclear fuel-cycle activity” or acts of nuclear terrorism. In this connection, suppliers have agreed on the following principles, common definitions, and an export control list of equipment, materials, software, and related technology. The Guidelines are not designed to impede international co-operation as long as such co-operation will not contribute to a nuclear explosive activity, an unsafeguarded nuclear fuel-cycle activity or acts of nuclear terrorism. Suppliers intend to implement the Guidelines in accordance with national legislation and relevant international commitments.

BASIC PRINCIPLE

2. Suppliers should not authorize transfers of equipment, materials, software, or related technology identified in the Annex:
 - for use in a non-nuclear-weapon state in a nuclear explosive activity or an unsafeguarded nuclear fuel-cycle activity, or
 - in general, when there is an unacceptable risk of diversion to such an activity, or when the transfers are contrary to the objective of averting the proliferation of nuclear weapons, or
 - when there is an unacceptable risk of diversion to acts of nuclear terrorism.

EXPLANATION OF TERMS

3. (a) "Nuclear explosive activity" includes research on or development, design, manufacture, construction, testing or maintenance of any nuclear explosive device or components or subsystems of such a device.

(b) "Unsafeguarded nuclear fuel-cycle activity" includes research on or development, design, manufacture, construction, operation or maintenance of any reactor, critical facility, conversion plant, fabrication plant, reprocessing plant, plant for the separation of isotopes of source or special fissionable material, or separate storage installation, where there is no obligation to accept International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards at the relevant facility or installation, existing or future, when it contains any source or special fissionable material; or of any heavy water production plant where there is no obligation to accept IAEA safeguards on any nuclear material produced by or used in connection with any heavy water produced therefrom; or where any such obligation is not met.

ESTABLISHMENT OF EXPORT LICENSING PROCEDURES

4. Suppliers should have in place legal measures to ensure the effective implementation of the Guidelines, including export licensing regulations, enforcement measures, and penalties for violations. In considering whether to authorize transfers, suppliers should exercise prudence in order to carry out the Basic Principle and should take relevant factors into account, including:
 - (a) Whether the recipient state is a party to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) or to the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America (Treaty of Tlatelolco), or to a similar international legally-binding nuclear non-proliferation agreement, and has an IAEA safeguards agreement in force applicable to all its peaceful nuclear activities;
 - (b) Whether any recipient state that is not party to the NPT, Treaty of Tlatelolco, or a similar international legally-binding nuclear non-proliferation agreement has any facilities or installations listed in paragraph 3(b) above that are operational or being designed or constructed that are not, or will not be, subject to IAEA safeguards;
 - (c) Whether the equipment, materials, software, or related technology to be transferred is appropriate for the stated end-use and whether that stated end-use is appropriate for the end-user;
 - (d) Whether the equipment, materials, software, or related technology to be transferred is to be used in research on or development, design, manufacture, construction, operation, or maintenance of any reprocessing or enrichment facility;
 - (e) Whether governmental actions, statements, and policies of the recipient state are supportive of nuclear non-proliferation and whether the recipient state is in compliance with its international obligations in the field of non-proliferation;
 - (f) Whether the recipients have been engaged in clandestine or illegal procurement activities; and
 - (g) Whether a transfer has not been authorized to the end-user or whether the end-user has diverted for purposes inconsistent with the Guidelines any transfer previously authorized.
 - (h) Whether there is reason to believe that there is a risk of diversion to acts of nuclear terrorism.
 - (i) Whether there is a risk of retransfers of equipment, material, software, or related technology identified in the Annex or of transfers of any replica thereof contrary to the Basic Principle, as a result of a failure by the recipient State to develop and maintain appropriate, effective national export and transshipment controls, as identified by UNSC Resolution 1540.
5. Suppliers should ensure that their national legislation requires an authorisation for the transfer of items not listed in the Annex if the items in question are or may be intended, in their entirety or in part, for use in connection with a “nuclear explosive activity.”

Suppliers will implement such an authorisation requirement in accordance with their domestic licensing practices.

Suppliers are encouraged to share information on “catch all” denials.

CONDITIONS FOR TRANSFERS

6. In the process of determining that the transfer will not pose any unacceptable risk of diversion, in accordance with the Basic Principle and to meet the objectives of the Guidelines, the supplier should obtain, before authorizing the transfer and in a manner consistent with its national law and practices, the following:
 - (a) a statement from the end-user specifying the uses and end-use locations of the proposed transfers; and
 - (b) an assurance explicitly stating that the proposed transfer or any replica thereof will not be used in any nuclear explosive activity or unsafeguarded nuclear fuel-cycle activity.

CONSENT RIGHTS OVER RETRANSFERS

7. Before authorizing the transfer of equipment, materials, software, or related technology identified in the Annex to a country not adhering to the Guidelines, suppliers should obtain assurances that their consent will be secured, in a manner consistent with their national law and practices, prior to any retransfer to a third country of the equipment, materials, software, or related technology, or any replica thereof.

CONCLUDING PROVISIONS

8. The supplier reserves to itself discretion as to the application of the Guidelines to other items of significance in addition to those identified in the Annex, and as to the application of other conditions for transfer that it may consider necessary in addition to those provided for in paragraph 5 of the Guidelines.
9. In furtherance of the effective implementation of the Guidelines, suppliers should, as necessary and appropriate, exchange relevant information and consult with other states adhering to the Guidelines.
10. In the interest of international peace and security, the adherence of all states to the Guidelines would be welcome.

ANNEX

**LIST OF NUCLEAR-RELATED DUAL-USE
EQUIPMENT, MATERIALS, SOFTWARE, AND
RELATED TECHNOLOGY**

ANNEX

Note: The International System of Units (SI) is used in this Annex. In all cases the physical quantity defined in SI units should be considered the official recommended control value. However, some machine tool parameters are given in their customary units, which are not SI.

Commonly used abbreviations (and their prefixes denoting size) in this Annex are as follows:

A	---	ampere(s)
Bq	---	becquerel(s)
°C	---	degree(s) Celsius
CAS	---	chemical abstracts service
Ci	---	curie(s)
cm	---	centimeter(s)
dB	---	decibel(s)
dBm	---	decibel referred to 1 milliwatt
g	---	gram(s); also, acceleration of gravity (9.81 m/s ²)
GBq	---	gigabecquerel(s)
GHz	---	gigahertz
GPa	---	gigapascal(s)
Gy	---	gray
h	---	hour(s)
Hz	---	hertz
J	---	joule(s)
K	---	kelvin
keV	---	thousand electron volt(s)
kg	---	kilogram(s)
kHz	---	kilohertz
kN	---	kilonewton(s)
kPa	---	kilopascal(s)
kV	---	kilovolt(s)
kW	---	kilowatt(s)
m	---	meter(s)
mA	---	milliampere(s)
MeV	---	million electron volt(s)
MHz	---	megahertz
ml	---	milliliter(s)
mm	---	millimeter(s)
MPa	---	megapascal(s)
mPa	---	millipascal(s)
MW	---	megawatt(s)
μF	---	microfarad(s)
μm	---	micrometer(s)
μs	---	microsecond(s)
N	---	newton(s)
nm	---	nanometer(s)
ns	---	nanosecond(s)
nH	---	nanohenry(ies)
ps	---	picosecond(s)
RMS	---	root mean square
rpm	---	revolutions per minute
s	---	second(s)
T	---	tesla(s)
TIR	---	total indicator reading
V	---	volt(s)
W	---	watt(s)

GENERAL NOTE

The following paragraphs are applied to the List of Nuclear-Related Dual-Use Equipment, Material, Software, and Related Technology.

1. The description of any item on the List includes that item in either new or second-hand condition.
2. When the description of any item on the List contains no qualifications or specifications, it is regarded as including all varieties of that item. Category captions are only for convenience in reference and do not affect the interpretation of item definitions.
3. The object of these controls should not be defeated by the transfer of any non-controlled item (including plants) containing one or more controlled components when the controlled component or components are the principal element of the item and can feasibly be removed or used for other purposes.

Note: In judging whether the controlled component or components are to be considered the principal element, governments should weigh the factors of quantity, value, and technological know-how involved and other special circumstances which might establish the controlled component or components as the principal element of the item being procured.

4. The object of these controls should not be defeated by the transfer of component parts. Each government will take such action as it can to achieve this aim and will continue to seek a workable definition for component parts, which could be used by all the suppliers.

TECHNOLOGY CONTROLS

The transfer of "technology" is controlled according to the Guidelines and as described in each section of the Annex. "Technology" directly associated with any item in the Annex will be subject to as great a degree of scrutiny and control as will the item itself, to the extent permitted by national legislation.

The approval of any Annex item for export also authorizes the export to the same end user of the minimum "technology" required for the installation, operation, maintenance, and repair of the item.

Note: Controls on "technology" transfer do not apply to information "in the public domain" or to "basic scientific research".

GENERAL SOFTWARE NOTE

The transfer of "software" is controlled according to the Guidelines and as described in the Annex.

Note: Controls on "software" transfers do not apply to "software" as follows:

1. Generally available to the public by being:
 - a. Sold from stock at retail selling points without restriction; and
 - b. Designed for installation by the user without further substantial support by the supplier;or
2. "In the public domain".

DEFINITIONS

"Accuracy" --

Usually measured in terms of inaccuracy, defined as the maximum deviation, positive or negative, of an indicated value from an accepted standard or true value.

"Angular position deviation" --

The maximum difference between angular position and the actual, very accurately measured angular position after the workpiece mount of the table has been turned out of its initial position. (Ref. VDI/VDE 2617 Draft: "Rotary table on coordinate measuring machines")

"Basic scientific research" --

Experimental or theoretical work undertaken principally to acquire new knowledge of the fundamental principles of phenomena and observable facts, not primarily directed toward a specific practical aim or objective.

"Contouring control" --

Two or more "numerically controlled" motions operating in accordance with instructions that specify the next required position and the required feed rates to that position. These feed rates are varied in relation to each other so that a desired contour is generated. (Ref. ISO 2806-1980 as amended)

"Development" --

is related to all phases before "production" such as:

- design
- design research
- design analysis
- design concepts
- assembly and testing of prototypes
- pilot production schemes
- design data
- process of transforming design data into a product
- configuration design
- integration design
- layouts

"Fibrous or filamentary materials" --

means continuous 'monofilaments', 'yarns', 'rovings', 'tows' or 'tapes'.

