On May 7, 2021, China initiated a virtual discussion at the UN Security Council on the future of the Organization and the international order.
In remarks to the Security Council, Secretary Blinken, after thanking China for the initiative, underlined respect for international commitments, particularly the legally binding ones such as the UN Charter, treaties and conventions, UN Security Council resolutions, international humanitarian law, and the rules and standards agreed to under the auspices of the World Trade Organization and numerous international standard-setting organizations.
He also admitted that “some of our actions in recent years have undermined the rules-based order and led others to question whether we are still committed to it. Rather than take our word for it, we ask the world to judge our commitment by our actions.”[i] In reality, what he downplayed as “some of our actions” is a long list of US interventions incompatible with Secretary Blinken’s definition of the so-called “rules-based international order”. And now, the world is increasingly judging Washington accordingly, not by what it says but by its actions as well as lack of action.
The October 7 Hamas onslaught was a shock to Israel. It was Israel’s 9/11. Because successive Israeli governments, and mostly the longest-serving prime minister had led the people of Israel to believe that the challenges to their security and the two-state solution were things of the past, or at least became manageable, that peace with the Arab world was around the corner. Thus, the Israeli government reacted to the shock with a massive bombardment of the Gaza Strip killing more than 21,000 Gazans. Last week, Israel claimed that 8,000 Hamas fighters had been killed in the war so far. Assuming that the claim is correct, that leaves more than 13,000 civilians, including thousands of children, who lost their lives in a war with no end in sight.
Before the war in Gaza, Israelis were politically divided. Massive demonstrations against Mr. Netanyahu’s far-right government had become routine protests. But now, Israelis are faced with serious immediate and long-term questions. How long will the war in Gaza last? What about the hostages? Do they matter to the Prime Minister or are they a lost cause? What is the dictate of national unity at the moment? Rallying behind Mr. Netanyahu or pushing for a government change? What are the options for a new government? What about the world’s reaction to the civilian deaths in Gaza? And what about the long-term, the two-state solution, the question of demographics, and the regional threats? What are Mr. Netanyahu’s plans for the West Bank? There are no easy answers or magic solutions. Finding the answers and moving closer to national consensus will take time and Mr. Netanyahu knows that.
So far, the US has stood solidly behind Israel. Visits to the region by Secretary Blinken, Secretary Austin, and senior White House officials, Washington’s calls for respect for civilian lives were distractions to allow the Netanyahu government enough time to achieve its objectives. Washington vetoed two UN Security Council resolutions and finally abstained in the vote on resolution 2720 (2023). Nobody has paid the slightest attention to this resolution because it was far short of expectations. However, the unexpected level of Hamas resistance in Gaza, Israeli statements that the war would continue, and the world reaction to the Israeli military campaign have put Washington in a corner.
Mr. Netanyahu’s prerequisites for peace are the destruction of Hamas, the demilitarization of Gaza, and the deradicalization of the whole of Palestinian society. However, for a good number of Middle East observers that is mission impossible. Does Washington have a clear-cut understanding of what exactly Mr. Netanyahu intends to do in the months ahead? Probably not. Does Washington have any possibility whatsoever of convincing Mr. Netanyahu to change course? No.
Moreover, the risks of regional escalation cannot be overlooked. The Israeli Defense Minister Yoav Gallant recently said that Israel was coming under attack from seven theatres: Gaza, Syria, Lebanon, the West Bank, Iraq, Yemen, and Iran.
On December 26, the US conducted airstrikes targeting facilities used by Kataib Hezbollah, a militia group in Iraq that is considered a proxy of Iran. According to Washington, about 3,500 US troops remain in Iraq and Syria to prevent a resurgence of the Islamic State (IS). The reality is ISIS was a product of the US invasion of Iraq and American troop presence in Iraq and Syria has nothing to do with ISIS. They are there for a bigger separatist project. The truth is that the Syrian government has a greater interest in eliminating ISIS than any other country.
Strikes and counterstrikes along the border Lebanese border between Israel and Hezbollah could spin out of control.
Security of shipping in the Red Sea is another problem with continuing Houthi drone attacks. On Sunday US forces sank three Houthi boats and killed those aboard. At some point, the Houthis may become the likelier target of a message to Tehran.