N.B.:

1. 'Filament' or 'monofilament' --

is the smallest increment of fiber, usually several μm in diameter.

2. 'Roving' --

is a bundle (typically 12-120) of approximately parallel 'strands'.

3. 'Strand' --

is a bundle of 'filaments' (typically over 200) arranged approximately parallel.

4. 'Tape' --

is a material constructed of interlaced or unidirectional 'filaments', 'strands', 'rovings', 'tows' or 'yarns', etc., usually preimpregnated with resin.

5. 'Tow' --

is a bundle of 'filaments', usually approximately parallel.

6. 'Yarn' --

is a bundle of twisted 'strands'.

'Filament' --

See "Fibrous or filamentary materials".

"In the public domain" --

"In the public domain", as it applies herein, means "technology" or "software" that has been made available without restrictions upon its further dissemination. (Copyright restrictions do not remove "technology" or "software" from being "in the public domain".)

"Linearity" --

(Usually measured in terms of non-linearity) is the maximum deviation of the actual characteristic (average of upscale and downscale readings), positive or negative, from a straight line so positioned as to equalize and minimize the maximum deviations.

"Measurement uncertainty" --

The characteristic parameter which specifies in what range around the output value the correct value of the measurable variable lies with a confidence level of 95%. It includes the uncorrected systematic deviations, the uncorrected backlash, and the random deviations. (Ref. VDI/VDE 2617)

"Microprogram" --

A sequence of elementary instructions, maintained in a special storage, the execution of which is initiated by the introduction of its reference instruction into an instruction register.

'Monofilament' --

See "Fibrous or filamentary materials".

"Numerical control" --

The automatic control of a process performed by a device that makes use of numeric data usually introduced as the operation is in progress. (Ref. ISO 2382)

"Positioning accuracy" --

of "numerically controlled" machine tools is to be determined and presented in accordance with Item 1.B.2., in conjunction with the requirements below:

(a) Test conditions (ISO 230/2 (1988), paragraph 3):

- (1) For 12 hours before and during measurements, the machine tool and accuracy measuring equipment will be kept at the same ambient temperature. During the premeasurement time, the slides of the machine will be continuously cycled identically to the way they will be cycled during the accuracy measurements;
- (2) The machine shall be equipped with any mechanical, electronic, or software compensation to be exported with the machine;
- (3) Accuracy of measuring equipment for the measurements shall be at least four times more accurate than the expected machine tool accuracy;
- (4) Power supply for slide drives shall be as follows:
 - (i) Line voltage variation shall not be greater than $\pm 10\%$ of nominal rated voltage;
 - (ii) Frequency variation shall not be greater than ± 2 Hz of normal frequency;
 - (iii) Lineouts or interrupted service are not permitted.

(b) Test Program (paragraph 4):

- (1) Feed rate (velocity of slides) during measurement shall be the rapid traverse rate;

N.B.: In the case of machine tools which generate optical quality surfaces, the feed rate shall be equal to or less than 50 mm per minute;

- (2) Measurements shall be made in an incremental manner from one limit of the axis travel to the other without returning to the starting position for each move to the target position;
- (3) Axes not being measured shall be retained at mid-travel during test of an axis.

(c) Presentation of the test results (paragraph 2):

The results of the measurements must include:

- (1) "positioning accuracy" (A) and
- (2) The mean reversal error (B).

"Production" --

means all production phases such as:

- construction
- production engineering
- manufacture
- integration
- assembly (mounting)
- inspection
- testing
- quality assurance

"Program" --

A sequence of instructions to carry out a process in, or convertible into, a form executable by an electronic computer.

"Resolution" --

The least increment of a measuring device; on digital instruments, the least significant bit.
(Ref. ANSI B-89.1.12)

"Roving" --

See "Fibrous or filamentary materials".

"Software" --

A collection of one or more "programs" or "microprograms" fixed in any tangible medium of expression.

'Strand' --

See "Fibrous or filamentary materials".

'Tape" --

See "Fibrous or filamentary materials".

"Technical assistance" --

"Technical assistance" may take forms such as: instruction, skills, training, working knowledge, consulting services.

Note: "Technical assistance" may involve transfer of "technical data".

"Technical data" --

"Technical data" may take forms such as blueprints, plans, diagrams, models, formulae, engineering designs and specifications, manuals and instructions written or recorded on other media or devices such as disk, tape, read-only memories.

"Technology" --

means specific information required for the "development", "production", or "use" of any item contained in the List. This information may take the form of "technical data" or "technical assistance".

"Tow" --

See "Fibrous or filamentary materials".

"Use" --

Operation, installation (including on-site installation), maintenance (checking), repair, overhaul, and refurbishing.

"Yarn" --

See "Fibrous or filamentary materials".

ANNEX CONTENTS

1. INDUSTRIAL EQUIPMENT

1.A.	EQUIPMENT, ASSEMBLIES AND COMPONENTS	
1.A.1.	High-density radiation shielding windows	1 – 1
1.A.2.	Radiation-hardened TV cameras, or lenses therefor	1 – 1
1.A.3.	Robots, end-effectors' and control units	1 – 1
1.A.4.	Remote manipulators	1 – 3
1.B.	TEST AND PRODUCTION EQUIPMENT	
1.B.1.	Flow-forming machines, spin-forming machines capable of flow-forming functions, and mandrels	1 – 3
1.B.2.	Machine tools	1 – 4
1.B.3.	Dimensional inspection machines, instruments, or systems	1 – 6
1.B.4.	Controlled atmosphere induction furnaces, and power supplies therefor	1 – 7
1.B.5.	Isostatic presses, and related equipment	1 – 7
1.B.6.	Vibration test systems, equipment, and components	1 – 8
1.B.7.	Vacuum or other controlled atmosphere metallurgical melting and casting furnaces and related equipment	1 – 8
1.C.	MATERIALS	1 – 9
1.D.	SOFTWARE	1 – 9
1.E.	TECHNOLOGY	1 - 9

ANNEX CONTENTS

2. MATERIALS

2.A.	EQUIPMENT, ASSEMBLIES AND COMPONENTS	
2.A.1.	Crucibles made of materials resistant to liquid actinide metals	2 – 1
2.A.2.	Platinized catalysts	2 – 1
2.A.3.	Composite structures in the forms of tubes	2 – 2
2.B.	TEST AND PRODUCTION EQUIPMENT	
2.B.1.	Tritium facilities or plants, and equipment therefor	2 – 2
2.B.2.	Lithium isotope separation facilities or plants, and equipment therefor	2 – 2
2.C.	MATERIALS	
2.C.1.	Aluminium	2 – 2
2.C.2.	Beryllium	2 – 3
2.C.3.	Bismuth	2 – 3
2.C.4.	Boron	2 – 3
2.C.5.	Calcium	2 – 3
2.C.6.	Chlorine trifluoride	2 – 3
2.C.7.	Fibrous or filamentary materials, and prepregs	2 – 3
2.C.8.	Hafnium	2 – 4
2.C.9.	Lithium	2 – 4
2.C.10.	Magnesium	2 – 4
2.C.11.	Maraging steel	2 – 4
2.C.12.	Radium-226	2 – 4
2.C.13.	Titanium	2 – 5
2.C.14.	Tungsten	2 – 5
2.C.15.	Zirconium	2 – 5
2.C.16.	Nickel powder and porous nickel metal	2 – 5
2.C.17.	Tritium	2 – 6
2.C.18.	Helium-3	2 – 6
2.C.19.	Alpha-emitting radionuclides	2 – 6
2.D.	SOFTWARE	2 – 6
2.E.	TECHNOLOGY	2 – 6

ANNEX CONTENTS

3. URANIUM ISOTOPE SEPARATION EQUIPMENT AND COMPONENTS (Other Than Trigger List Items)

3.A.	EQUIPMENT, ASSEMBLIES AND COMPONENTS	
3.A.1.	Frequency changers or generators	3 – 1
3.A.2.	Lasers, laser amplifiers and oscillators	3 – 1
3.A.3.	Valves	3 – 3
3.A.4.	Superconducting solenoidal electromagnets	3 – 3
3.A.5.	High-power direct current power supplies	3 – 3
3.A.6.	High-voltage direct current power supplies	3 – 3
3.A.7.	Pressure transducers	3 – 4
3.A.8.	Vacuum pumps	3 – 4
3.B.	TEST AND PRODUCTION EQUIPMENT	
3.B.1.	Electrolytic cells for fluorine production	3 – 4
3.B.2.	Rotor fabrication or assembly equipment, rotor straightening equipment, bellows-forming mandrels and dies	3 – 4
3.B.3.	Centrifugal multiplane balancing machines	3 – 5
3.B.4.	Filament winding machines and related equipment	3 – 5
3.B.5.	Electromagnetic isotope separators	3 – 6
3.B.6.	Mass spectrometers	3 – 6
3.C.	MATERIALS	3 – 7
3.D.	SOFTWARE	3 – 7
3.E.	TECHNOLOGY	3 - 7

ANNEX CONTENTS

4. HEAVY WATER PRODUCTION PLANT RELATED EQUIPMENT (Other Than Trigger List Items)

4.A.	EQUIPMENT, ASSEMBLIES AND COMPONENTS	
4.A.1.	Specialized packings	4 – 1
4.A.2.	Pumps	4 – 1
4.A.3.	Turboexpanders or turboexpander-compressor sets	4 – 1
4.B.	TEST AND PRODUCTION EQUIPMENT	
4.B.1.	Water-hydrogen sulfide exchange tray columns and internal contactors	4 – 1
4.B.2.	Hydrogen-cryogenic distillation columns	4 – 2
4.B.3.	Ammonia synthesis converters or synthesis units	4 – 2
4.C.	MATERIALS	4 – 2
4.D.	SOFTWARE	4 – 2
4.E.	TECHNOLOGY	4 – 2

5. TEST AND MEASUREMENT EQUIPMENT FOR THE DEVELOPMENT OF NUCLEAR EXPLOSIVE DEVICES

5.A.	EQUIPMENT, ASSEMBLIES AND COMPONENTS	
5.A.1.	Photomultiplier tubes	5 – 1
5.B.	TEST AND PRODUCTION EQUIPMENT	
5.B.1.	Flash X-ray generators or pulsed electron accelerators	5 – 1
5.B.2.	Multistage light gas guns or other high-velocity gun systems	5 – 1
5.B.3.	Mechanical rotating mirror cameras	5 – 2
5.B.4.	Electronic streak cameras, electronic framing cameras, tubes and devices	5 – 2
5.B.5.	Specialized instrumentation for hydrodynamic experiments	5 – 2
5.B.6.	High-speed pulse generators	5 – 3
5.C.	MATERIALS	5 – 3
5.D.	SOFTWARE	5 – 3
5.E.	TECHNOLOGY	5 – 3

ANNEX CONTENTS

6. COMPONENTS FOR NUCLEAR EXPLOSIVE DEVICES

6.A.	EQUIPMENT, ASSEMBLIES AND COMPONENTS	
6.A.1.	Detonators and multipoint initiation systems	6 – 1
6.A.2.	Firing sets and equivalent high-current pulse generators	6 – 1
6.A.3.	Switching devices	6 – 2
6.A.4.	Pulse discharge capacitors	6 – 2
6.A.5.	Neutron generator systems	6 – 3
6.B.	TEST AND PRODUCTION EQUIPMENT	6 – 3
6.C.	MATERIALS	
6.C.1.	High explosive substances or mixtures	6 – 3
6.D.	SOFTWARE	6 – 3
6.E.	TECHNOLOGY	6 - 3

1. INDUSTRIAL EQUIPMENT

1.A. EQUIPMENT, ASSEMBLIES AND COMPONENTS

1.A.1. High-density (lead glass or other) radiation shielding windows, having all of the following characteristics, and specially designed frames therefor:

- a. A 'cold area' greater than 0.09 m²;
- b. A density greater than 3 g/cm³; and
- c. A thickness of 100 mm or greater.

Technical Note: *In Item 1.A.1.a. the term 'cold area' means the viewing area of the window exposed to the lowest level of radiation in the design application.*

1.A.2. Radiation-hardened TV cameras, or lenses therefor, specially designed or rated as radiation hardened to withstand a total radiation dose greater than 5 x 10⁴ Gy (silicon) without operational degradation.

Technical Note: *The term Gy (silicon) refers to the energy in Joules per kilogram absorbed by an unshielded silicon sample when exposed to ionizing radiation.*

1.A.3. 'Robots', 'end-effectors' and control units as follows:

- a. 'Robots' or 'end-effectors' having either of the following characteristics:
 1. Specially designed to comply with national safety standards applicable to handling high explosives (for example, meeting electrical code ratings for high explosives); or
 2. Specially designed or rated as radiation hardened to withstand a total radiation dose greater than 5 x 10⁴ Gy (silicon) without operational degradation;

Technical Note: *The term Gy (silicon) refers to the energy in Joules per kilogram absorbed by an unshielded silicon sample when exposed to ionizing radiation.*

- b. Control units specially designed for any of the 'robots' or 'end-effectors' specified in Item 1.A.3.a.

Note: Item 1.A.3. does not control 'robots' specially designed for non-nuclear industrial applications such as automobile paint-spraying booths.

Technical Notes: 1. 'Robots'

In Item 1.A.3. 'robot' means a manipulation mechanism, which may be of the continuous path or of the point-to-point variety, may use 'sensors', and has all of the following characteristics:

(a) is multifunctional;

- (b) *is capable of positioning or orienting material, parts, tools, or special devices through variable movements in three-dimensional space;*
- (c) *incorporates three or more closed or open loop servo-devices which may include stepping motors; and*
- (d) *has 'user-accessible programmability' by means of teach/playback method or by means of an electronic computer which may be a programmable logic controller, i.e., without mechanical intervention.*

N.B.1:

In the above definition 'sensors' means detectors of a physical phenomenon, the output of which (after conversion into a signal that can be interpreted by a control unit) is able to generate "programs" or modify programmed instructions or numerical "program" data. This includes 'sensors' with machine vision, infrared imaging, acoustical imaging, tactile feel, inertial position measuring, optical or acoustic ranging or force or torque measuring capabilities.

N.B.2:

In the above definition 'user-accessible programmability' means the facility allowing a user to insert, modify or replace "programs" by means other than:

- (a) *a physical change in wiring or interconnections; or*
- (b) *the setting of function controls including entry of parameters.*

N.B.3:

The above definition does not include the following devices:

- (a) *Manipulation mechanisms which are only manually/teleoperator controllable;*
- (b) *Fixed sequence manipulation mechanisms which are automated moving devices operating according to mechanically fixed programmed motions. The "program" is mechanically limited by fixed stops, such as pins or cams. The sequence of motions and the selection of paths or angles are not variable or changeable by mechanical, electronic, or electrical means;*
- (c) *Mechanically controlled variable sequence manipulation mechanisms which are automated moving devices operating according to mechanically fixed programmed motions. The "program" is mechanically limited by fixed, but adjustable, stops such as pins or cams. The sequence of motions and the selection of paths or angles are variable within the fixed "program" pattern. Variations or modifications of the "program" pattern (e.g.,*

changes of pins or exchanges of cams) in one or more motion axes are accomplished only through mechanical operations;

(d) Non-servo-controlled variable sequence manipulation mechanisms which are automated moving devices, operating according to mechanically fixed programmed motions. The "program" is variable but the sequence proceeds only by the binary signal from mechanically fixed electrical binary devices or adjustable stops;

(e) Stacker cranes defined as Cartesian coordinate manipulator systems manufactured as an integral part of a vertical array of storage bins and designed to access the contents of those bins for storage or retrieval.

2. 'End-effectors'

In Item 1.A.3. 'end-effectors' are grippers, 'active tooling units', and any other tooling that is attached to the baseplate on the end of a 'robot' manipulator arm.

N.B.:

In the above definition 'active tooling units' is a device for applying motive power, process energy or sensing to the workpiece.

- 1.A.4. Remote manipulators that can be used to provide remote actions in radiochemical separation operations or hot cells, having either of the following characteristics:
- a. A capability of penetrating 0.6 m or more of hot cell wall (through-the-wall operation); or
 - b. A capability of bridging over the top of a hot cell wall with a thickness of 0.6 m or more (over-the-wall operation).

Technical Note: *Remote manipulators provide translation of human operator actions to a remote operating arm and terminal fixture. They may be of a master/slave type or operated by joystick or keypad.*

1.B. TEST AND PRODUCTION EQUIPMENT

- 1.B.1. Flow-forming machines, spin-forming machines capable of flow-forming functions, and mandrels, as follows:
- a. Machines having both of the following characteristics:
 1. Three or more rollers (active or guiding); and
 2. Which, according to the manufacturer's technical specification, can be equipped with "numerical control" units or a computer control;

- b. Rotor-forming mandrels designed to form cylindrical rotors of inside diameter between 75 and 400 mm.

Note: Item 1.B.1.a. includes machines which have only a single roller designed to deform metal plus two auxiliary rollers which support the mandrel, but do not participate directly in the deformation process.

- 1.B.2. Machine tools, as follows, and any combination thereof, for removing or cutting metals, ceramics, or composites, which, according to the manufacturer's technical specifications, can be equipped with electronic devices for simultaneous "contouring control" in two or more axes:

N.B.: For "numerical control" units controlled by their associated "software", see Item 1.D.3.

- a. Machine tools for turning, that have "positioning accuracies" with all compensations available better (less) than 6 μm according to ISO 230/2 (1988) along any linear axis (overall positioning) for machines capable of machining diameters greater than 35 mm;

Note: Item 1.B.2.a. does not control bar machines (Swissturn), limited to machining only bar feed thru, if maximum bar diameter is equal to or less than 42 mm and there is no capability of mounting chucks. Machines may have drilling and/or milling capabilities for machining parts with diameters less than 42 mm.

- b. Machine tools for milling, having any of the following characteristics:

- 1. "Positioning accuracies" with all compensations available better (less) than 6 μm according to ISO 230/2 (1988) along any linear axis (overall positioning);
- 2. Two or more contouring rotary axes; or
- 3. Five or more axes which can be coordinated simultaneously for "contouring control."

Note: Item 1.B.2.b. does not control milling machines having both of the following characteristics:

- 1. X-axis travel greater than 2 m; and
- 2. Overall "positioning accuracy" on the x-axis worse (more) than 30 μm according to ISO 230/2 (1988).

- c. Machine tools for grinding, having any of the following characteristics:

- 1. "Positioning accuracies" with all compensations available better (less) than 4 μm according to ISO 230/2 (1988) along any linear axis (overall positioning);
- 2. Two or more contouring rotary axes; or
- 3. Five or more axes which can be coordinated simultaneously for "contouring control."

Note: Item 1.B.2.c. does not control grinding machines as follows:

- 1. Cylindrical external, internal, and external-internal grinding machines having all the following characteristics:

- a. Limited to a maximum workpiece capacity of 150 mm outside diameter or length; and
 - b. Axes limited to x, z and c.
2. Jig grinders that do not have a z-axis or a w-axis with an overall positioning accuracy less (better) than 4 microns. Positioning accuracy is according to ISO 230/2 (1988).
- d. Non-wire type Electrical Discharge Machines (EDM) that have two or more contouring rotary axes and that can be coordinated simultaneously for "contouring control".

Notes: 1. Stated "positioning accuracy" levels derived under the following procedures from measurements made according to ISO 230/2 (1988) or national equivalents may be used for each machine tool model if provided to, and accepted by, national authorities instead of individual machine tests.