As for the war in Ukraine, developments are not encouraging. Kyiv has experienced setbacks not only on the battlefield but also in the provision of assistance by the US and the EU as President Zelensky’s last visit to Washington has shown. Interestingly, every time Mr. Zelensky visits the White House, one sees pictures of him and President Biden, usually with the latter’s arm over the shoulder of the latter. Those are revealing pictures.
On December 26, Russia’s large landing ship Novocherkassk was struck in Crimea by Ukrainian aircraft carrying guided missiles. Three days later, at least 30 people were killed and many were wounded in Russia’s missile bombardment and Ukraine responded. This “timely” escalation might remind the US lawmakers that all is not quiet on the eastern front and help President Biden to push the Ukraine aid package through Congress. Nonetheless, support for the war seems to be waning. It also appears that the Europeans are getting weary of the war and probably think that Ukraine’s future membership in the EU will compensate for its losses in the war, except for the lives lost.
Last week Indian Foreign Minister Jaishankar visited Moscow where he had extensive and cordial talks with the Russian side and also met with President Putin. In remarks to the press, Foreign Minister Lavrov said that the talks reaffirmed the trust-based nature of Moscow’s relations with New Delhi, which are rooted in mutual respect and immune to momentary fluctuations. India, soon to become the world’s fourth global power, emphasizes a multipolar order and understandably wants to become a permanent member of the UN Security Council, an objective supported by Russia.
In June 2022, during an interview at the 17th edition of the GLOBSEC Bratislava Forum, when questioned about India’s position on the war in Ukraine, Mr. Jaishankar made headlines by saying, “… Somewhere Europe has to grow out of the mindset that Europe’s problems are the world’s problems but world’s problems are not Europe’s problems…”
The Biden administration is not only faced with the wars in Ukraine and Gaza but also domestic political challenges. The presidential election is only ten months away but the competitors for the 2025 White House are far from inspiring confidence, Mr. Trump with the legacy of the Capitol attack and Mr. Biden with questions about his age.
Mr. Biden was President Obama’s Vice President for eight years. Unlike Vice President Kamala Harris, he was, more often than not, on stage with Mr. Obama. In other words, Mr. Obama paved Mr. Biden’s way to the White House. Mr. Biden will finish his four years at the White House at the end of 2024 and is likely to run again for president. But there may still be surprises on both the Democratic and the Republican fronts.
Finally, a word on Türkiye’s stance on the war in Gaza. All one has heard from Ankara since October 7 is extreme political rhetoric based on the assumption that Mr. Netanyahu will soon have to leave the stage. However, such rhetoric is not a good investment in future relations with any new Israeli government. It is counterproductive. Why is it that senior Turkish officials have not visited Tel Aviv to tell the Israeli government to agree to a ceasefire and respect international humanitarian law? Why have they not warned them face-to-face and in good faith about the extremely negative regional consequences of the war? Why have they not told their Israeli interlocutors that nothing justifies such a humanitarian catastrophe? Such an approach, but not endless rhetoric, could have secured them a place in some future peace process. Qatar does not have diplomatic relations with Israel, Hamas leaders are in Doha, yet Qatar has played an essential role in negotiating the truce and the hostage-prisoner exchanges. Whatever the chances, Egypt is offering plans to stop the fighting. Does Ankara’s vocal support for Hamas and the Muslim Brotherhood rhyme with the policies of Egypt and the Gulf states? No.
To ask bluntly, where was Türkiye in the flurry of diplomacy since October 7 beyond a “contribution” to the release of Thai migrant workers who were taken hostage by Hamas probably by mistake in the heat of the attack?
Was Ankara on stage? No. Backstage? No. It was among the audience, but only up on the balcony.
Yesterday, Israel’s Supreme Court struck down a law passed by Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s right-wing government to limit the Court’s powers. This is what the Turkish government and the people of Türkiye must watch, not from the balcony but from the first row.
[i] https://www.state.gov/secretary-antony-j-blinken-virtual-remarks-at-the-un-security-council-open-debate-on-multilateralism/