Stated "positioning accuracy" are to be derived as follows:

- a. Select five machines of a model to be evaluated;
 - b. Measure the linear axis accuracies according to ISO 230/2 (1988);
 - c. Determine the accuracy values (A) for each axis of each machine. The method of calculating the accuracy value is described in the ISO 230/2 (1988) standard;
 - d. Determine the average accuracy value of each axis. This average value becomes the stated "positioning accuracy" of each axis for the model ($\hat{A}_x, \hat{A}_y, \dots$);
 - e. Since Item 1.B.2. refers to each linear axis, there will be as many stated "positioning accuracy" values as there are linear axes;
 - f. If any axis of a machine tool not controlled by Items 1.B.2.a., 1.B.2.b., or 1.B.2.c. has a stated "positioning accuracy" of 6 μm or better (less) for grinding machines, and 8 μm or better (less) for milling and turning machines, both according to ISO 230/2 (1988), then the builder should be required to reaffirm the accuracy level once every eighteen months.
2. Item 1.B.2. does not control special purpose machine tools limited to the manufacture of any of the following parts:
- a. Gears
 - b. Crankshafts or cam shafts
 - c. Tools or cutters
 - d. Extruder worms

Technical Notes: 1. *Axis nomenclature shall be in accordance with International Standard ISO 841, "Numerical Control Machines - Axis and Motion Nomenclature".*

2. *Not counted in the total number of contouring axes are secondary parallel contouring axes (e.g., the w-axis on horizontal boring mills or a secondary rotary axis the centerline of which is parallel to the primary rotary axis).*
3. *Rotary axes do not necessarily have to rotate over 360 degrees. A rotary axis can be driven by a linear device, e.g., a screw or a rack-and-pinion.*
4. *For the purposes of 1.B.2. the number of axes which can be coordinated simultaneously for "contouring control" is the number of axes along or around which, during processing of the workpiece, simultaneous and interrelated motions are performed between the workpiece and a tool. This does not include any additional axes along or around which other relative motions within the machine are performed, such as:*
 - a. *Wheel-dressing systems in grinding machines;*
 - b. *Parallel rotary axes designed for mounting of separate workpieces;*
 - c. *Co-linear rotary axes designed for manipulating the same workpiece by holding it in a chuck from different ends.*
5. *A machine tool having at least 2 of the 3 turning, milling or grinding capabilities (e.g., a turning machine with milling capability) must be evaluated against each applicable entry, 1.B.2.a., 1.B.2.b. and 1.B.2.c.*
6. *Items 1.B.2.b.3 and 1.B.2.c.3 include machines based on a parallel linear kinematic design (e.g., hexapods) that have 5 or more axes none of which are rotary axes.*

1.B.3. Dimensional inspection machines, instruments, or systems, as follows:

- a. Computer controlled or numerically controlled coordinate measuring machines (CMM) having both of the following characteristics:
 1. Two or more axes; and
 2. A maximum permissible error of length measurement (E_0 , MPE) along any axis (one dimensional), identified as E_{0x} , E_{0y} , or E_{0z} , equal to or less (better) than $(1.25 + L/1000)$ μm (where L is the measured length in mm) at any point within the operating range of the machine (i.e., within the length of the axis), tested according to ISO 10360-2(2009).
- b. Linear displacement measuring instruments, as follows:
 1. Non-contact type measuring systems with a "resolution" equal to or better (less) than $0.2 \mu\text{m}$ within a measuring range up to 0.2 mm;
 2. Linear variable differential transformer (LVDT) systems having both of the following characteristics:
 - a. "Linearity" equal to or better (less) than 0.1% within a measuring range up to 5 mm; and
 - b. Drift equal to or better (less) than 0.1% per day at a standard ambient test room temperature $\pm 1 \text{ K}$;

3. Measuring systems having both of the following characteristics:
- a. Contain a laser; and
 - b. Maintain for at least 12 hours, over a temperature range of ± 1 K around a standard temperature and a standard pressure:
 1. A "resolution" over their full scale of $0.1 \mu\text{m}$ or better; and
 2. With a "measurement uncertainty" equal to or better (less) than $(0.2 + L/2000) \mu\text{m}$ (L is the measured length in millimeters);

Note: Item 1.B.3.b.3. does not control measuring interferometer systems, without closed or open loop feedback, containing a laser to measure slide movement errors of machine tools, dimensional inspection machines, or similar equipment.

Technical Note: In Item 1.B.3.b. 'linear displacement' means the change of distance between the measuring probe and the measured object.

- c. Angular displacement measuring instruments having an "angular position deviation" equal to or better (less) than 0.00025° ;

Note: Item 1.B.3.c. does not control optical instruments, such as autocollimators, using collimated light (e.g., laser light) to detect angular displacement of a mirror.

- d. Systems for simultaneous linear-angular inspection of hemishells, having both of the following characteristics:
 1. "Measurement uncertainty" along any linear axis equal to or better (less) than $3.5 \mu\text{m}$ per 5 mm; and
 2. "Angular position deviation" equal to or less than 0.02° .

Notes: 1. Item 1.B.3. includes machine tools that can be used as measuring machines if they meet or exceed the criteria specified for the measuring machine function.

2. Machines described in Item 1.B.3. are controlled if they exceed the threshold specified anywhere within their operating range.

Technical Note: All parameters of measurement values in this item represent plus/minus, i.e., not total band.

1.B.4. Controlled atmosphere (vacuum or inert gas) induction furnaces, and power supplies therefor, as follows:

- a. Furnaces having all of the following characteristics:
 1. Capable of operation at temperatures above 1123 K (850°C);
 2. Induction coils 600 mm or less in diameter; and
 3. Designed for power inputs of 5 kW or more;

Note: Item 1.B.4.a. does not control furnaces designed for the processing of semiconductor wafers.

- b. Power supplies, with a specified output power of 5 kW or more, specially designed for

furnaces specified in Item 1.B.4.a.

1.B.5. 'Isostatic presses', and related equipment, as follows:

- a. 'Isostatic presses' having both of the following characteristics:
 1. Capable of achieving a maximum working pressure of 69 MPa or greater; and
 2. A chamber cavity with an inside diameter in excess of 152 mm;
- b. Dies, molds, and controls specially designed for the 'isostatic presses' specified in Item 1.B.5.a.

Technical Notes:

1. *In Item 1.B.5. 'Isostatic presses' means equipment capable of pressurizing a closed cavity through various media (gas, liquid, solid particles, etc.) to create equal pressure in all directions within the cavity upon a workpiece or material.*
2. *In Item 1.B.5. the inside chamber dimension is that of the chamber in which both the working temperature and the working pressure are achieved and does not include fixtures. That dimension will be the smaller of either the inside diameter of the pressure chamber or the inside diameter of the insulated furnace chamber, depending on which of the two chambers is located inside the other.*

1.B.6. Vibration test systems, equipment, and components as follows:

- a. Electrodynamic vibration test systems, having all of the following characteristics:
 1. Employing feedback or closed loop control techniques and incorporating a digital control unit;
 2. Capable of vibrating at 10 g RMS or more between 20 and 2000 Hz; and
 3. Capable of imparting forces of 50 kN or greater measured 'bare table';
- b. Digital control units, combined with "software" specially designed for vibration testing, with a real-time bandwidth greater than 5 kHz and being designed for a system specified in Item 1.B.6.a.;
- c. Vibration thrusters (shaker units), with or without associated amplifiers, capable of imparting a force of 50 kN or greater measured 'bare table', which are usable for the systems specified in Item 1.B.6.a.;
- d. Test piece support structures and electronic units designed to combine multiple shaker units into a complete shaker system capable of providing an effective combined force of 50 kN or greater, measured 'bare table', which are usable for the systems specified in Item 1.B.6.a.

Technical Note: *In Item 1.B.6. 'bare table' means a flat table, or surface, with no fixtures or fittings.*

1.B.7. Vacuum or other controlled atmosphere metallurgical melting and casting furnaces and related equipment, as follows:

- a. Arc remelt and casting furnaces having both of the following characteristics:
 1. Consumable electrode capacities between 1000 and 20000 cm³; and

2. Capable of operating with melting temperatures above 1973 K (1700 °C);

- b. Electron beam melting furnaces and plasma atomization and melting furnaces, having both of the following characteristics:
 - 1. A power of 50 kW or greater; and
 - 2. Capable of operating with melting temperatures above 1473 K (1200 °C);
- c. Computer control and monitoring systems specially configured for any of the furnaces specified in Item 1.B.7.a. or 1.B.7.b.

1.C. MATERIALS

None.

1.D. SOFTWARE

- 1.D.1. "Software" specially designed for the "use" of equipment specified in Item 1.A.3., 1.B.1., 1.B.3., 1.B.5., 1.B.6.a., 1.B.6.b., 1.B.6.d. or 1.B.7.

Note: "Software" specially designed for systems specified in Item 1.B.3.d. includes "software" for simultaneous measurements of wall thickness and contour.

- 1.D.2. "Software" specially designed or modified for the "development", "production", or "use" of equipment specified in Item 1.B.2.

- 1.D.3. "Software" for any combination of electronic devices or system enabling such device(s) to function as a "numerical control" unit capable of controlling five or more interpolating axes that can be coordinated simultaneously for "contouring control".

Notes: 1. "Software" is controlled whether exported separately or residing in a "numerical control" unit or any electronic device or system.

- 2. Item 1.D.3. does not control "software" specially designed or modified by the manufacturers of the control unit or machine tool to operate a machine tool that is not specified in Item 1.B.2.

1.E. TECHNOLOGY

- 1.E.1. "Technology" according to the Technology Controls for the "development", "production" or "use" of equipment, material or "software" specified in 1.A. through 1.D.

2. MATERIALS

2.A. EQUIPMENT, ASSEMBLIES AND COMPONENTS

2.A.1. Crucibles made of materials resistant to liquid actinide metals, as follows:

a. Crucibles having both of the following characteristics:

1. A volume of between 150 cm³ (150 ml) and 8000 cm³ (8 liters); and
2. Made of or coated with any of the following materials, having a purity of 98% or greater by weight:
 - a. Calcium fluoride (CaF₂);
 - b. Calcium zirconate (metazirconate) (CaZrO₃);
 - c. Cerium sulfide (Ce₂S₃);
 - d. Erbium oxide (erbia) (Er₂O₃);
 - e. Hafnium oxide (hafnia) (HfO₂);
 - f. Magnesium oxide (MgO);
 - g. Nitrided niobium-titanium-tungsten alloy (approximately 50% Nb, 30% Ti, 20% W);
 - h. Yttrium oxide (yttria) (Y₂O₃); or
 - i. Zirconium oxide (zirconia) (ZrO₂);

b. Crucibles having both of the following characteristics:

1. A volume of between 50 cm³ (50 ml) and 2000 cm³ (2 liters); and
2. Made of or lined with tantalum, having a purity of 99.9% or greater by weight;

c. Crucibles having all of the following characteristics:

1. A volume of between 50 cm³ (50 ml) and 2000 cm³ (2 liters);
2. Made of or lined with tantalum, having a purity of 98% or greater by weight; and
3. Coated with tantalum carbide, nitride, boride, or any combination thereof.

2.A.2. Platinized catalysts specially designed or prepared for promoting the hydrogen isotope exchange reaction between hydrogen and water for the recovery of tritium from heavy water or for the production of heavy water.

- 2.A.3. Composite structures in the form of tubes having both of the following characteristics:
- a. An inside diameter of between 75 and 400 mm; and
 - b. Made with any of the "fibrous or filamentary materials" specified in Item 2.C.7.a. or carbon prepreg materials specified in Item 2.C.7.c.

2.B. TEST AND PRODUCTION EQUIPMENT

2.B.1. Tritium facilities or plants, and equipment therefor, as follows:

- a. Facilities or plants for the production, recovery, extraction, concentration or handling of tritium;
- b. Equipment for tritium facilities or plants, as follows:
 1. Hydrogen or helium refrigeration units capable of cooling to 23 K (-250 °C) or less, with heat removal capacity greater than 150 W;
 2. Hydrogen isotope storage or purification systems using metal hydrides as the storage or purification medium.

2.B.2. Lithium isotope separation facilities or plants, and equipment therefor, as follows:

- a. Facilities or plants for the separation of lithium isotopes;
- b. Equipment for the separation of lithium isotopes, as follows:
 1. Packed liquid-liquid exchange columns specially designed for lithium amalgams;
 2. Mercury or lithium amalgam pumps;
 3. Lithium amalgam electrolysis cells;
 4. Evaporators for concentrated lithium hydroxide solution.

2.C. MATERIALS

2.C.1. Aluminium alloys having both of the following characteristics:

- a. 'Capable of' an ultimate tensile strength of 460 MPa or more at 293 K (20 °C); and
- b. In the form of tubes or cylindrical solid forms (including forgings) with an outside diameter of more than 75 mm.

Technical Note: In Item 2.C.1. the phrase 'capable of' encompasses aluminium alloys before or after heat treatment.

2.C.2. Beryllium metal, alloys containing more than 50% beryllium by weight, beryllium compounds, manufactures thereof, and waste or scrap of any of the foregoing.

Note: Item 2.C.2. does not control the following:

- a. Metal windows for X-ray machines or for bore-hole logging devices;
- b. Oxide shapes in fabricated or semi-fabricated forms specially designed for electronic component parts or as substrates for electronic circuits;
- c. Beryl (silicate of beryllium and aluminium) in the form of emeralds or aquamarines.

2.C.3. Bismuth having both of the following characteristics:

- a. A purity of 99.99% or greater by weight; and
- b. Containing less than 10 parts per million by weight of silver.

2.C.4. Boron enriched in the boron-10 (¹⁰B) isotope to greater than its natural isotopic abundance, as follows: elemental boron, compounds, mixtures containing boron, manufactures thereof, waste or scrap of any of the foregoing.

Note: In Item 2.C.4. mixtures containing boron include boron loaded materials.

Technical Note: *The natural isotopic abundance of boron-10 is approximately 18.5 weight percent (20 atom percent).*

2.C.5. Calcium having both of the following characteristics:

- a. Containing less than 1000 parts per million by weight of metallic impurities other than magnesium; and
- b. Containing less than 10 parts per million by weight of boron.

2.C.6. Chlorine trifluoride (ClF₃).

2.C.7. "Fibrous or filamentary materials", and prepregs, as follows:

a. Carbon or aramid "fibrous or filamentary materials" having either of the following characteristics:

1. A 'specific modulus' of 12.7×10^6 m or greater; or
2. A 'specific tensile strength' of 23.5×10^4 m or greater;

Note: Item 2.C.7.a. does not control aramid "fibrous or filamentary materials" having 0.25% or more by weight of an ester based fiber surface modifier.

b. Glass "fibrous or filamentary materials" having both of the following characteristics:

1. A 'specific modulus' of 3.18×10^6 m or greater; and

2. A 'specific tensile strength' of 7.62×10^4 m or greater;
- c. Thermoset resin impregnated continuous "yarns", "rovings", "tows" or "tapes" with a width of 15 mm or less (prepregs), made from carbon or glass "fibrous or filamentary materials" specified in Item 2.C.7.a. or Item 2.C.7.b.

Technical Note: *The resin forms the matrix of the composite.*

Technical Notes: 1. In Item 2.C.7. 'Specific modulus' is the Young's modulus in N/m^2 divided by the specific weight in N/m^3 when measured at a temperature of 296 ± 2 K (23 ± 2 °C) and a relative humidity of $50 \pm 5\%$.

2. In Item 2.C.7. 'Specific tensile strength' is the ultimate tensile strength in N/m^2 divided by the specific weight in N/m^3 when measured at a temperature of 296 ± 2 K (23 ± 2 °C) and a relative humidity of $50 \pm 5\%$.

- 2.C.8. Hafnium metal, alloys containing more than 60% hafnium by weight, hafnium compounds containing more than 60% hafnium by weight, manufactures thereof, and waste or scrap of any of the foregoing.
- 2.C.9. Lithium enriched in the lithium-6 (${}^6\text{Li}$) isotope to greater than its natural isotopic abundance and products or devices containing enriched lithium, as follows: elemental lithium, alloys, compounds, mixtures containing lithium, manufactures thereof, waste or scrap of any of the foregoing.

Note: Item 2.C.9. does not control thermoluminescent dosimeters.

Technical Note: *The natural isotopic abundance of lithium-6 is approximately 6.5 weight percent (7.5 atom percent).*

- 2.C.10. Magnesium having both of the following characteristics:
- a. Containing less than 200 parts per million by weight of metallic impurities other than calcium; and
- b. Containing less than 10 parts per million by weight of boron.

- 2.C.11. Maraging steel 'capable of' an ultimate tensile strength of 2050 MPa or more at 293 K (20 °C).

Note: Item 2.C.11. does not control forms in which all linear dimensions are 75 mm or less.

Technical Note: *In Item 2.C.11. the phrase 'capable of' encompasses maraging steel before or after heat treatment.*

- 2.C.12. Radium-226 (${}^{226}\text{Ra}$), radium-226 alloys, radium-226 compounds, mixtures containing radium-226, manufactures thereof, and products or devices containing any of the foregoing.

Note: Item 2.C.12. does not control the following:

- a. Medical applicators;
- b. A product or device containing less than 0.37 GBq of radium-226.

2.C.13. Titanium alloys having both of the following characteristics:

- a. 'Capable of' an ultimate tensile strength of 900 MPa or more at 293 K (20 °C); and
- b. In the form of tubes or cylindrical solid forms (including forgings) with an outside diameter of more than 75 mm.

Technical Note: *In Item 2.C.13. the phrase 'capable of' encompasses titanium alloys before or after heat treatment.*

2.C.14. Tungsten, tungsten carbide, and alloys containing more than 90% tungsten by weight, having both of the following characteristics:

- a. In forms with a hollow cylindrical symmetry (including cylinder segments) with an inside diameter between 100 and 300 mm; and
- b. A mass greater than 20 kg.

Note: Item 2.C.14. does not control manufactures specially designed as weights or gamma-ray collimators.

2.C.15. Zirconium with a hafnium content of less than 1 part hafnium to 500 parts zirconium by weight, as follows: metal, alloys containing more than 50% zirconium by weight, compounds, manufactures thereof, waste or scrap of any of the foregoing.

Note: Item 2.C.15. does not control zirconium in the form of foil having a thickness of 0.10 mm or less.

2.C.16. Nickel powder and porous nickel metal, as follows:

N.B.: For nickel powders which are especially prepared for the manufacture of gaseous diffusion barriers see INFCIRC/254/Part 1 (as amended).

- a. Nickel powder having both of the following characteristics:
 1. A nickel purity content of 99.0% or greater by weight; and
 2. A mean particle size of less than 10 µm measured by the ASTM B 330 standard;
- b. Porous nickel metal produced from materials specified in Item 2.C.16.a.

Note: Item 2.C.16. does not control the following:

- a. Filamentary nickel powders;
- b. Single porous nickel metal sheets with an area of 1000 cm² per sheet or less.

Technical Note: *Item 2.C.16.b. refers to porous metal formed by compacting and sintering the material in Item 2.C.16.a. to form a metal material with fine pores interconnected throughout the structure.*

2.C.17. Tritium, tritium compounds, mixtures containing tritium in which the ratio of tritium to hydrogen atoms exceeds 1 part in 1000, and products or devices containing any of the foregoing.

Note: Item 2.C.17. does not control a product or device containing less than 1.48×10^3 GBq of tritium.

2.C.18. Helium-3 (^3He), mixtures containing helium-3, and products or devices containing any of the foregoing.

Note: Item 2.C.18. does not control a product or device containing less than 1 g of helium-3.

2.C.19. Alpha-emitting radionuclides having an alpha half-life of 10 days or greater but less than 200 years, in the following forms:

- a. Elemental;
- b. Compounds having a total alpha activity of 37 GBq per kg or greater;
- c. Mixtures having a total alpha activity of 37 GBq per kg or greater;
- d. Products or devices containing any of the foregoing.

Note: Item 2.C.19. does not control a product or device containing less than 3.7 GBq of alpha activity.

2.D. SOFTWARE

None

2.E. TECHNOLOGY

2.E.1. "Technology" according to the Technology Controls for the "development", "production" or "use" of equipment, material or "software" specified in 2.A. through 2.D.

3. URANIUM ISOTOPE SEPARATION EQUIPMENT AND COMPONENTS (Other Than Trigger List Items)

3.A. EQUIPMENT, ASSEMBLIES AND COMPONENTS

3.A.1. Frequency changers or generators having all of the following characteristics:

N.B.: Frequency changers and generators especially designed or prepared for the gas centrifuge process are controlled under INFCIRC/254/Part 1 (as amended).

- a. Multiphase output capable of providing a power of 40 W or greater;
- b. Capable of operating in the frequency range between 600 and 2000 Hz;
- c. Total harmonic distortion better (less) than 10%; and
- d. Frequency control better (less) than 0.1%.

Technical Note: *Frequency changers in Item 3.A.1. are also known as converters or inverters.*

3.A.2. Lasers, laser amplifiers and oscillators as follows:

- a. Copper vapor lasers having both of the following characteristics:
 1. Operating at wavelengths between 500 and 600 nm; and
 2. An average output power equal to or greater than 40 W;
- b. Argon ion lasers having both of the following characteristics:
 1. Operating at wavelengths between 400 and 515 nm; and
 2. An average output power greater than 40 W;
- c. Neodymium-doped (other than glass) lasers with an output wavelength between 1000 and 1100 nm having either of the following:
 1. Pulse-excited and Q-switched with a pulse duration equal to or greater than 1 ns, and having either of the following:
 - a. A single-transverse mode output with an average output power greater than 40 W; or
 - b. A multiple-transverse mode output with an average output power greater than 50 W;
 - or
 2. Incorporating frequency doubling to give an output wavelength between 500 and 550 nm with an average output power of greater than 40 W;

- d. Tunable pulsed single-mode dye laser oscillators having all of the following characteristics:
1. Operating at wavelengths between 300 and 800 nm;
 2. An average output power greater than 1 W;
 3. A repetition rate greater than 1 kHz; and
 4. Pulse width less than 100 ns;

- e. Tunable pulsed dye laser amplifiers and oscillators having all of the following characteristics:
1. Operating at wavelengths between 300 and 800 nm;
 2. An average output power greater than 30 W;
 3. A repetition rate greater than 1 kHz; and
 4. Pulse width less than 100 ns;

Note: Item 3.A.2.e. does not control single mode oscillators.

- f. Alexandrite lasers having all of the following characteristics:
1. Operating at wavelengths between 720 and 800 nm;
 2. A bandwidth of 0.005 nm or less;
 3. A repetition rate greater than 125 Hz; and
 4. An average output power greater than 30 W;

- g. Pulsed carbon dioxide lasers having all of the following characteristics:
1. Operating at wavelengths between 9000 and 11000 nm;
 2. A repetition rate greater than 250 Hz;
 3. An average output power greater than 500 W; and
 4. Pulse width of less than 200 ns;

Note: Item 3.A.2.g. does not control the higher power (typically 1 to 5 kW) industrial CO₂ lasers used in applications such as cutting and welding, as these latter lasers are either continuous wave or are pulsed with a pulse width greater than 200 ns.

- h. Pulsed excimer lasers (XeF, XeCl, KrF) having all of the following characteristics:
 - 1. Operating at wavelengths between 240 and 360 nm;
 - 2. A repetition rate greater than 250 Hz; and
 - 3. An average output power greater than 500 W;
- i. Para-hydrogen Raman shifters designed to operate at 16 μm output wavelength and at a repetition rate greater than 250 Hz.

3.A.3. Valves having all of the following characteristics:

- a. A nominal size of 5 mm or greater;
- b. Having a bellows seal; and
- c. Wholly made of or lined with aluminium, aluminium alloy, nickel, or nickel alloy containing more than 60% nickel by weight.

Technical Note: For valves with different inlet and outlet diameter, the nominal size parameter in Item 3.A.3.a. refers to the smallest diameter.

3.A.4. Superconducting solenoidal electromagnets having all of the following characteristics:

- a. Capable of creating magnetic fields greater than 2 T;
- b. A ratio of length to inner diameter greater than 2;
- c. Inner diameter greater than 300 mm; and
- d. Magnetic field uniform to better than 1% over the central 50% of the inner volume.

Note: Item 3.A.4. does not control magnets specially designed for and exported *as part of* medical nuclear magnetic resonance (NMR) imaging systems.

N.B.: *As part of*, does not necessarily mean physical part in the same shipment. Separate shipments from different sources are allowed, provided the related export documents clearly specify the *as part of* relationship.

3.A.5. High-power direct current power supplies having both of the following characteristics:

- a. Capable of continuously producing, over a time period of 8 hours, 100 V or greater with current output of 500 A or greater; and
- b. Current or voltage stability better than 0.1% over a time period of 8 hours.

3.A.6. High-voltage direct current power supplies having both of the following characteristics:

- a. Capable of continuously producing, over a time period of 8 hours, 20 kV or greater with current output of 1 A or greater; and

b. Current or voltage stability better than 0.1% over a time period of 8 hours.

3.A.7. Pressure transducers capable of measuring absolute pressures at any point in the range 0 to 13 kPa and having both of the following characteristics:

a. Pressure sensing elements made of or protected by aluminium, aluminium alloy, nickel, or nickel alloy with more than 60% nickel by weight; and

b. Having either of the following characteristics:

1. A full scale of less than 13 kPa and an “accuracy” of better than $\pm 1\%$ of full scale; or

2. A full scale of 13 kPa or greater and an “accuracy” of better than ± 130 Pa.

Technical Notes: 1. *In Item 3.A.7. pressure transducers are devices that convert pressure measurements into an electrical signal.*

2. *In Item 3.A.7. “accuracy” includes non-linearity, hysteresis and repeatability at ambient temperature.*

3.A.8. Vacuum pumps having all of the following characteristics:

a. Input throat size equal to or greater than 380 mm;

b. Pumping speed equal to or greater than $15 \text{ m}^3/\text{s}$; and

c. Capable of producing an ultimate vacuum better than 13.3 mPa.

Technical Notes: 1. *The pumping speed is determined at the measurement point with nitrogen gas or air.*

2. *The ultimate vacuum is determined at the input of the pump with the input of the pump blocked off.*

3.B. TEST AND PRODUCTION EQUIPMENT

3.B.1. Electrolytic cells for fluorine production with an output capacity greater than 250 g of fluorine per hour.

3.B.2. Rotor fabrication or assembly equipment, rotor straightening equipment, bellows-forming mandrels and dies, as follows:

a. Rotor assembly equipment for assembly of gas centrifuge rotor tube sections, baffles, and end caps;

Note: Item 3.B.2.a. includes precision mandrels, clamps, and shrink fit machines.

- b. Rotor straightening equipment for alignment of gas centrifuge rotor tube sections to a common axis;

Technical Note: In Item 3.B.2.b. such equipment normally consists of precision measuring probes linked to a computer that subsequently controls the action of, for example, pneumatic rams used for aligning the rotor tube sections.

- c. Bellows-forming mandrels and dies for producing single-convolution bellows.

Technical Note: The bellows referred to in Item 3.B.2.c. have all of the following characteristics:

1. Inside diameter between 75 and 400 mm;
2. Length equal to or greater than 12.7 mm;
3. Single convolution depth greater than 2 mm; and
4. Made of high-strength aluminium alloys, maraging steel, or high strength "fibrous or filamentary materials".

3.B.3. Centrifugal multiplane balancing machines, fixed or portable, horizontal or vertical, as follows:

- a. Centrifugal balancing machines designed for balancing flexible rotors having a length of 600 mm or more and having all of the following characteristics:

1. Swing or journal diameter greater than 75 mm;
2. Mass capability of from 0.9 to 23 kg; and
3. Capable of balancing speed of revolution greater than 5000 rpm;

- b. Centrifugal balancing machines designed for balancing hollow cylindrical rotor components and having all of the following characteristics:

1. Journal diameter greater than 75 mm;
2. Mass capability of from 0.9 to 23 kg;
3. Capable of balancing to a residual imbalance equal to or less than 0.010 kg x mm/kg per plane; and
4. Belt drive type.

3.B.4. Filament winding machines and related equipment, as follows:

- a. Filament winding machines having all of the following characteristics:

1. Having motions for positioning, wrapping, and winding fibers coordinated and programmed in two or more axes;

2. Specially designed to fabricate composite structures or laminates from "fibrous or filamentary materials"; and
 3. Capable of winding cylindrical rotors of diameter between 75 and 400 mm and lengths of 600 mm or greater;
- b. Coordinating and programming controls for the filament winding machines specified in Item 3.B.4.a.;
 - c. Precision mandrels for the filament winding machines specified in Item 3.B.4.a.
- 3.B.5. Electromagnetic isotope separators designed for, or equipped with, single or multiple ion sources capable of providing a total ion beam current of 50 mA or greater.

Notes: 1. Item 3.B.5. includes separators capable of enriching stable isotopes as well as those for uranium.

N.B.: A separator capable of separating the isotopes of lead with a one-mass unit difference is inherently capable of enriching the isotopes of uranium with a three-unit mass difference.

2. Item 3.B.5. includes separators with the ion sources and collectors both in the magnetic field and those configurations in which they are external to the field.

Technical Note: *A single 50 mA ion source cannot produce more than 3 g of separated highly enriched uranium (HEU) per year from natural abundance feed.*

- 3.B.6. Mass spectrometers capable of measuring ions of 230 atomic mass units or greater and having a resolution of better than 2 parts in 230, as follows, and ion sources therefor:

N.B.: Mass spectrometers especially designed or prepared for analyzing on-line samples of uranium hexafluoride are controlled under INFCIRC/254/Part 1 (as amended).

- a. Inductively coupled plasma mass spectrometers (ICP/MS);
- b. Glow discharge mass spectrometers (GDMS);
- c. Thermal ionization mass spectrometers (TIMS);
- d. Electron bombardment mass spectrometers which have a source chamber constructed from, lined with or plated with materials resistant to UF₆;
- e. Molecular beam mass spectrometers having either of the following characteristics:
 1. A source chamber constructed from, lined with or plated with stainless steel or molybdenum, and equipped with a cold trap capable of cooling to 193 K (-80 °C) or less; or
 2. A source chamber constructed from, lined with or plated with materials resistant to UF₆;

- f. Mass spectrometers equipped with a microfluorination ion source designed for actinides or actinide fluorides.

3.C. MATERIALS

None.

3.D. SOFTWARE

- 3.D.1. "Software" specially designed for the "use" of equipment specified in Item 3.B.3. or 3.B.4.

3.E. TECHNOLOGY

- 3.E.1. "Technology" according to the Technology Controls for the "development", "production" or "use" of equipment, material or "software" specified in 3.A. through 3.D.

4. HEAVY WATER PRODUCTION PLANT RELATED EQUIPMENT (Other Than Trigger List Items)

4.A. EQUIPMENT, ASSEMBLIES AND COMPONENTS

4.A.1. Specialized packings which may be used in separating heavy water from ordinary water, having both of the following characteristics:

- a. Made of phosphor bronze mesh chemically treated to improve wettability; and
- b. Designed to be used in vacuum distillation towers.

4.A.2. Pumps capable of circulating solutions of concentrated or dilute potassium amide catalyst in liquid ammonia (KNH_2/NH_3), having all of the following characteristics:

- a. Airtight (i.e., hermetically sealed);
- b. A capacity greater than $8.5 \text{ m}^3/\text{h}$; and
- c. Either of the following characteristics:
 1. For concentrated potassium amide solutions (1% or greater), an operating pressure of 1.5 to 60 MPa; or
 2. For dilute potassium amide solutions (less than 1%), an operating pressure of 20 to 60 MPa.

4.A.3. Turboexpanders or turboexpander-compressor sets having both of the following characteristics:

- a. Designed for operation with an outlet temperature of 35 K (-238 °C) or less; and
- b. Designed for a throughput of hydrogen gas of 1000 kg/h or greater.

4.B. TEST AND PRODUCTION EQUIPMENT

4.B.1. Water-hydrogen sulfide exchange tray columns and internal contactors, as follows:

N.B.: For columns which are especially designed or prepared for the production of heavy water, see INFCIRC/254/Part 1 (as amended).

- a. Water-hydrogen sulfide exchange tray columns, having all of the following characteristics:
 1. Can operate at pressures of 2 MPa or greater;
 2. Constructed of carbon steel having an austenitic ASTM (or equivalent standard) grain size number of 5 or greater; and
 3. With a diameter of 1.8 m or greater;

- b. Internal contactors for the water-hydrogen sulfide exchange tray columns specified in Item 4.B.1.a.

Technical Note: Internal contactors of the columns are segmented trays which have an effective assembled diameter of 1.8 m or greater; are designed to facilitate countercurrent contacting and are constructed of stainless steels with a carbon content of 0.03% or less. These may be sieve trays, valve trays, bubble cap trays or turbogrid trays.

- 4.B.2. Hydrogen-cryogenic distillation columns having all of the following characteristics:
 - a. Designed for operation at internal temperatures of 35 K (-238 °C) or less;
 - b. Designed for operation at internal pressures of 0.5 to 5 MPa;
 - c. Constructed of either:
 - 1. Stainless steel of the 300 series with low sulfur content and with an austenitic ASTM (or equivalent standard) grain size number of 5 or greater; or
 - 2. Equivalent materials which are both cryogenic and H₂-compatible; and
 - d. With internal diameters of 1 m or greater and effective lengths of 5 m or greater.

- 4.B.3. Ammonia synthesis converters or synthesis units, in which the synthesis gas (nitrogen and hydrogen) is withdrawn from an ammonia/hydrogen high-pressure exchange column and the synthesized ammonia is returned to said column.

4.C. MATERIALS

None.

4.D. SOFTWARE

None.

4.E. TECHNOLOGY

- 4.E.1. "Technology" according to the Technology Controls for the "development", "production" or "use" of equipment, material or "software" specified in 4.A. through 4.D.

5. TEST AND MEASUREMENT EQUIPMENT FOR THE DEVELOPMENT OF NUCLEAR EXPLOSIVE DEVICES

5.A. EQUIPMENT, ASSEMBLIES AND COMPONENTS

5.A.1. Photomultiplier tubes having both of the following characteristics:

- a. Photocathode area of greater than 20 cm²; and
- b. Anode pulse rise time of less than 1 ns.

5.B. TEST AND PRODUCTION EQUIPMENT

5.B.1. Flash X-ray generators or pulsed electron accelerators having either of the following sets of characteristics:

- a.
 1. An accelerator peak electron energy of 500 keV or greater but less than 25 MeV; and
 2. With a figure of merit (K) of 0.25 or greater; or
- b.
 1. An accelerator peak electron energy of 25 MeV or greater; and
 2. A peak power greater than 50 MW.

Note: Item 5.B.1. does not control accelerators that are component parts of devices designed for purposes other than electron beam or X-ray radiation (electron microscopy, for example) nor those designed for medical purposes.

- Technical Notes:
1. *The figure of merit K is defined as: $K=1.7 \times 10^3 V^{2.65}Q$. V is the peak electron energy in million electron volts. If the accelerator beam pulse duration is less than or equal to 1 μ s, then Q is the total accelerated charge in Coulombs. If the accelerator beam pulse duration is greater than 1 μ s, then Q is the maximum accelerated charge in 1 μ s. Q equals the integral of i with respect to t, over the lesser of 1 μ s or the time duration of the beam pulse ($Q = \int idt$) where i is beam current in amperes and t is the time in seconds.*
 2. *Peak power = (peak potential in volts) x (peak beam current in amperes).*
 3. *In machines based on microwave accelerating cavities, the time duration of the beam pulse is the lesser of 1 μ s or the duration of the bunched beam packet resulting from one microwave modulator pulse.*
 4. *In machines based on microwave accelerating cavities, the peak beam current is the average current in the time duration of a bunched beam packet.*

5.B.2. Multistage light gas guns or other high-velocity gun systems (coil, electromagnetic, and electrothermal types, and other advanced systems) capable of accelerating projectiles to 2 km/s or greater.

5.B.3. Mechanical rotating mirror cameras, as follows, and specially designed components therefor:

- a. Framing cameras with recording rates greater than 225000 frames per second;
- b. Streak cameras with writing speeds greater than 0.5 mm/ μ s.

Note: In Item 5.B.3. components of such cameras include their synchronizing electronics units and rotor assemblies consisting of turbines, mirrors, and bearings.

5.B.4. Electronic streak cameras, electronic framing cameras, tubes and devices, as follows:

- a. Electronic streak cameras capable of 50 ns or less time resolution;
- b. Streak tubes for cameras specified in Item 5.B.4.a.;
- c. Electronic (or electronically shuttered) framing cameras capable of 50 ns or less frame exposure time;
- d. Framing tubes and solid-state imaging devices for use with cameras specified in Item 5.B.4.c., as follows:
 1. Proximity focused image intensifier tubes having the photocathode deposited on a transparent conductive coating to decrease photocathode sheet resistance;
 2. Gate silicon intensifier target (SIT) vidicon tubes, where a fast system allows gating the photoelectrons from the photocathode before they impinge on the SIT plate;
 3. Kerr or Pockels cell electro-optical shuttering;
 4. Other framing tubes and solid-state imaging devices having a fast image gating time of less than 50 ns specially designed for cameras specified in Item 5.B.4.c.

5.B.5. Specialized instrumentation for hydrodynamic experiments, as follows:

- a. Velocity interferometers for measuring velocities exceeding 1 km/s during time intervals of less than 10 μ s;
- b. Manganin gauges for pressures greater than 10 GPa;
- c. Quartz pressure transducers for pressures greater than 10 GPa.

Note: Item 5.B.5.a. includes velocity interferometers such as VISARs (Velocity interferometer systems for any reflector) and DLIs (Doppler laser interferometers).

5.B.6. High-speed pulse generators having both of the following characteristics:

- a. Output voltage greater than 6 V into a resistive load of less than 55 ohms; and
- b. 'Pulse transition time' less than 500 ps.

Technical Note: In Item 5.B.6.b. 'pulse transition time' is defined as the time interval between 10% and 90% voltage amplitude.

5.C. MATERIALS

None.

5.D. SOFTWARE

None.

5.E. TECHNOLOGY

5.E.1. "Technology" according to the Technology Controls for the "development", "production" or "use" of equipment, material or "software" specified in 5.A. through 5.D.

6. COMPONENTS FOR NUCLEAR EXPLOSIVE DEVICES

6.A. EQUIPMENT, ASSEMBLIES AND COMPONENTS

6.A.1. Detonators and multipoint initiation systems, as follows:

a. Electrically driven explosive detonators, as follows:

1. Exploding bridge (EB);
2. Exploding bridge wire (EBW);
3. Slapper;
4. Exploding foil initiators (EFI);

b. Arrangements using single or multiple detonators designed to nearly simultaneously initiate an explosive surface over an area greater than 5000 mm² from a single firing signal with an initiation timing spread over the surface of less than 2.5 μs.

Note: Item 6.A.1. does not control detonators using only primary explosives, such as lead azide.

Technical Note: *In Item 6.A.1. the detonators of concern all utilize a small electrical conductor (bridge, bridge wire, or foil) that explosively vaporizes when a fast, high-current electrical pulse is passed through it. In non-slapper types, the exploding conductor starts a chemical detonation in a contacting high-explosive material such as PETN (pentaerythritoltetranitrate). In slapper detonators, the explosive vaporization of the electrical conductor drives a flyer or slapper across a gap, and the impact of the slapper on an explosive starts a chemical detonation. The slapper in some designs is driven by magnetic force. The term exploding foil detonator may refer to either an EB or a slapper-type detonator. Also, the word initiator is sometimes used in place of the word detonator.*

6.A.2. Firing sets and equivalent high-current pulse generators, as follows:

a. Explosive detonator firing sets designed to drive multiple controlled detonators specified by Item 6.A.1. above;

b. Modular electrical pulse generators (pulsers) having all of the following characteristics:

1. Designed for portable, mobile, or ruggedized-use;
2. Enclosed in a dust-tight enclosure;
3. Capable of delivering their energy in less than 15 μs;
4. Having an output greater than 100 A;
5. Having a 'rise time' of less than 10 μs into loads of less than 40 ohms;

6. No dimension greater than 25.4 cm;
7. Weight less than 25 kg ; and
8. Specified to operate over an extended temperature range of 223 to 373 K (-50 °C to 100 °C) or specified as suitable for aerospace applications.

Note: Item 6.A.2.b. includes xenon flashlamp drivers.

Technical Note: *In Item 6.A.2.b.5. 'rise time' is defined as the time interval from 10% to 90% current amplitude when driving a resistive load.*

6.A.3. Switching devices as follows:

- a. Cold-cathode tubes, whether gas filled or not, operating similarly to a spark gap, having all of the following characteristics:
 1. Containing three or more electrodes;
 2. Anode peak voltage rating of 2.5 kV or more;
 3. Anode peak current rating of 100 A or more; and
 4. Anode delay time of 10 μ s or less;

Note: Item 6.A.3.a. includes gas krytron tubes and vacuum sprytron tubes.

- b. Triggered spark-gaps having both of the following characteristics:
 1. Anode delay time of 15 μ s or less; and
 2. Rated for a peak current of 500 A or more;
- c. Modules or assemblies with a fast switching function having all of the following characteristics:
 1. Anode peak voltage rating greater than 2 kV;
 2. Anode peak current rating of 500 A or more; and
 3. Turn-on time of 1 μ s or less.

6.A.4. Pulse discharge capacitors having either of the following sets of characteristics:

- a.
 1. Voltage rating greater than 1.4 kV;
 2. Energy storage greater than 10 J;
 3. Capacitance greater than 0.5 μ F; and
 4. Series inductance less than 50 nH; or

- b. 1. Voltage rating greater than 750 V;
- 2. Capacitance greater than 0.25 μF ; and
- 3. Series inductance less than 10 nH.

6.A.5. Neutron generator systems, including tubes, having both of the following characteristics:

- a. Designed for operation without an external vacuum system; and
- b. Utilizing electrostatic acceleration to induce a tritium-deuterium nuclear reaction.

6.B. TEST AND PRODUCTION EQUIPMENT

None.

6.C. MATERIALS

6.C.1. High explosive substances or mixtures, containing more than 2 % by weight of any of the following:

- a. Cyclotetramethylenetetranitramine (HMX) (CAS 2691-41-0);
- b. Cyclotrimethylenetrinitramine (RDX) (CAS 121-82-4);
- c. Triaminotrinitrobenzene (TATB) (CAS 3058-38-6);
- d. Hexanitrostilbene (HNS) (CAS 20062-22-0); or
- e. Any explosive with a crystal density greater than 1.8 g/cm^3 and having a detonation velocity greater than 8000 m/s.

6.D. SOFTWARE

None.

6.E. TECHNOLOGY

6.E.1. "Technology" according to the Technology Controls for the "development", "production" or "use" of equipment, material or "software" specified in 6.A. through 6.D.

COMPARISON TABLE OF CHANGES TO THE GUIDELINES FOR NUCLEAR TRANSFERS (INFCIRC/254/Rev. 7/Part 2)

Old	New
<p>1.B.3. Dimensional inspection machines, instruments, or systems, as follows:</p> <p>a. Computer controlled or numerically controlled dimensional inspection machines having both of the following characteristics:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Two or more axes; <u>and</u> 2. A one-dimensional length "measurement uncertainty" equal to or better (less) than $(1.25 + L/1000)$ μm tested with a probe of an "accuracy" of better (less) than $0.2 \mu\text{m}$ (L is the measured length in millimeters) (Ref: VDI/VDE 2617 parts 1 and 2); <p>b. Linear displacement measuring instruments, as follows:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Non-contact type measuring systems with a "resolution" equal to or better (less) than $0.2 \mu\text{m}$ within a measuring range up to 0.2 mm; 2. Linear variable differential transformer (LVDT) systems having both of the following characteristics: <ol style="list-style-type: none"> a. "Linearity" equal to or better (less) than 0.1% within a measuring range up to 5 mm; <u>and</u> b. Drift equal to or better (less) than 0.1% per day at a standard ambient test room temperature $\pm 1 \text{ K}$; 3. Measuring systems having both of the following characteristics: <ol style="list-style-type: none"> a. Contain a laser; <u>and</u> 	<p>1.B.3. Dimensional inspection machines, instruments, or systems, as follows:</p> <p>a. Computer controlled or numerically controlled dimensional inspection machines coordinate measuring machines (CMM) having both of the following characteristics:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Two or more axes; <u>and</u> 2. A one dimensional length "measurement uncertainty" equal to or better (less) than $(1.25 + L/1000)$ μm tested with a probe of an "accuracy" of better (less) than $0.2 \mu\text{m}$ (L is the measured length in millimeters) (Ref: VDI/VDE 2617 parts 1 and 2); 2. <u>A maximum permissible error of length measurement (E_0, MPE) along any axis (one dimensional), identified as $E_{0x}, E_{0y},$ or E_{0z}, equal to or less (better) than $(1.25 + L/1000) \mu\text{m}$ (where L is the measured length in mm) at any point within the operating range of the machine (i.e., within the length of the axis), tested according to ISO 10360-2(2009).</u> <p>b. Linear displacement measuring instruments, as follows:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Non-contact type measuring systems with a "resolution" equal to or better (less) than $0.2 \mu\text{m}$ within a measuring range up to 0.2 mm; 2. Linear variable differential transformer (LVDT) systems having both of the following characteristics:

COMPARISON TABLE OF CHANGES TO THE GUIDELINES FOR NUCLEAR TRANSFERS (INFCIRC/254/Rev. 7/Part 2)

Old	New
<p>b. Maintain for at least 12 hours, over a temperature range of ± 1 K around a standard temperature and a standard pressure:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. A "resolution" over their full scale of $0.1 \mu\text{m}$ or better; <u>and</u> 2. With a "measurement uncertainty" equal to or better (less) than $(0.2 + L/2000) \mu\text{m}$ (L is the measured length in millimeters); <p><u>Note:</u> Item 1.B.3.b.3. does not control measuring interferometer systems, without closed or open loop feedback, containing a laser to measure slide movement errors of machine tools, dimensional inspection machines, or similar equipment.</p> <p><i>Technical Note:</i> In Item 1.B.3.b. 'linear displacement' means the change of distance between the measuring probe and the measured object.</p> <p>c. Angular displacement measuring instruments having an "angular position deviation" equal to or better (less) than 0.00025°;</p> <p><u>Note:</u> Item 1.B.3.c. does not control optical instruments, such as autocollimators, using collimated light (e.g., laser light) to detect angular displacement of a mirror.</p> <p>d. Systems for simultaneous linear-angular inspection of hemishells, having both of the following characteristics:</p>	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> a. "Linearity" equal to or better (less) than 0.1% within a measuring range up to 5 mm; <u>and</u> b. Drift equal to or better (less) than 0.1% per day at a standard ambient test room temperature ± 1 K; <p>3. Measuring systems having both of the following characteristics:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> a. Contain a laser; <u>and</u> b. Maintain for at least 12 hours, over a temperature range of ± 1 K around a standard temperature and a standard pressure: <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. A "resolution" over their full scale of $0.1 \mu\text{m}$ or better; <u>and</u> 2. With a "measurement uncertainty" equal to or better (less) than $(0.2 + L/2000) \mu\text{m}$ (L is the measured length in millimeters); <p><u>Note:</u> Item 1.B.3.b.3. does not control measuring interferometer systems, without closed or open loop feedback, containing a laser to measure slide movement errors of machine tools, dimensional inspection machines, or similar equipment.</p> <p><i>Technical Note:</i> In Item 1.B.3.b. 'linear displacement' means the change of distance between the measuring probe and the measured object.</p>

COMPARISON TABLE OF CHANGES TO THE GUIDELINES FOR NUCLEAR TRANSFERS (INFCIRC/254/Rev. 7/Part 2)

Old	New
<p>1. "Measurement uncertainty" along any linear axis equal to or better (less) than 3.5 μm per 5 mm; <u>and</u></p> <p>2. "Angular position deviation" equal to or less than 0.02°.</p> <p><u>Notes:</u> 1. Item 1.B.3. includes machine tools that can be used as measuring machines if they meet or exceed the criteria specified for the measuring machine function.</p> <p>2. Machines described in Item 1.B.3. are controlled if they exceed the threshold specified anywhere within their operating range.</p> <p><u>Technical Notes:</u></p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. <i>The probe used in determining the measurement uncertainty of a dimensional inspection system shall be as described in VDI/VDE 2617 parts 2, 3 and 4.</i> 2. <i>All parameters of measurement values in this item represent plus/minus, i.e., not total band.</i> 	<p>c. Angular displacement measuring instruments having an "angular position deviation" equal to or better (less) than 0.00025°;</p> <p><u>Note:</u> Item 1.B.3.c. does not control optical instruments, such as autocollimators, using collimated light (e.g., laser light) to detect angular displacement of a mirror.</p> <p>d. Systems for simultaneous linear-angular inspection of hemishells, having both of the following characteristics:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. "Measurement uncertainty" along any linear axis equal to or better (less) than 3.5 μm per 5 mm; <u>and</u> 2. "Angular position deviation" equal to or less than 0.02°. <p><u>Notes:</u> 1. Item 1.B.3. includes machine tools that can be used as measuring machines if they meet or exceed the criteria specified for the measuring machine function.</p> <p>2. Machines described in Item 1.B.3. are controlled if they exceed the threshold specified anywhere within their operating range.</p> <p><u>Technical Notes:</u></p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. The probe used in determining the measurement uncertainty of a dimensional inspection system shall be as described in VDI/VDE 2617 parts 2, 3 and 4. 2. All parameters of

COMPARISON TABLE OF CHANGES TO THE GUIDELINES FOR NUCLEAR TRANSFERS (INFCIRC/254/Rev. 7/Part 2)

Old	New
	<i><u>measurement values in this item represent plus/minus, i.e., not total band.</u></i>